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From Patron-Client to Client-Server

e-democracy in Tanzania?

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Abstract

This thesis is a first explorative study of the existence of e-democracy in Africa. E-democracy means that information- and communication technology (ICT) is used in political processes to enhance transparency and participation. The case studied is Tanzania, a transitional democracy that is marginalised in the global information society.

Given the conditions set by the digital divide, this thesis argues that e-democracy in Tanzania should mainly focus on providing public information to the political elite. This way, political pluralism would increase. However, community telecentres could be used for experimental citizen panels. This way, a limited deliberative quality could also be added.

The empirical study found that both government and parliament are developing ambitious web sites. There are also plans to computerise both institutions. The initiatives have mainly been carried out without donor -involvement and a strong ownership has been detected in both institutions. The democratic value of the web sites is so far limited, as little information is online and there are no interactive applications. Further developed, they could however make a difference for democracy in Tanzania.

Several of the political parties are developing or have already developed web sites. The target group is however mostly foreigners or Tanzanians abroad. One exception is the party NCCR that has an ambitious plan for computerising the party organisation. Most opposition parties have great faith in that the Internet could improve democracy in Tanzania. Still, some of them argue for censorship of web content.

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Introduction

Democracy has never been as widely spread and acknowledged as it is today. At the same time, democracy is considered to be in a deep crisis in the western world. Political participation is going down, while trust in institutions, parties and politicians is declining. Some argue that the representative political system still functions quite well, though one has to use new means for mobilising people. Others claim that the entire political system has to be changed. The representative system is said to give too much power to the elite, while leaving citizens to only react and say no. According to them, democracy is too thin.

Both schools of thought see the Internet as an important tool to help solve the problems that democracy is facing. It can be used both for attracting new party members and voters, as well as for involving citizens in the process of policymaking. E-democracy can both mobilise people and let them rule.

E-democracy has landed high on the political agenda in the industrialised world. Large research efforts are made to clarify what role e-democracy plays and could play. In a recent conference in Stockholm on “Democracy and the Information Revolution”, delegates from the developing world complained that the discussions went over their heads. “The more I listened the more depressed I became about how this is divorced from our own reality,” an opposition MP from Zimbabwe said. “It is a matter of priorities. How can you put 5 million dollars into buying solar panels for information technology in a village when you need bore-holes to provide water to the community?”¹

The man is undoubtedly right when he points at the limits that poverty sets for e-democracy in Africa. Does this mean that opposition parties in Africa are not using e-mail, or that governments do not put up web sites? Is e-democracy irrelevant for further democratisation of Africa’s transitional states? As little academic attention has been directed towards the transitional democracies in the developing world, we do not really know.

This thesis sets out to bring some insight into how state institutions and political parties use the Internet, and how it is conceived as tool for democracy in this marginalised part of the world. The case selected is Tanzania, a country in sub-Saharan Africa, poor in both information and democracy. Multiparty-elections is a quite new phenomenon in this country, after 30 years of one-party rule. The political scene is still dominated by the same party as before the elections and Tanzania is far from a consolidated democracy. Also the Internet is new in this country. Still, there are about 300 to 400 Internet-café’s in Dar es Salaam. Let us see if the Internet has spread to Tanzania’s political world.

¹ Matume, Gumisai, [2001], “Information Technology for Whom?”.
www.idea.int/2001_forum/feature_0629.htm 2001-12-08

Definitions

Some key concepts will be defined here, while other concepts will be defined as they appear.

Information and communication technology (ICT) refers to digital technology used for handling information and aid communication. Examples of ICTs are computers connected in networks, mobile phones etc. The ICT studied in this thesis is the Internet.

The Internet is a global digital network, which offers several different services. In this thesis it mainly refers to the World Wide Web and e-mail.

Democracy will be given several meanings, as this thesis moves on. A minimum definition that will be used is however Robert Dahl's definition of a polyarchy. It demands elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, the right to access alternative information, and associational autonomy.²

E-commerce, e-government or e-democracy?

There are a lot of discussions about e- these days³. Two commonly used terms are *e-commerce* and *e-government*. *E-democracy* has so far been less used, but is in the focus of this thesis. How do the three concepts relate to each other, from a government point of view? Catherine Needham presents a good distinction in *Figure 1*.

*Figure 1: Government on the Internet*⁴

E-commerce	E-government	E-democracy
Policies to encourage and facilitate the adoption of ICTs by business.	Strategies to put government online. - Information provision - Service delivery	Policies to expand democratic participation. - E-voting - E-consultation
Users as Consumers	Users as Consumer-Citizens	Users as Citizens

E-commerce is mainly performed by the private sector. From a government point of view, e-commerce is when commerce over the net is regulated and encouraged by government. Sometimes the government is even performing income-generating activities itself, such as providing services to tourists and investors. In all these cases, the users of e-commerce are seen as consumers. *E-government* is when the government uses ICT to deliver services and inform citizens. It is difficult to decide if the user is seen as a citizen or a consumer. For example, a Swedish municipality web site normally contains both minutes from council meetings and information about the opening hours of the local library. *E-democracy* is clearly focusing on the use of ICTs in political processes, and the users are seen as citizens. To summarise the main difference between e-government and e-democracy, one can say that the first is about output of the political process, while the later is about input.⁵

² Dahl, Robert, [1989], *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, London, p. 221.

³ The e- stands for electronic.

⁴ Needham, Catherine, [2001], "E-consultation in the UK and the USA: Electronic Democracy Beyond the Vote". <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3/needham.pdf> 2001-09-14, p. 6.

⁵ Needham, 2001, p. 5-7.

Needham is using a quite narrow definition of e-democracy applications: e-voting and e-consultation. This thesis uses a wider definition. Applications of e-democracy can be:

- Legislation that protects freedom of expression on the Internet
- The state providing access to public information online
- Voting online
- Referendums online
- Opinion polls online
- The state consulting citizens in online citizen panels, focus groups, open discussion forums etc.
- Citizens contacting individual politicians online, through e-mail, chatting etc.

These applications should be considered as basic ideal-types of e-democracy. In reality there are various mixed and integrated solutions; an online referendum can for example be combined with discussion forums and public information online. There are also various technical solutions that will not be discussed further in this thesis.⁶ An application that however might need further presentation is *citizen consultations* online. They can vary in terms of participants, aim and quality of the discussion. The *citizen panel* consists of a sample of the population, while other consultations focus on citizens that will be affected by a decision, or are simply open to all citizens. Consultations can have formal status as advisory, but they can also be used more informally, which is often the case with *focus groups*. The quality of the discussion can vary depending on the ambitions of deliberation.

The concept of e-democracy will also be widened in terms of who undertakes it. In its classical definition, the state and its institutions exercise democracy. E-democracy is thus about the relation between these institutions and its citizens. However, political parties that compete about taking over the rule of the state, and utilise ICTs in so doing (for example through having online discussion forums for members, or publishing party manifestos on their web sites), can also be seen as using some kind of e-democracy. To widen the concept even more, one could include the activities by civil society and the free media. These groups are not contesting for the power of the state, but are clearly related to the existence of democracy. Since it is quite uncommon that parliaments uphold discussion forums for people online, newspapers are often the ones that provide a national discussion forum online for current events. E-communities can also be consulted by the state on policy issues. This thesis will however limit itself to only studying state institutions and political parties.

Sometimes e-democracy is said to include information support systems for politicians, as well as election-monitoring and other applications. As a citizen/party member perspective on e-democracy is used in this thesis, those applications are kept outside the study. However, when assessing how advanced an institution is in using ICTs, such applications might also be taken into account.

Aim and question

This thesis sets out to give a first insight into the presence of e-democracy in Tanzania. The knowledge gathered should be seen as a foundation for further studies of e-democracy in Africa. There was little evidence of any larger e-democracy initiatives in state institutions or political parties when the investigation began (at least to be found on the Internet). Therefore

⁶ For a good overview of different forms of e-democracy and technical solutions, see www.bowlingtogether.net.

the scope of the investigation is not to study the impact of e-democracy in Tanzania, but rather to get an overview of how e-democracy is used and how it is conceived. To establish a framework for the study, issues of feasibility and desirability of e-democracy in Tanzania will also be discussed. The thesis is thus mainly descriptive, though there will also be room for interpretation and normative stands.

Three main questions are asked regarding e-democracy in state institutions and political parties in Tanzania. The first question is mainly theoretical while the two following are empirical:

1. What function could e-democracy fill in Tanzania?
2. How do state institutions and political parties use the Internet?
3. What policies do political parties have for e-democracy?

Selection and demarcations

Tanzania was picked as a representative case for sub-Saharan Africa, as it is a developing country in a democratic transition that is also marginalised in the global information society. Given the limited knowledge we have about e-democracy in Africa, there is no ambition to generalise the results to other African states. This case study might however serve as a reference for further studies.

To grasp the full picture of e-democracy in Tanzania, both state institutions and political parties were selected. This broad approach was also based on the assumption of a limited occurrence of e-democracy initiatives. The state institutions are the union parliament and government. For the government, technical staff and an information officer were interviewed. In parliament, administrative staff, as well as several MPs were interviewed. All parties with representatives in parliament were studied. Initially interviews with MPs from each party were thought to give a sufficiently clear picture of how the parties use the Internet and attitudes towards e-democracy. Many MPs however proved to have low awareness of both these areas. For this reason, interviews were also made with people in the party boards. Where applicable and possible, interviews were made with people working with party web sites. When assessing CCM's policy, an interview was also made with the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Communications and Transport, to see what policies CCM makes in reality. This is relevant, since the party is the dominant political power in Tanzania, closely connected to the state. Considering the marginal opposition and the absence of powerful checks and balances, there are basically only financial restrictions on what policies CCM can pull through. Therefore, CCM's policies should be interpreted together with government policies.

When it comes to demarcations, the investigation does not cover the Zanzibar government and assembly. As all political parties have to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, no demarcation has to be made for parties on Zanzibar.

Method

The theoretical question of what function e-democracy could fill in Tanzania is answered in a discussion that is mainly based on secondary material. The discussion combines theory of e-democracy and theory of democratic transition and consolidation with the social, political and technological conditions found in Tanzania. The answers for my empirical questions were mainly sought in semi-structured interviews with representatives for state institutions and

political parties. The interviews were carried out on place in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in June and July 2001. Besides interviews, relevant web sites were also visited and assessed. The visits were generally carried out in November and December 2001. A list of the web sites is presented in the end of the thesis.

When assessing how state institutions and political parties use the Internet, four issues were studied; e-readiness and future plans for use of the Internet, how democratic Internet-initiatives are, at whom are they aiming, and how institutionalised the initiatives are. Interviews with technical staff played an important role here, as they were expected to give a good insight into the level of institutionalisation of e-democracy initiatives.

The interviews about policies on e-democracy had a less structured character than those about use of the Internet. As the interviewees did generally not know the concept e-democracy, the term “Internet supporting democracy” was often used instead. The interviewees were confronted with a number of proposals, such as “Should the Internet be used for citizen consultations”. From these proposals, the interviewees were encouraged to speak freely and develop issues that were important to them. The results should thus not be considered as hard scientific data, but rather as insights into how parties in Tanzania conceive e-democracy. What is desirable? What is important? What is realistic? This kind of insight is necessary for understanding the use of e-democracy in Tanzania.

Some difficulties occurred in the interviews. One was that the level of knowledge about the Internet varied highly. Therefore I was not always really sure how well the interviewees had understood the questions. In some cases, the very idea of e-democracy seemed new, why I might have interacted with the study-object. This difference in knowledge is also problematic for how representative a spokesperson is for his party. Chance becomes a factor for if the spokesperson will be an Internet-user or not; and thus also for how a party’s policies will be conceived by me. Another related issue is the lack of coherent policies regarding ICT and e-democracy expressed in party manifestos. Even though the person interviewed was IT-literate, did he really express the views of the party, or was it rather personal opinions? These concerns must be seen in the light of that ICT is quite new in Tanzania, and that political parties have a low level of institutionalisation. I have tried to control for these difficulties by interviewing people from the party leadership; if the leadership is uninterested or ignorant of ICT, the party is likely to be so too.

Disposition

The following chapter will deal with the theory of this thesis; that is e-democracy, democratic transitions and consolidations and the digital divide. Thereafter the case Tanzania will be introduced, with emphasis on the political situation and the country’s e-readiness level. The next chapter contains a theoretical discussion on what function e-democracy could fill in Tanzania, with examples for state institutions and political parties. Then the results of the empirical study are presented and analysed. Finally some conclusive remarks are made.

Two schools of theory plus a digital divide

The first section of theory is about e-democracy. To better understand the different functions e-democracy can fill, it will be discussed with four basic models of democracy as reference points. Then theory for how ICT affects institutions and organisations is presented, ending with a presentation of research focusing specifically at government institutions and political parties. In the second section, theory on democratic transition and consolidation is presented. It deals with democratic transitions in general, African regimes, and what role ICTs play in transitions. The third section is about the digital divide. The digital divide is not really a school of theory, but rather a phenomenon that strongly affects the preconditions for e-democracy in developing countries. Here, attention is given to the divide on a global, as well as on a national level. But let us start with the four models of democracy.

Theory of e-democracy

Four models of democracy

Elite-democracy in Schumpeter's tradition does not consider democracy to be a moral necessity; it is rather a way of making political decisions. With this economical view of politics, a general public opinion is considered unrealistic. The output of politics is thus essential, while input is more or less uninteresting. People are generally not seen as very interested in politics, and an extensive involvement in the political process is not really desirable. The citizen's function is to vote every few years, and thereby make sure that there is a circulation between the competing elites. Emphasis is put on a correct procedure of voting. In-between elections, politicians are the one's that should be active, while citizens are merely supposed to scrutinise the politicians.⁷

Elite-democracy's main interest in e-democracy is to simplify scrutiny of the government through online access to public documents. Internet-voting can also make the voting process easier. Another important aspect is that party web sites will make it easier for people to access information about political alternatives. This way, the cost for running a political party will be reduced and the competition between parties is likely to increase.⁸ On the whole though, elite-democracy is more interested in e-government than e-democracy.

Representative liberal democracy could be considered the mainstream model of democracy. As in elite democracy, the aim for politics is to produce outputs, but the democratic procedure is seen as a moral necessity. The idea of equal citizens demands political equality and thus the right to vote. People's main direct involvement in the political process is still voting, but the view of citizens is more optimistic. Citizens are thus encouraged to be active in the political parties and participate in the public discussion on how society should be run. There is scepticism towards relying on referendums and political activity outside the parliamentary system.

When faced with e-democracy, representative liberal democracy looks pretty much like elite democracy. However, people's participation in parties is more active, for example through

⁷ SOU 2000:1, *En uthållig demokrati*, Demokratiutredningen, p. 21.

⁸ Åström, Joachim, [2001], "Digital Democracy: Ideas, Intentions and Initiatives in Swedish Local Governments". www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3.htm 2001-04-27, p. 6-7.

internal online voting on candidates, and online policy discussions. Politicians are also supposed to keep contact with its electorate through personal web sites and e-mail.

Deliberative democracy can be seen as an extension of representative liberal democracy, and is gaining more and more followers from that model. The main feature of deliberative democracy is that it considers discussion and debate as being the very core of democracy. Opinions are not set; they are developed through deliberations with other citizens. In the deliberative ideal, the public opinion is developed in an inclusive, open discussion between equals. It is not necessary that everyone participates, but all opinions must be heard. One central idea is that preferences are “washed” when expressed in public, as people then tend to avoid illegitimate arguments, like prejudices. Over time, people are supposed to adjust their thoughts and attitudes to what they say. The most concrete contribution of deliberative democracy is the citizen panel, where a randomly picked sample of citizens meet in a moderated, informed discussion over an actual political matter. In the end of the discussion, the participants are supposed to vote, and the results will be used as advice for political decisions within the parliamentary system. The idea is that the citizen panel represents the voice of the people, as it had been if everyone would have had time to study and debate an issue.⁹ In contrast to participatory democracy, deliberative democracy wants a thicker kind of participation.

When it comes to e-democracy, deliberative democracy is naturally focusing on citizen panels online. A major advantage with the net is that people are able to participate no matter where they live. Anonymity can also be an advantage, as the room for prejudice will be reduced, thus increasing the role of the argument. This is however a contradiction to the idea of “washing” preferences, as you don’t have to stand up for your views publicly. Civil society and the media can also organise moderated online discussions that are deliberative; though not directly part of a decision. Quick online referendums on political issues are however rejected as a shallow kind of participation; e-democracy should lead to higher quality of decisions, not increased speed.

Participatory democracy has its roots in the original Greek democracy, where every citizen was supposed to directly participate in all decisions of the city-state. Over time, the number of citizens increased, as well as the complexity of the political issues, thus making the way for a representative democracy. The modern movement for participatory democracy argues for extensive decentralisation, citizen initiatives and decisive referendums. Citizens are believed to have a large interest in politics, and participation should be part of daily life. If people are passive, it is seen as a result of lack of opportunities for participation¹⁰. The republican ideal, where participation creates educated and engaged citizens, is celebrated. For participatory democracy, participation itself is more important than the output of politics.

E-democracy is often seen as the New Hope for participatory democracy. It will allow the entire population to directly take part in the national decision-making, and also give new life to local democracy. Radical proponents want to replace the representative system with online decisive referendums, while more moderate followers argue for increased use of online advisory referendums and citizen initiatives. Increased access to information is important, to

⁹ SOU 2001:48, *Att vara med på riktigt – demokratiutveckling i kommuner och landsting*, Kommundemokratikommittén, p. 362.

¹⁰ SOU 2001:48, p. 22.

allow for participation. A key obstacle for participatory democracy is that everyone does not have access to the Internet.

The models are summarised in *Figure 2*. Let us now go from what role e-democracy *should* play to what role it really *could* play; we have to study how technology relates to institutions and organisations.

Figure 2: Democracy models and e-democracy

Model of democracy	Elite democracy	Representative liberal democracy	Deliberative democracy	Participatory democracy
Main democratic value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Circulation of power through voting - Upholding of individual integrity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political equality through voting - Participation between elections through parties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political equality through voting - Active citizens between elections, through citizen panels and participation in the public debate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Realisation of the republican citizenship through direct democracy
Main applications of e-democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online access to information for scrutinising the government - Information to voters about political alternatives - Voting online 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourage participation in political parties through web sites with discussion forums - Strengthen connections between politicians and the electorate through e-mail and web sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Moderated citizen panels online, with advisory status - Public debate online 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online referendums - Online opinion polls - Online access to information for individual participation
E-democracy in one word	- Information	- Information	- Consultation	- Decision

Defining institutions, organisations and the Internet

What is an institution? According to new institutionalism, institutions facilitate human interaction over time; they are the rules of the game. Institutions can be formal, such as a parliament, a government or a constitution, but they can also be informal relations between actors, such as the state and interest groups. Douglass North argues that institutions do not evolve towards efficiency, but rather towards preserving the status of those in society who make the rules.¹¹ It is important to distinguish between organisations and institutions.

Organisations consist of groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. They are actors that work within the frames set by institutions. To make an example, a political party is an institution in the sense that it is the channel between the citizen and the state. The party aggregates citizen's preferences, and brings them to the state. They also create legitimacy for the political system among citizens. When studying a party's organisation, one focuses on internal relations between members, elected leaders and the party bureaucracy.

¹¹ North, Douglass, [1990], *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Since relations between institutions and actors are sustained by and reflected in complex sets of information flows,¹² it should theoretically be possible for ICTs to change institutions. Before continuing this discussion, we should however try to define some characteristics of the Internet, which is the ICT studied in this thesis. This, in order to better appreciate the Internet's potential of affecting institutions. The Internet, as a technology:

- Has a membership characterised by anarchy
- Has a content that is very difficult to control
- Increases the speed and quantity of communication
- Reduces transaction costs drastically over time
- Reduces the importance of space in time and room for communication
- Offers anonymity which reduces the importance of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and class in social interaction
- Gives younger generations an advantage over older generations, since they generally find it easier to learn how to use digital technology
- Creates horizontal instead of vertical flows of information
- Is an interactive medium for communication, reducing the importance of concepts like sender and receiver

How technology affects institutions and organisations

The list of characteristics presented above is quite powerful, which by intuition implies that the Internet should be able to have quite a large impact on institutions, and thus also democracy. There are however differences on this issue. *Optimists* and *pessimists* make up two general schools of thought. *Optimists* believe that ICT have a large democratic potential, especially when it comes to creating new channels of communication between political institutions and citizens. It is argued that technological innovation will create new political needs and demands. When people get used to communicating horizontally in their daily life, they will also demand more of this in the political world. This will lead to changes in political conditions.¹³ *Optimists* are often said to be technology-determinists, believing that intrinsic features of technology will create political change. *Pessimists* argue that it is unlikely that ICTs will have such a great impact on democracy. They often refer to the *reinforcement thesis*, which derives from new institutionalism. The reinforcement thesis means that institutions tend to tame new technology and shape it after their own purposes. Technology is thus a tool for the reinforcement of existing power structures. When technology is adopted it is done in a harmless way, that does not threaten the current order.¹⁴

Research so far tends to support the reinforcement thesis (or at least reject optimism). For example, a study made on e-government in Swedish municipalities concluded that most municipalities were much better at e-government than e-democracy. Only a small number of municipalities had moderated discussion forums on their web sites. Many municipalities published minutes from council meetings, though it was uncommon with information about matters that were to be processed.¹⁵

¹² Lenk, Klaus [1998], "Book review: Bellamy Taylor", ICS. www.infosoc.co.uk/reviews/00104br4.htm 2001-04-27

¹³ Grönlund, Kimmo, [2001], "Do new ICTs Demand more Responsive Governance?" www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3.htm 2001-04-27, p. 7.

¹⁴ Bellamy, Christine & Raab, Charles, [1999], "Wiring-up the Deck-Chairs?". *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3, July, pp. 518-534.

¹⁵ SKTF, [2001], "Om demokratiska processer och offentlig service på Sveriges kommuners webbplatser." www.sktf.se/media/rapporter/2001/rapport_2_2001.pdf 2001-12-28

Technology is likely to have more impact on organisations than on institutions, as they overall are easier to reform. This can not least be seen in the dramatic changes that have appeared in offices since PCs were introduced twenty years ago. Also here, however, social structures set the limits for what impact technology will have.

Organisations can utilise from ICT in two main ways. The first is that they do what they do now, but faster and better, for example through marketing online. The other way is to use ICT for organisational innovation. The Internet is then seen as a part of the environment where the organisation grows, and the organisation develops into some kind of network-organisation. There are several kinds of network-organisations, and in its highest form the organisation consists of teams that exist over project life spans. Exchange of information is essential for the organisation, and all members need to have equal access. In this organisation, an entirely new culture is built.¹⁶

A reason to reconsider the reinforcement thesis; the time factor

There seems to be good support for the reinforcement thesis in the current research on e-democracy. However, the time factor is seldom mentioned in this research. Throughout 2001, different political entities in Sweden have used the Internet for multifaceted consultations of citizens and members. Several municipalities have consulted citizens on concrete issues. The municipality of Kalix asked its citizens to vote on the local tax level, received a higher turnout than what was measured in the elections to the European parliament in the same municipality. The Swedish Social Democratic Youth Organisation invited all its members to discuss how the organisation could be developed, and the conservative party, Moderaterna, asked the entire population to participate in their internal nomination election for the upcoming general elections. More examples could be given, also from large, institutionalised popular movements, such as trade unions. Many of them challenge the reinforcement thesis, as citizens and members have been trusted with new roles. How could this be explained? One answer is that institutions, instead of taming technology, are rather slow in adapting to it. So far, a lot of e-democracy initiatives have been experimental, driven by enthusiasts. It takes time to create an institutional ownership. Another answer would be that there has not been any well-working commercial e-democracy applications available on the market until now. E-democracy might also be a field where research lags behind reality, and where a lot of research will have to be rejected after a few years. The rapid development and diffusion of technology changes the preconditions for e-democracy. Also this thesis must thus be seen in the light of that.

Research on state institutions and ICT

A study of how three parliaments utilise ICTs gives support for the reinforcement thesis. In a comparison between the US House, the German Bundestag and the Swedish Riksdagen, it was found that no parliament polled citizens on policy issues. There were ideas in the US House to try to foster dialogue with citizens and increase access to information on a committee level. No such steps were taken in the other two parliaments. The difference between the US House and its European equivalents was explained with institutional theory; The US House is less important since it is operating in a presidential system, thus making it

¹⁶ Ward, Stephen, [2001], "Political Organisations and the Internet: Towards a Theoretical Framework of Analysis". www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3.htm 2001-04-27, p. 5-8.

more open to innovations.¹⁷ Also research on parliaments in Denmark, Slovenia and Scotland offers little support for the optimist.¹⁸

Research on political parties and ICT

Political parties function as channels between the people and the state. Optimists believe that ICTs will strengthen this function, as well as making the parties more democratic internally. However, many investigations of parties have found that so far ICTs are mostly used for top-down communication; thus “politics as usual”.¹⁹ Bellamy & Raab believe that ICTs can offer ordinary members tools to challenge the party elite, but at the same time they remind us of how hard it historically has been to reform party organisations.²⁰

Another optimist idea is that small and large parties will have about the same costs for creating web sites, thus creating some kind of equality between parties. Global comparisons show that parties with more than 20 percent of parliament seats were as likely to have web sites as parties with between 20 percent and 3 percent. This suggests that there is some kind of equality between parties, even though the quality of web sites might vary with resources.²¹

Stephen Ward has developed a theoretical framework for explaining levels of activity and strategies for political parties.²² Here are some of his assumptions:

- States with lower user costs and strong ICT strategies will promote the highest levels of political organisational Internet usage.
- Closed political systems are more likely to generate innovative and protest activity online whereas open consensual seeking systems are likely to generate more supplemental types of activity.
- In general, we would expect organisations with greater organisational capacity to develop more sophisticated and multi-purpose strategies than those with limited capacity.
- Organisations with a high proportion of members and supporters of high socio-economic status or geographically dispersed will have a more developed Internet-strategy than organisations with large numbers of working class supporters or geographically concentrated members.
- In organisations founded more recently, ICTs will be more central to communication strategies and more embedded in the organisation than older organisations.

These assumptions may work as a framework for interpreting some of the results found of Tanzanian political parties. Let us now proceed to the scientific study of democratisation.

¹⁷ Zittel, Thomas, [2001], “Electronic Democracy and Electronic Parliaments – A Comparison between the US House, the Swedish Riksdagen, and the German Bundestag.” www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3.htm 2001-04-27, p. 19-20.

¹⁸ Coleman, S, Taylor, J, and Donk, W van de, (eds), [1999] *Parliament in the Age of the Internet*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

¹⁹ Norris, Pippa, [2001], “Digital Parties: Civic Engagement & Online Democracy”. www.pippanorris.com 2001-04-26, p. 3.

²⁰ Bellamy & Raab, 1999.

²¹ Norris, 2001, p. 5-7.

²² Ward, 2001, p. 10.

Theory of democratic transitions and consolidations

Following the fall of the Berlin wall, a wave of democracy swept over the world. By the mid-nineties one could with astonishment conclude that there were hardly any formally non-democratic states left in the world. Eastern Europe, South America, the former Soviet Union, Africa and Asia; autocracies had fallen everywhere. Since then a large literature has grown out, studying what makes transitions begin, how they work, and then how democracy is consolidated

Defining transitions and consolidations

Non-democratic regimes can take several shapes. In Linz and Stepan's major study on transitions in South America and Eastern and Southern Europe, two main regime models are the authoritarian and the totalitarian regimes. The *authoritarian*²³ regime does not allow elections and political rights, but allows pluralism when it comes to the economic and social life. The regime is not guided by a strong ideology. One example is Franco's Spain. In *totalitarian* regimes, the state grasps all over society, allowing no room for pluralism in any sphere. The regime is heavily guided by ideology, and can be exemplified with the GDR.²⁴ Transitions from totalitarian rule are considered as the more difficult, since they apart from political change also imply economical and cultural transitions.

Democratisation is often being divided into phases. The first phase, *liberalisation* occurs when a non-democratic regime starts loosening up. Liberalisation can include both political and economic factors. A good example is Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestrojka-policy. It should be noted that liberalisation does not always take place; sometimes a regime falls over a night. On the other hand, there can also be liberalisation without a following transition.

The second phase is the *transition* from non-democratic rule. Transitions can take many paths. Sometimes the masses or the army take to the streets and pull down the regime. Sometimes the initial transition is negotiated between soft-liners in the regime and the opposition, a so-called *pacted transition*. Another case is when the regime initiates and leads the transition itself. There are many opinions about what constitutes a fulfilled transition from non-democracy. Some argue that a completed multiparty-election is sufficient. I have chosen to use a bit of a more demanding definition. According to it, the transition phase is over when a new constitution has been approved, the democratic institutions have started working and the political elite has adjusted its behaviour to the new democratic norms. The remains of the authoritarian structure have been shut down, and new forms of co-operation and competition are established.²⁵

The third phase is called *consolidation*. This is often a long process, and according to Linz and Stepan it ends when democracy has become "the only game in town". That is when no significant actor is trying to obstruct democracy, when a strong majority of the population supports democracy and when conflicts are solved according to laws and institutions decided

²³ This term is somewhat confusing, since authoritarian is often used synonymously with non-democratic.

²⁴ Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred, [1996], *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p. 38-54.

²⁵ Goldmann, Kjell, Pedersen, Mogens & Ostrud, Oyvind (eds), [1997], *Statsvetenskapligt lexikon*. Universitetsvetenskapliga, Stockholm, p. 42-43.

by the democratic process.²⁶ To achieve consolidation, Linz and Stepan demands that five arenas be in place:

- Preconditions for a free and lively *civil society*, allowing for people to organise autonomously from the state.
- A relatively autonomous and valued *political society*, with working political parties, elections, election rules and legislatures.
- *Rule of law* to ensure legal guaranties for citizen's freedoms and independent associational life.
- A *state bureaucracy* that is usable by a new government. Especially important is a professional army.
- An institutionalised *economic society* with a degree of market economy and plurality in ownership forms.

One important phase that might appear during and after a consolidation is a *reconciliation-process*, where attempts to heal the wounds from non-democratic rule are made. One example is South Africa's Truth Commission. But even when reconciliation and consolidation are reached, there is always need to develop democracy further. There is a large span between consolidated democracies, when it comes to level of democracy. Of course, the optimum criteria for democracy vary between people, for example following the models of democracy presented earlier on.

Not all transitions are fulfilled and end up in consolidations. Larry Diamond presents two other possible outcomes. The first is the *electoral democracy*; in which free and fair elections are allowed, but where freedom of speech, press, organisation and assembly are not respected. Turkey, Russia and Colombia are examples of electoral democracies.²⁷ The second regime type is *pseudo-democracy*, which is similar to electoral democracy, but it also lacks an arena of multiparty-elections that is fair enough to allow a defeat for the ruling party. Opposition parties may pick a few seats in parliament, but they will never be able to take over government. Singapore, Kazakhstan and Mexico under the PRI are examples of pseudo-democracies.²⁸ Should these two types of regimes still be considered to be in transition? According to my opinion, this depends on whether there is any movement towards more democracy, or if the transition is blocked.

African regimes

African regimes have some distinct features, why a literature only focusing on African transitions has emerged over the last years. The main institutional factor that makes African regimes unique is that *neopatrimonialism* is a core feature.²⁹ Neopatrimonialism means that traditional authority, where "big men" make decisions, is mixed with the modern, legal-rational authority. The following institutions can be found in the neopatrimonial state. *Presidentialism* means that the president himself makes all decisions of any importance. Rule of decree is outspread, thus undermining the rule of law. Systematic *clientilism* is also used, where the patron (for example a president) builds up his political support through personal

²⁶ Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5.

²⁷ Diamond, Larry [1999], *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p. 8-10.

²⁸ Diamond, 1999, p. 15-16.

²⁹ This can also be said about a few other states, like Tahiti and the Philippines.

favours to clients. These clients then act as patrons, giving out spoils to the clients under them, and then it continues in a whole chain of clients. Spoils often consist of public offices, but can also be a new road project to a village, etc. In a clientelist system, civil servants use their positions for gathering personal wealth and status, rather than carrying out their duties. Closely linked to clientilism is *the use of state resources* that to a large extent are considered as the personal assets of the ruler. Clientilism may, at least short term, be a good way of gathering support to stay in power, but it is hardly effective when it comes to controlling and running a state. Thus corruption and mismanagement is widespread and the state's development capacity is low.³⁰

Other factors that are extreme in Africa, though not unique, is the outspread poverty and the influence and dependency of donors. There is a well-known relation between GNP per capita and level of democracy; economic development is a necessary, however not sufficient precondition for democracy. Low economic development generally implies a low level of education, as well as the absence of a middle class that can drive democratisation.

Bratton & van de Walle have made an important study of democratisation in Africa. Their approach is political-institutional, where they categorise regimes after how much participation and competition they allow for. From these two criteria they identified five modal regimes that existed in sub-Saharan Africa in 1989. The *plebiscitary* one-party system was the most common one, with states such as Zaire and Kenya. The regime type allowed for little competition in the political system, but contained high levels of popular participation. Participation was channelled through official rallies and elections, that functioned as rituals where the rulers were celebrated; all orchestrated from above. The *military oligarchy* included Nigeria, Liberia and Uganda, and allowed for little participation. Some competition was allowed in the junta, which was often led by younger officers. Another popular model was the *competitive one-party state*. Tanzania and Zambia are classical cases, where participation was as high as in the plebiscitary states, but with much more internal competition in the ruling party. These states were often led by founding fathers, like Julius Nyerere. The *settler oligarchies* only consisted of Namibia and South Africa, and were the only ones that did not have neopatrimonialism as a core feature. The settler oligarchies were quite democratic for their white minorities, but totally exclusive towards their black majorities. Finally, the *multiparty-system* only covered five states, notably Zimbabwe, Senegal and Botswana. These states allowed opposition, but in practise there was little chance of power circulation, and there were tendencies to neopatrimonial rule. Also in the multiparty-systems, big men were setting the agenda.³¹

During the 1990's, most African states have held elections. The democratic experiments have however often suffered from serious backlashes. Today, only a few African states could be considered to be consolidated democracies. As was initially mentioned, African transitions are special. This does however not mean that it is impossible to apply general transition theory on Africa; you just have to keep the neopatrimonial aspect in mind when using them.

³⁰ Bratton, Michael, & van de Walle, Nicolas, [1997], *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 61-68.

³¹ Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 77-82.

ICTs, non-democratic regimes and transitions

For decades it has been widely known that mediums of mass-communication is a threat to non-democratic regimes. Already during World War Two, the Germans prohibited people in occupied states to use radio receivers. During the Cold War, Radio Free Europe spread western propaganda in Eastern Europe, and television played an important role in mobilising people when the Berlin Wall fell and the events that followed. So far ICTs have hardly been mentioned in the literature on democratic transition and consolidation. Reports by journalists or individual case studies have been our main source of knowledge in this area, though we can expect that more research will start pouring in, not least about the Internet in China.³² Attention is often given to how the civil society uses the Internet.³³ Here, research focusing on the state and political parties will be presented.

Kalathil & Boas have made one of the first comparative studies of how non-democratic regimes meet the threat from the Internet. When comparing the regimes in China and Cuba they found that both took reactive measures; that is limiting citizen's use of the Internet. Cuba tried to limit the very access to the Internet, while China instead encouraged access, but at the same time put a lot of effort into filtering content, monitoring, deterrence and promoting self-censorship. At the same time, both states have developed proactive strategies for utilising the Internet for their own purposes. Both states have set up their own propaganda web sites, and are also planning for national intranets, where only approved information will be published. When it comes to e-commerce, Cuba has focused on some areas that can deliver hard currency, while China has a broader policy. Both states invest in e-government, to increase bureaucratic efficiency and provision of services. On top of this, China is also using the Internet for increasing transparency and targeting corruption.³⁴ The conclusion reached is that the Internet will not automatically make non-democratic regimes fall, but might in fact even prolong their livelihood. In an African context, the issue of e-government and transparency is highly interesting. Though many African regimes are committed to good governance and transparency, it does not mean that they will support democratic governance. In an ICT context, this means that initiatives for e-government will not automatically include e-democracy.

Let us now turn to the study of online parties in non-democracies. Pippa Norris has found that the level of democratisation cannot explain the density of parties online. Even though non-democratic states have few parties online, and slightly more can be found in states in transition and consolidation, the correlation fails when it comes to democracies. There is a large variation between democratic states, and when cross-checked it was found that the number of parties online is rather dependent on socio-economic and technological development, than on the level of democratisation.³⁵

³² For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has started a comparative program where Internet impact on authoritarian regimes in Asia and the Middle East will be studied.

³³ See for example Abbott, Jason, [2001], "Democracy@ internet.asia? The Challenges to the Emancipatory Potential of the net: Lessons from China and Malaysia". *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 99-114, or Brophy, Peter & Halpin, Edward, [1999], "Through the Net to Freedom: Information, the Net and Human Rights". *Journal of Information Science* 25(5): 351-364, or Larsson, Karin, [2001], "CLICK - OR CONTROL? A Case Study of the Adoption and Impact of the Internet on the Vietnamese Civil Society". Student thesis, Lund University.

³⁴ Boas, Taylor & Kalathil, Shanthi, [2001], "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba and the Counterrevolution". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.ceip.org p. 15-17.

³⁵ Norris, 2001, p. 9-10.

Semetko & Krsanoboka have made a comparative study of online parties and media in two countries in transition, namely Russia and Ukraine. Major parties were generally more prominent online, but in some cases newer parties had even higher prominence. People seldom visited party web sites, at least during the non-election period studied. This could be a consequence of low interest, but it could also depend on low accessibility. Promotion of web sites is uncommon, and the parties proved difficult to find through search engines. Unlike in Europe and North America, references to web sites are seldom made in newspapers in Russia and Ukraine, why web sites are not naturally exposed to publicity. Even more important than low accessibility is that few web sites offered content that made them worth visiting. The level of user-friendliness, interactivity and updatedness was generally low.³⁶

What about Africa then? So far I am only aware of one academic article focusing on the Internet's importance for democracy in Africa. It contains a fairly general discussion on the democratic potential of the Internet, followed by a quantitative study of the correlation between Internet density and level of democracy in Africa. A connection was found, but no causality could be established.³⁷ When it comes to case studies and comparative studies of the importance of the Internet in transitions and consolidations in Africa, our knowledge seems to be nil.

The digital divide

When studying e-democracy in the developing world, the *digital divide* must always be considered. The digital divide is rather an empirical phenomenon than a school of theory. The concept was coined a few years ago, and highlights the divide that has been created between people who do have access to new ICTs and those who do not. It springs from the idea of a new network society, where access to information and means of communication for everyone is a prerequisite for a successful participation in society. Initially, the term focused on the divide within states, where different social groups would have different ability to access the Internet. In the mid-nineties, when the impact of the Internet was starting to be appreciated, many governments in the western world took measures to counter this digital divide. A main strategy was to bring the Internet to schools and public libraries. Investment in public infrastructure was also on the agenda. However, towards the late nineties, when the Internet revolution was a fact, more concern was directed towards the developing world. It was found that the digital divide between developing and industrialised countries was even larger than the old economic divide. A lot of hope had been put into how ICT would speed up development, through reduced transaction costs and increased access to knowledge. Applications such as telemedicine and e-education created entirely new opportunities for remote rural areas. There were even thoughts of that ICT would offer possibilities of technological leapfrogging; perhaps the developing countries could skip the industrial phase and jump straight into the network society? Instead, the developing world seemed to be about to miss the second train as well.

Statistics about the digital divide tend to be short-lived, since the development in ICTs is so rapid. Figures from 2000 state that the percentage of Internet users of the population was 54.3

³⁶ Krsanoboka, Natalya & Semetko, Holli, [2001], "The Political Role of the Internet in Societies in Transition". <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws3/semetko.pdf> 2002-05-02, p. 15-16.

³⁷ Ott, Dana & Rosser, Melissa, [2000], "The Electronic Republic? The Role of the Internet in Promoting Democracy in Africa". In Ferdinand, Peter (ed.), "The Internet, Democracy and Democratisation". Frank Cass Publishers, London.

for USA, 28.2 for the rest of the high income OECD, while the rest of the world had less than 4. Sub-Saharan Africa, together with South Asia was in the bottom of the list with 0.4 percent. Taken together, the Internet users made up 6.7 percent of the world's population. As many as 79 percent of the Internet users lived in OECD countries.³⁸ UNDP has created a new index for their annual Human Development Report, focusing on technological achievement. Aspects of technology creation, diffusion of recent and old innovations as well as human skills are taken into account. While Finland leads the index with 0.744, the first sub-Saharan African country is South Africa with 0.340, and is together with Zimbabwe, with 0.220 considered to be dynamic adopters. Tanzania is considered to be marginalised at 0.08. For most of sub-Saharan Africa, statistics for the index could not even be produced.³⁹

It can thus be stated that there is a digital divide, and that sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions that are poorest of information. There are however also differences within the region. As mentioned, South Africa is the leading ICT country in sub-Saharan Africa, while a country like Sudan is far behind.⁴⁰ The digital divide that is found within rich countries does also apply to the developing world and Africa; in fact, it is most probably even bigger there. Internet access in developing countries is concentrated to urban areas, not least because there are few Internet rural hosts and phone calls are often very expensive. Likewise the typical Internet-user has higher education, higher income, is younger and is more often male. In Ethiopia 86 percent of the Internet users are men.⁴¹

The digital divide can also be seen in the applications of e-democracy. In 2000, Pippa Norris found that in sub-Saharan Africa, only 15 out of 50 parliaments were online⁴². The region was likewise at the bottom of the list when it came to online governments and parties; Scandinavia had more parties online than the entire sub-Saharan Africa.⁴³ Mike Jensen, who delivers Internet-statistics about Africa concludes that though the number of governments offering web sites are growing, few offer any services online. The most advanced web pages generally relate to tourism and foreign investment. Some countries are however developing a more advanced content.⁴⁴

There are several barriers to increased Internet use in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a lack of capital for buying computers, trained staff for maintenance, as well as access to telephone-lines and electricity. To this comes that the African continent is poorly connected to the global Internet backbone. To add on, even if there was connectivity, most of the Internet's content is in English, and thus demands literacy in this language.

The reasons for the low capacity in infrastructure is to a large extent lack of performance by government actors, such as telecom companies and electricity companies, as well as legislation that has been holding development back. With deregulation of these markets there has been a dramatic increase in the use of the Internet and mobile phones over the last years.

³⁸ UNDP, [2001], *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 40.

³⁹ UNDP, 2001, Technology Achievement Index.

⁴⁰ UNDP, 2001, Technology Achievement Index.

⁴¹ UNDP, 2001, p. 40.

⁴² Norris, Pippa, [2000a], "Democratic Divide? The Impact of the Internet on Parliaments Worldwide?". www.pippanorris.com 2001-10-18, p. 8.

⁴³ Norris, Pippa, [2000b], "Parties and Governments Online". www.pippanorris.com 2001-10-18, p. 5-8.

⁴⁴ Jensen, Mike, [2001], "The African Internet – A Status Report, may 2001". www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm 2001-12-09.

Analysts forecast that there will be more than 140 million mobile-phone users in Africa by the year 2005, while there is a 90 percent annual growth-rate in the African Internet-connectivity⁴⁵.

Several initiatives have been started to reduce the digital divide by international actors, often focusing on Africa. The G8's Okinawa Chapter, the World Bank's African Virtual University and infoDEV-project, as well as the UN ICT TASKFORCE are examples from multilateral organisations. Also among bilateral donors it has become high fashion to do something about the digital divide. The US Leland initiative as well as the IDRC Acacia programme are examples here. Technology development might however be an even more important allied. Low-orbiting satellites will be able to bring broadband to rural areas, without raising high demands on infrastructure. Also mobile Internet and 3G mobile-phone networks can create new opportunities for connectivity, while the lack of electricity can be handled by new cheap solar panels.

How should e-democracy relate to the digital divide, on a national level? In the western world, concerns have been made that e-democracy can marginalise weak groups even more from the political life, as they can not afford access. *Radicals* argue that participation by a few is better than by none and that exclusion should not be a reason to refrain from, for example, using electronic consultations. The logic goes that if equality would be such a priority, one should also stop debating issues in newspapers since far from everyone can afford a newspaper. *Conservatives* think that equality should have priority, and that one should keep democratic key functions off the Internet until most people are connected.⁴⁶

Having gone through theory on e-democracy, theory on democratic transition and consolidation, as well as the digital divide, we now turn to see where Tanzania stands in its democratic transition, and what the digital divide looks like there.

⁴⁵ Parkes, Sarah, [2001], "Land of opportunity", *Telecommunications Magazine* (November 2001), www.telecommagazine.com 2001-12-07.

⁴⁶ It should be admitted that the terms *radicals* and *conservatives* carry some normative load.

Presenting the case – Tanzania

Tanzania is a coastal East African state, with a population of approximately 30 million people. It is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranking 140 out of 162 countries in UNDP's Human Development Index, and most people have agriculture as their main source of income. Tanzania is a plural society, with about 120 ethnic groups, most of which have their own language, though about 95 percent are Bantu-people. Nilotic pastoralists make up one minority group, and another one is the small Asian minority that has a large economic power. Most people are fluent in Kiswahili, but only part of the population can speak English, though both are official languages. About 40 percent of the population are Christians, while a third are Muslims and about 23 percent belong to traditional religions.

A political background

Tanzania became independent from Great Britain in 1961. From the start, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), led by Julius Nyerere dominated the political scene completely. The Zanzibar-islands achieved their independence from Britain two years later, soon followed by a revolution in which the Arab sultan was kicked out. The Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) took power. In 1964, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was completed and Tanzania was formed. Zanzibar was given autonomy, with its own government and parliament.

In the 1965 Constitution it was decided that Tanzania was a one-party system.⁴⁷ According to Nyerere's ideology the multiparty-system was only suitable for the western world, where there were social classes. In Africa, society was based upon the extended family, in which co-operation instead of competition was the core value. Nyerere saw the multiparty-system as immoral, and instead argued for a "one-party democracy".⁴⁸ Initially there was quite some competition within the system, and signs of a democratic spirit. People were for example allowed to choose between two parliamentary candidates within each constituency.⁴⁹

In 1967 the Arusha-declaration was made, introducing the socialist *Ujamaa*-policy. The policy aimed at national unity, self-reliance and development based on the traditional village community. The goals were to be achieved through a socialist policy, where the party and the state kept the country together and led development. A command economy was introduced, with extensive nationalisation. An ambitious social programme was also launched which up to about 1980 led to increased literacy, reduced infant mortality and increased life expectancy. In the mid-70's, thousands of people were moved to Ujamaa-villages, in an attempt to modernise agriculture. People were also supposed to get access to services such as education, water and healthcare. The project was a success in terms of moving people into villages, but a complete failure when it came to agricultural production. It also included that people were forced to move to the Ujamaa-villages.⁵⁰ The one-party democracy was starting to get authoritarian. This also showed in elections, that to a higher extent were controlled by the party. In 1977 TANU and ASP merged into Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, the Party of the

⁴⁷ Hydén, Göran, [1999], "Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania". *Journal of Democracy*, 10:4, p. 142-155.

⁴⁸ Larsson, Reidar, [1997], *Politiska ideologier i vår tid*. Studentlitteratur, Lund, p. 77-79.

⁴⁹ Pinkney, Robert, [1997], *Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania*. Macmillan Press Ltd, Hampshire, p. 97.

⁵⁰ Pinkney, 1997, p. 104-106.

Revolution) and the new Tanzanian constitution brought the country even closer to a communist system in terms of party-state relations.⁵¹ In the mid-eighties, the party had moved further away from the people, with fewer attending meetings and paying membership fees. Nyerere also criticised party officials for being too concerned with their own enrichment.⁵²

All along the process, Tanzania received huge amounts of support from the international donor community. Nyerere's policy of self-reliance made him the darling of the donors. In practise this however led to that Tanzania became one of the worlds most aid-dependent states in the world. Inefficiency was spreading, as structural weaknesses were covered by donor money, and in the process nurturing corruption. It should however be noted that the policy of peace and national unity was a success. With Tanzania's 120 ethnic groups, ethnic violence was kept to a minimum, and religious freedom was maintained while avoiding religion to play a role in politics. One of the most important weapons the government used was spreading Kiswahili as the national language.

The combination of command economy, mismanagement and the worsened international trade situation led to a falling economical performance of the country. Nyerere, clinging to the policy of self-reliance and socialism rejected all reform-initiatives from the IMF and the World Bank. The economical situation only got worse, and in 1985 Nyerere resigned and handed over the presidency to Ali Hassan Mwinyi. With Mwinyi in power, Tanzania joined the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). A period of economic liberalisation began, with privatisation, reductions in salaries and subsidies as well as cost sharing in the school system. Mwinyi lacked socialist commitment and focused on liberalising the economy. Initially, no signs of political liberalisation were seen. The laissez-faire politics brought an epidemic of corruption and lawlessness to Tanzania, destabilising the country.⁵³

With the fall of the Berlin-wall, Nyerere realised that the time for one-party-systems was over. As an elder statesman with a large amount of influence over the government, he argued for a transition to a multiparty-system. In 1991, president Mwinyi appointed the so-called Nyalala-commission to look into what legal and constitutional changes that were demanded to reintroduce multiparty politics. The commission finished its work in 1992, suggesting about 40 laws to be revised, but only a few of them have been implemented. The government also decided to wait with elections for another three years.⁵⁴ In 1992 opposition parties were legalised, but with two restrictions. Parties could not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life.⁵⁵

In the first multiparty parliamentary election in 1995, CCM received 59 percent of the votes, but through the majority election system took 80 percent of the directly elected seats. The CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 62.8 percent compared to 27.8 for the leading opposition candidate Augustine Mrema. Irregularities and administrative chaos were reported from the elections in Dar es Salaam, where they were remade. There were also reports of irregularities on Zanzibar, but here no action was taken from the

⁵¹ Hydén, 1999, 144.

⁵² Pinkney, 1997, p. 185.

⁵³ Hydén, 1999, p. 144.

⁵⁴ Hydén, 1999, p. 144.

⁵⁵ Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 165.

governments side.⁵⁶ After this, most foreign donors decided to leave Zanzibar. Despite the huge advantage for the CCM in controlling the state apparatus, the media and large financial resources, the opposition did fairly well in the elections. This gave some promise for a continued transition to democracy in Tanzania.

The irregularities on Zanzibar created political tension between CCM and the opposition party CUF. An agreement was brooked by the Commonwealth, containing a reform of the Zanzibar electoral commission, a review of some of Zanzibar's constitutional and electoral laws, as well as two more CUF seats in the Zanzibar parliament.⁵⁷ The agreement was not implemented, which caused a lot of bitterness among the opposition. Between 1997 and 2000, 18 CUF leaders were sent to jail charged for treason, until they were finally released as a court declared that there was no legal basis for the charges. In the period following up to the 2000 election there was also political violence on the Islands.⁵⁸

The elections in 2000 were carried out in a satisfactory way in the Tanzanian mainland. Mkapa was re-elected President, and the CCM once again won a large majority in parliament. On Zanzibar, cheating was reported in 15 constituencies and the opposition demanded a rerun of elections. On the 27th of January 2001, CUF made a protest march on Zanzibar. Security-forces answered with brutal force, and at least 20 people were killed, most of whom were from the opposition. Western diplomats have said that the number of killed people is more likely to be about 60. Mass arrests and torture of prisoners followed. After the killings, about 2000 CUF-supporters fled to Kenya, a unique event in the history of the normally so peaceful Tanzania.⁵⁹ There was hard criticism from the donor community and human rights groups. Eventually, new discussions started between CCM and CUF, and an agreement was reached during the autumn of 2001. Again, there have however been difficulties in the implementation of the agreement.

Though the political transition has been stalled under the Mkapa-government, the economic transition has kept going at high pace. There has been a clear understanding within the regime that there is no turning back to command economy. Professor T.L. Maliyamkono painted a chaotic picture in 1995, just before the first elections "There is a total collapse in the public service system ... Getting loans now is more difficult than trying to make a telephone call to the next town if you don't own a mobitel. It is surprising that electricity, water, trains buses and planes are still in business."⁶⁰ Since then, Tanzania has made very good macro-economic progress, bringing down inflation and keeping a high rate of economic growth. This progress has so far not shown to the country's poor; partly because the country has a higher growth of population than economic growth. The government has privatised most of its parastatals, and developed regulatory bodies for markets like public transport, telecom, and electricity.

The government has also started up several reform programs for good governance, like the Public Service Reform, The Legal Sector Reform and the Local Government Reform. They

⁵⁶ Gros, Jean-Germain [1998], "Leadership and Democratization: The Case of Tanzania". In Gros, Jean-Germain (ed), "Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa". Greenwood Press, Westport, p. 105-107.

⁵⁷ Commonwealth press release, "Commonwealth Secretary-General to Witness Signing of Zanzibar Agreement" 1999-06-08.

⁵⁸ Amnesty International, [2000] *Tanzania 2000 Annual Report*

⁵⁹ Amnesty International press release, "Tanzania: Amnesty International calls for independent inquiry into Zanzibar killings and torture." 2001-03-01.

⁶⁰ Maliyamkono, T L, [1995], *The Race for the Presidency*. Tema Publishers Company Ltd, Dar es Salaam, p. viii.

are very much needed, as the delivery of services is disastrous and Tanzania is one of the world's most corrupt states. The reforms are in line with World Bank recommendations, and for example the Public Service Reform has in its scope to reduce ghost workers, raise salaries, create greater transparency, and create new management systems based on individual performance. The usage of ICT plays an important role in this programme.

Putting Tanzania's transition into a theoretical context

According to Bratton & van de Walle's typology, Tanzania was a competitive one-party state up to 1995, thus allowing for comparatively high levels of popular participation and internal competition. In their study, which goes up to 1994, Tanzania is considered to be a blocked transition. As we know, the transition moved on the year later, but followed a different path than most African countries. The transition was not initiated from protest, but rather engineered by the government itself. This can be explained if we turn to Linz & Stepan's totalitarian regime type.

In Nyerere's Tanzania, the state controlled most spheres of society; the political society, the economy and the civil society. The state even abolished the municipalities and replaced them with government offices. It was basically only religious groups that were autonomous in Tanzania. It should be mentioned, that although the regime was totalitarian, even opposition politicians admit that the oppression was moderate. Under Mwinyi's rule, Tanzania looked more like a post-totalitarian regime, where economy was being liberalised, and the system was starting to crack up from its own weight, not least through corruption. The belief in the socialist ideology was being loosened up, while the mantra about national unity remained strong, allowing for the party to maintain control over civil society and the political society. There were thus no organised civil society or opposition parties that could take the initiative of democratisation. At the same time, the system was not oppressive enough to bring people out on the streets. For people that were living on less than half a US dollar a day, lack of political rights seemed to be a minor problem.

What did the transition then end up in? According to my definition, a transition to democracy is far from fulfilled. Many of the necessary constitutional changes have not been implemented, and the CCM has not adjusted its behaviour to democratic norms. While the two elections, that on the mainland were largely free and fair, can be considered as major steps towards democracy, the killings on Zanzibar on the 27th of January 2001 must be considered as the major setbacks. It should be noted that this is not a separate Zanzibar issue. The union government took part in the killings with mainland security forces. President Mkapa also gave the police officers responsible for the killings a promotion the following days, and he has refused to set up a commission to investigate the events. I argue that Tanzania's transition has ended up in a *pseudo-democracy*; there are elections now and then, but there is no realistic chance for a change in power, and human rights are not respected⁶¹. With the CCM sitting on such vast resources, and using undemocratic methods when it suits them, the opposition has little chance of winning elections.⁶² Even if they would, the Zanzibar-killings show that it is far from evident that CCM would accept a defeat.

⁶¹ Except for the already mentioned incidents, police brutality is common, and it has often happened that people have died in prison. The legal system is very poor, and there have been little effort from the government to improve the situation. See for example Annual Reports by Amnesty International.

⁶² For further discussions on the transition, see Pinkney, Robert, [1999], "Democratic Consolidation in East Africa: External Pressures and Constraints". www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/manpapers/w3/pinkney.pdf 2002-05-02

What is then the way forward? We never saw the masses storming the state house, or the CCM collapsing from within, and we are not likely to see it either. Nor is it perhaps desirable, as many of the more rapid transitions in Africa have suffered from major backlashes. Göran Hydén refers to Tanzania as a creeping transition; moving slowly ahead and managed from above. He borrows Huntington's terminology, that African transitions are more about *transformation* than *replacement*.⁶³ Is this then a sort of Catch 22 for democracy? The system is likely to become less authoritarian through various government reforms, but the CCM will never allow defeat? Larry Diamond argues for a developmental perspective on democracy, in which no timetable is followed, but where small steps count. The continued transition then looks more like a consolidation-process. He gives the examples of Mexico, Jordan and Marocco as states where there actually is good potential of change to electoral democracy. Indeed, Mexico has taken this step since Diamond wrote his book. Another example Diamond gives is Ghana, where electoral democracy was achieved in 1996.⁶⁴ CCM-supporters often ask if democracy means that CCM has to lose an election. The answer is: not necessarily, but the party must follow the rules of the game and win fairly. After the Zanzibar-killings, it seems even more that the only way we can know that the CCM will stick to the rules is by going through a defeat.

From this developmental perspective, we may have to allow the Tanzanian transition to keep creeping, while at the same time hoping that the surrounding world puts pressure on the regime and gives its support to an independent judiciary and bureaucracy, civil society, opposition parties and so on. In this creeping transition, ICT can play a role. Before we look at what this role could be, let us first learn some more about Tanzanian politics and e-readiness.

Examining Tanzanian politics further

Here the study-objects will be presented; the government, the parliament and the political parties. To better understand what function e-democracy could fill in Tanzania, the country's political culture and the extent of popular participation will first be examined.

Political culture and popular participation

Tanzanian political culture is still dominated by a strife for peace and unity. To start with, it implies a fear from conflict and the seeking of consensus. A leader must never be seen losing his temper. It also implies that it is illegitimate for a politician to play on ethnic or religious strings. Challenging the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar is also taboo, even though there are voices for secession within CUF. For the CCM, there has been a struggle of balancing pluralism with national unity. That is allowing political parties and civil society to operate, without seeing the nation falling apart and the party losing power.⁶⁵ The level of religious tension has lately increased somewhat. During the summer and autumn of 2001, some Muslim groups became dominated by militants, and there has been violence related to religion.⁶⁶

⁶³ Hydén, 1999, p. 154.

⁶⁴ Diamond, 1999, p. 16.

⁶⁵ Johansson, Sofia & Lindberg, Åsa, [2000], "Balancing Pluralism and National Unity". Master's Thesis in Political Science, University College of Södertörn, Stockholm, p. 67-69.

⁶⁶ *Majira*, 2001-08-28.

However, the Tanzanian polity has never been free from ethnic tendencies. The Chagga - and Haya - groups have had a disproportional influence in politics and bureaucracy because of their high level of education. Likewise, the Asian minority is said to have disproportional informal political influence due to their economic power.⁶⁷ The opposition is also to some extent organised after ethnicity.

Tanzanian society is by tradition authoritarian and patriarchal. On all levels elders, and particularly men, make the decisions. From school, people are taught not to question authority and this can be seen in the political culture; there are few women and young people in politics, and female politicians often face strong resistance from the political society. The dominance of the elders is partly upheld by an oral culture. It is far from obvious for a Tanzanian to read something every day, and information has traditionally been spread orally. Decisions are often made in discussions that exclude women and young people. The oral culture makes it difficult to control decisions that are made, and it has also nurtured a culture of secrecy. Knowledge is seen as power, why it should not be shared. During the one-party rule, CCM adjusted to this oral culture and built an impressive structure for spreading and controlling information from the party top down to the cell, which consisted of ten households.⁶⁸ This structure is to a large extent still active.

How do people then relate to politics in Tanzania? The society might seem highly politicised, as there are flags from the different parties hanging from houses and street stands all over Tanzania. However, research tends to show that people, and especially young people, are not very interested in politics at all.⁶⁹ The same opinion is given by opposition politicians; "People are not interested in politics, they are interested in football."⁷⁰ Poverty and the fatal HIV-epidemic are reasons for fatalistic attitudes among many people, both in urban areas and rurally. People see little possibility of improving their lives, and therefore politics become meaningless.⁷¹

When it comes to attitudes towards democracy, the Nyalali-commission from 1992 found that 77.2 percent were in favour of continued one-party system.⁷² A survey from 1999 however showed that 69 percent of the respondents thought that the multiparty-system could contribute to the development of democracy, and that it was an essential part of democracy.⁷³ Democratic values are being more and more institutionalised among people, though it is not self-evident to be a supporter of multiparty democracy. The voter turnout in national elections has remained high, with over 75 percent in 1995, and approximately 80 percent in 2000, out of the officially registered voters.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, [2000], "Perspektiv på demokratins kultur och fortsatt demokratisk utveckling i Tanzania", p. 13.

⁶⁸ Embassy of Sweden, 2000, p. 4.

⁶⁹ Interview with Professor T.L. Maliyamkono, Executive Director ESAURP, Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2001.

⁷⁰ Interview with Mr. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, Member of the CUF national board, Dar es Salaam, 20 July 2001.

⁷¹ Hydén, 1999, p. 153.

⁷² Whitehead, Richard [2000], "Institutionalisation of the Tanzanian Opposition Parties: How Stable are they?" home.enitel.no/stunetii/Tanzania/Seminar%20Paper.doc 2001-09-02, p. 8.

⁷³ Mpangala, Gaudens, [1999], "Peace, Conflicts, and Democratization Process in the Great Lakes Region: the Experience of Tanzania." www.fiuc.org/ids/pdf/mpangala1.pdf 2002-01-01, p. 47.

⁷⁴ Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. www.eisa.org.za/WEP/WEP_12.htm 2002-01-01

Politics in Tanzania is very much centred around individuals. Political discussions tend to be about personalities rather than ideologies, and it is not uncommon for politicians to change parties. Politics is also very much about “delivering the goods”; a politician’s main task is to make sure that his constituency receives government resources. Ideologies and policies are thus of limited importance.

Tanzanian media is by African standards quite free. With the introduction of multiparty-elections there has been a dramatic increase in privately owned newspapers, radio-stations and TV-channels. There are however legal restrictions on the broadcasting of both radio and TV, prohibiting private channels to cover more than 25 percent of the country.⁷⁵ This gives the government radio and TV a national monopoly over the only mediums that cover all Tanzania. Printed media has difficulties in distribution, because of the poor infrastructure. Thus, few people in rural areas read newspapers. The high cost of a newspaper is also a major obstacle to any greater popular impact of this media. For example, *The African* costs 200 Tanzanian Shillings (TSH) while the minimum daily salary is 500 TSH.

Censorship is uncommon and critical articles about corruption, human rights violations and lack of democracy are published. Self-censorship is however widely used by journalists and editors. Newspapers, as well as journalists, need licenses, why they have a strong incentive to adjust their coverage to government views.⁷⁶ The government also openly encourages journalists to restrain themselves for patriotic reasons. Another reason for the self-censorship is that most of the bigger newspapers are aligned to the CCM. The practise of self-censorship was quite obvious when *The Guardian* argued that one should stop discussing the Zanzibar-killings, just a few days after they had happened.

Most opposition politicians that I interviewed complained about the government control of the media. It was difficult for them to get space in newspapers, and reports from opposition meetings were often being manipulated. Most parties considered the radio to be the most effective medium, but no party had their own station. Instead, public rallies were often the main way of reaching people.

There is legislation that prohibits people to receive information from a public official that is not authorised to do so; no matter how trivial it might be. Investigating journalism is thus very difficult.⁷⁷ According to one journalist, it is very hard to get any information from the ministries. “They give out press releases rather than letting the journalists access information that is not prepared. The ministries often answer a question with “*we want written questions.*” He also said that it was easier to get information from the parliament.⁷⁸

The Union Government

The directly elected President is head of state, head of government, commander in chief of the armed forces as well as specifically responsible for issues relating to good governance. The President appoints the entire cabinet, including the Prime Minister, from the parliament. As the President leads the cabinet meetings, the Prime Minister plays a limited role as the

⁷⁵ Tripp, 1999, p. 26.

Lång, Ulrika & Nilsson, Torsten, [1998], “The State of Democracy, Human Rights and Peace in Tanzania”. Consultancy Report for Sida, DESO, p. 9-11.

⁷⁷ Lång & Nilsson, 1998, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Interview with anonymous journalist, Tanzania, 2001-07-10.

government's representative in parliament and as leader of day to day activities in the government. The President of Zanzibar is also a member of the cabinet, but is elected directly on the Zanzibar-isles. The cabinet is divided into a number of ministries that handle their respective portfolio of issues. Under them there are specific agencies. The President and most of the ministries are located in Dar es Salaam.⁷⁹

The President's power is very extensive; and has been strengthened further in constitutional amendments prior to the elections of 2000. Tanzania lacks effective checks and balances in form of strong parliament and an impartial and effective judiciary.⁸⁰

According to people with insight, the situation in the ministries is chaotic; people don't know what the person next door is doing. This partly emanates from top-down management. In the administration there is an extreme concentration of power, information and material resources to the top.⁸¹

The Union Parliament

The parliament has 285 members. 232 MPs are elected in a majority "winner-takes-all"-system, which gives great advantages for the CCM. Opposition candidates mainly make their way into parliament in constituencies where they have a regional stronghold. The president appoints 10 MPs, and there are 37 special women seats that are distributed proportionally between the parliament parties. There are also 5 MPs from the Zanzibar House, as well as the attorney general. The parliament has a five-year term.⁸²

The parliament is quite weak constitutionally, and the separation of powers is confusing, as the president appoints some MPs. The parliament has some control powers, such as confirming appointments by the president. In reality this is however worth little; when a new vice-president was being sworn in on July 2001, the MPs got to know his name about an hour prior to their vote. Many MPs complained that they had never heard about the person before.⁸³

The parliament is situated in Dodoma, in the middle of the country, and MPs are only there during session. Sessions from parliament are broadcast daily on national television where many people can follow their proceedings. The MPs are divided into two offices, one for the majority and one for the opposition. Ordinary MPs do not have offices, and thus have limited ability to work with policy proposals. There is a shadow cabinet where the opposition parties comment on government policy. All committees are chaired by the CCM, and the speaker, who belongs to the majority-party, appoints all committee members. As decisions in the committees are made in consensus, party affiliation has a lighter weight than the weight of arguments. Opposition MPs have managed to change details in bills, and some cases even forced the government to withdraw bills.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Tanzanian National web site, www.tanzania.go.tz/governancef.html 2001-11-18.

⁸⁰ Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, [2001], "Strategic Framework for Swedish Support to Democratic Development in Tanzania 2001-2005", p. 3.

⁸¹ Embassy of Sweden, 2001, p. 3.

⁸² Elections Around the World. www.electionworld.org/tanzania.htm 2001-11-18.

⁸³ I happened to be present when the event took place.

⁸⁴ Lång & Nilsson, 1998, p. 16.

The MPs have a quite low reputation among many Tanzanians. They are seen as badly informed and with little capability to really affect politics. A political career is often considered to be more for private enrichment than for the best of the country.

Political parties

Tanzania has thirteen registered political parties, but only six are represented in parliament. The other seven are quite small and will not be studied in this thesis. There is a major difference between the ruling CCM and the opposition parties. CCM has accumulated vast resources during the days of one-party rule, and is to some extent also able to use the state apparatus for the party's own purposes, although the flow of resources has been restricted since the separation of party and state. The opposition complains that it is impossible to work for the government and be active in the opposition at the same time, and that CCM uses bribery and fraud in elections. It is commonly known that CCM spends a lot of money and effort trying to buy over opposition leaders to their own party. The party is also extensively clientilistic. The business sector is included in the clientele, where donations to the party are traded for concessions.⁸⁵

The opposition parties suffer from weak institutionalisation. They are heavily dependent upon party leaders, and for example the NCCR-Mageuzi⁸⁶ suffered from great losses in support when the party leader Mrema left for TLP. Internal factions often struggle for power in the parties. Also the opposition-parties are to some extent clientilist.⁸⁷ Ideologies play a quite small role in the parties, even though they all adhere to ideologies. The opposition parties have so far mostly filled a function of criticising the government for corruption and ineffectiveness, while positive policy proposals have been rare. The opposition has small financial resources and find it difficult to reach out with their message. The picture of the opposition-parties is however not only dark. The parties have made quite some progress over the ten years they have been allowed. There is some co-operation between the parties, not least in parliament where they share common localities and staff. A good example of a party that is trying to actively increase its institutionalisation and come up with more policy-proposals is NCCR that has produced a strategic plan.⁸⁸

Here follows a brief description of the different parties:

- *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) is the ruling party, and has gone from being socialist to supporters of capitalism. Some critics complain that the party has lost its soul, and not found anything to replace it with. Some claim that the party is dominated by business-people these days and that common people are forgotten about. The party has members and offices all over the country.
- *The Civic United Front* (CUF) has become the main opposition party. It has been leading the struggle for a new election on Zanzibar, where it also has its main support. Likewise, the issue of the union and human rights-violations have been important for CUF. The party is often being associated with Muslims, but it has no formal link to religion. CUF

⁸⁵ Whitehead, 2000, p. 9.

⁸⁶ In this thesis, NCCR-Mageuzi will just be called NCCR.

⁸⁷ Whitehead, 2000, p. 6.

⁸⁸ NCCR-Mageuzi, [2001], *Strategic Plan*. www.nccr-mageuzi.org/s_plan.htm

receives support from the Liberal International and is considered to be in the middle of the ideological spectrum. It is lead by professor Ibrahim Lipumba.

- *The National Convention for Reconstruction and Reform* (NCCR-Mageuzi) has just recovered from strong internal power struggles and poor results in the parliament election. The party has its base in the Kilimanjaro- and Mara -regions. NCCR calls itself social democratic and has its main support from poor people, such as rural farmers and youth. A new party leader called James Mbatia has been elected, and he presents the party as being for young people. A strategic plan has been made to institutionalise the party further. One of the components in the plan is that NCCR is going to come up with positive policy suggestions to government.⁸⁹
- *Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (CHADEMA) is a market-oriented party, that strongly supports free capitalism. One of its main policies is financial reform. It is business-oriented also in its internal party-structure, and the members of the party-board have to own property.⁹⁰ The party is dependent on support from the private sector.⁹¹ CHADEMA has, like NCCR, its base of support in the Kilimanjaro-region. It mainly turns to middleclass voters. The party is a member of the conservative international Democratic Union of Africa.
- *United Democratic Party* (UDP) is another liberal party, focusing on individual freedom and empowerment. The party has policies similar to CHADEMA, but also emphasises social responsibility of the state. Redefinition of property rights is an important issue for the party. UDP was created by the party leader John Cheyo, a rich businessman, and the party is somewhat seen as a political company. UDP has many if its supporters in the regions of Mwanza and Shinyanga.⁹² It has observer status in the Liberal International.
- *Tanzania Labour Party* (TLP) describes itself as a social democratic party and has grown considerably since Mrema took over leadership for the party. There has though been internal turbulence during 2001. One of the party's key issues is irrigation.

E-readiness in Tanzania

When assessing a country's ICT-development, the term e-readiness is often used. We will shortly make an e-readiness assessment of Tanzania to show limitations and possibilities for e-democracy.

Access and use of the Internet

To start with, electricity is needed for Internet access. In Tanzania this is very much an urban phenomenon. Between 75-80 percent of Tanzania's about 30 million citizens live in the rural areas, spread in about 8-9,000 villages. The power-market is being deregulated, and service delivery is expected to improve.

⁸⁹ Interview with Mr. James Mbatia, Party Leader NCCR, Dar es Salaam, 20 July 2001.

⁹⁰ Mmuya, Max, [1998], *Political Reform in Eclipse*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dar es Salaam, p. 25.

⁹¹ Whitehead, 2000, p. 9.

⁹² Whitehead, 2000, p. 8.

A telephone line has so far also been a prerequisite for Internet-connectivity. Tanzania has about 5.5 landlines per 1000 inhabitants. It should be noted that landlines are often used collectively in Africa. Therefore, more people have access in reality. These lines are concentrated to urban areas, and then especially Dar es Salaam. Some say that only about 70 percent of the lines are working. The backbone is built of fibre optics in Dar es Salaam, while microwaves are used in rural areas and between cities. Also for landlines, dramatic improvements are expected following privatisation and deregulation. According to the privatisation conditions for Tanzania Telecommunication Company Ltd (TTCL), the company will keep its monopoly on the mainland until 2005, provided that it constructs 800,000 new lines. The TTCL has to put a line in every village with more than 2,500 citizens. Whether this is realistic could be discussed, but it would surely be a great improvement to today's 165,000 landlines.⁹³ There are also plans for a rural telecom-fund that will subsidise telecom investment in one third of the regions, where commercial investment is not viable.

When it comes to Internet-access, the market has been liberalised⁹⁴ and there are 13 Internet Service Providers operating. Services have so far been concentrated to Dar es Salaam, but are spreading at high speed out to the smaller cities. Last year, there were 816 new Internet-hosts in Tanzania. There are only 0.26-0.38 Internet subscriptions per 1000 citizens, but many more have access through company networks and Internet cafés. The Internet-café's are a real phenomenon in Dar es Salaam, where there are supposed to be between 300-400. Half an hour online costs 500 TSH, which equals about 0.5 US dollars. This can be compared to making a national telephone call which costs about 0.34 US dollars per minute.⁹⁵ Internet cafés are frequented by youngsters, and according to owners, the most common sites visited relate to e-mail and news. Sites related to politics are rarely visited. Little web-content is available in Kiswahili as it is now, though it is growing. This makes it difficult for large parts of the Tanzanian society to use the Internet.

Computers are too expensive for common people in Tanzania. Up to 1993 it was even prohibited to import computers. The hot climate and the unreliable power-supply also demands extra maintenance and special equipment for power supply. Computers are rare in the Tanzanian bureaucracy; on national as well as on local level. Hardly any libraries have computers, and only a few private schools are connected.

The Ministry of Communication and Transport is now developing a national ICT-policy. The donor community and the eThinkTank support the process.

Civil society as a user of the Internet

Tanzanian NGOs are not just limited in numbers and members; they also have a modest presence on the web. The umbrella organisation Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), the Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP), the Journalists Environment Association of Tanzania (JET) and a few other organisations have web sites. From TANGO's NGO-register one can also tell that some more use e-mail. The independent Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) is a keen user of the Internet, and is running an online database

⁹³ Sida, [2001], *A Country ICT Survey for Tanzania*. Made by Miller Esselaar and Associates. www.sida.se/Sida/articles/9400-9499/9481/tanzrep.pdf, p. 13.

⁹⁴ However, IP-telephony is still prohibited, though it in practise is impossible to control.

⁹⁵ Sida, 2000, p. 42-44.

on development research in Tanzania, called TZ-ONLINE. The database is funded by UNDP and the Tanzanian Government, and is open to the public.

When it comes to e-communities there is Tanzanet, Zanzinet and the eThinkTank. Tanzanet and Zanzinet are mainly turning to Tanzanians abroad. They offer Tanzanian news and have discussion forums, where political and religious issues are debated. The eThinkTank is a network for ICT-professionals, which mainly exist on its web site and e-mail list, though there are sometimes “live” sessions.⁹⁶ The list discusses all issues relating to ICT, though there is a focus on policy-issues and e-commerce. The eThinkTank recently presented a proposal for a national ICT-policy.

In the document, e-democracy is mentioned, though the term used is “e-governance”. It is said to consist of three components:

- “The first is gathering information as a basis for policy development, and the public dissemination of the results of policy deliberations.
- The second involves using ICT to facilitate participation and debate in order to formulate policies and set strategic directions and priorities.
- The third component – and the most advanced – involves electing political representatives using ICT.”⁹⁷

This should be seen as first evidence that there are indeed proponents for e-democracy in Tanzania even at this stage. With African measures, the eThinkTank is quite unique, and it has been given international attention, for example from the G8.

Several newspapers have web sites where they publish their paper-edition online, though it is still uncommon with net-only newspapers. Africa Online and Tanzania News are part of international companies and offer online-news only, though they produce few articles themselves.

Conclusion on Tanzania’s e-readiness

Given that we only expect collective access, the constraints for popular use of the Internet in the cities are mainly about people’s low purchase power. Rurally, the situation is much more difficult, both regarding electricity, telephones, Internet hosts, Internet cafés and maintenance staff. It remains to be seen how government and donor action can change this situation. As mentioned earlier, technology-development in form of low-orbiting satellites, mobile Internet, and cheap solar-panels could bring down demands on infrastructure dramatically.

⁹⁶ Interview with Mr. David J. A Sawe, Director Management Information Systems in the Civil Service Department, The President’s Office, and member of the Interim Steering Committee of the eSecretariat, part of the eThinkTank, Dar es Salaam, 20 July 2001.

⁹⁷ eSecretariat, [2001], “Proposal for Tanzania’s ICT Policy Formulation Framework”, p. 15. (the eSecretariat is a part of the eThinkTank)

What function could e-democracy fill in Tanzania?

General aspects on the Internet and democratisation in Tanzania

Let us now try to compare the characteristics of the Internet with characteristics of Tanzanian society, to see how the Internet generally can weaken neopatrimonial structures and strengthen democratisation. The most striking parallel is the vertical organisation of Tanzanian society compared to the Internet's horizontal structure. With the Internet, information and communication could be spread in a more egalitarian way in organisations and institutions. Likewise, anonymity on the net could be of great importance in the patriarchal and ethnically based Tanzanian society. The power of the old could be challenged if the Internet was used more extensively, because of young people's advantage in learning how to use new technology. The difficulty in controlling access and use of the Internet could also lessen the state's ability to demand self-censorship on people and thereby support freedom of expression. The reduced importance of place in time and space could also be of great importance for a country with as poor infrastructure as Tanzania's. Reduced costs for communication as well as increased speed could increase the amount of communication in Tanzania. As it is now, letters and phone calls are very expensive, and a letter can take weeks to deliver. This would simplify political activity in the country. An interesting aspect is that text on the Internet is generally short and accompanied with pictures. This could be an advantage for Tanzanians that rarely read books, and thus are not used to longer texts.

Increased Internet-use could thus theoretically make Tanzanian society more egalitarian. However, as the situation of connectivity looks today, the Internet's main political role in Tanzania will be to support pluralism within elites, and help cracking up clientelist patterns. For common people, the radio will probably remain the dominant mass medium for quite some time.

Prospects for e-democracy in Tanzania

Let us now assess if any of the four models of e-democracy is viable in Tanzania, if we only consider barriers set by the digital divide. *Elite democracy*, focusing on publishing information online, seems fully viable, though online voting is out of the question. Elite democracy is probably also the democracy model that lies closest to the political system in Tanzania of today, although the same elite remains in power over time. *The representative liberal democracy* model is a bit too demanding, as it implies that a large part of the citizens participate in political parties online. To accept this model one has to apply an extremely *radical* perspective, where exclusion is not a reason to refrain from e-democracy, as long as the application does not necessarily demand full popular participation, as in referendums. *The participatory democracy-model*, focusing on referendums, is thus out of the question. However, the *deliberative model* could be adopted, as it does not demand that everyone participate. Limited consultations could be carried out, as long as one sticks to a sample of the population, and lowers the demands on being representative for the whole population.

What is possible is thus a deliberative elite democracy, with some marginal elements of representative liberal democracy; a strange hybrid indeed. Let us for a while care little about implications for democracy theory, and instead see how it could work out practically in Tanzanian state institutions and political parties. Financial resources, when lacking, should be taken from donor funds, of which there are plenty.

The parliament

Information: The parliament could have a web site for publishing current bills being processed, bills passed, reports, as well as information about elections, the political procedure and presentations of MPs. Minutes from the parliamentary debate could be published (the Hansard), and the actual debate could also be broadcast live online. This would be important for journalists, political parties as well as interested citizens with access. Access to passed laws would be a great benefit to courts, where staff sometimes is unaware of current legislation.

Consultation: The parliamentary committees could build up a system for regular consultations through online citizen panels. To be representative, the participants would have to be spread over the country. The consultations could utilise already existing computers with Internet-access, for example in community telecenters. The participants would be a sample of citizens, picked randomly in the districts. As mentioned, the number of the participants would have to be adjusted to what is viable. They would discuss real issues with other citizens and in the end make a vote. Real time discussion would not be necessary. Access to expert information would give citizens a real opportunity to build their own opinions independently. As it is today, the lack of newspapers make people very much dependent on rumours, and the informal CCM information-structure. An independent NGO could facilitate the panels, from running the technical platform to picking the participants and giving them training. The participants would be anonymous, but the result would be public and it would serve as advise to the parliament. This would increase citizen presence in the parliament, and could be one way to empower citizens and build a more egalitarian political culture. A less demanding model would be for each committee to have an online discussion forum open to the public.

The government

Information: The government could publish all official documents on a web site. Documents could include budget information, policy proposals (White Papers), proposals put forward for consideration and public discussion (Green Papers), diplomatic documents such as treaties, reports from committees of inquiry and reports produced in the ministries. This would benefit journalists, politicians, the bureaucracy and interested citizens.

Consultation: Each ministry could have a discussion forum for receiving suggestions from various stakeholders.

Political parties

Information: All major political parties could have web sites where information about organisation, ideology, policy, contacts etc is presented. This would provide members, voters and journalists with up-to-date information. Also drafts of party programs, party policy proposals etc could be published for comment from the members. This would give members new tools for being active and challenging the party elite.

Consultation: Online discussion forums, open to the public could be established on the web sites. They could serve as new arenas for the public debate in Tanzania. There could also be conference-systems on the web sites for internal debate. This could increase the internal debate in the hierarchical parties. With more pluralism, the importance of the party leadership could be reduced, and the parties thus become more institutionalised.

What are the pros and cons?

Intuitively, these actions might seem very far from reality and shooting high over the target in a country as poor as Tanzania. Three important arguments speak against this. The first is, that provided that documents are written on computers, the cost for putting them on the web is marginal. Likewise, the consultations could be carried out without major costs, as they could be co-ordinated with other ICT-initiatives, like community telecentres. Studies from the industrialised world show that e-democracy is more dependent on commitment and political will than on resources. Secondly, Tanzania has a rapidly growing number of Internet-users. Why should there not also be a political aspect of the Internet for Tanzanians? Or as Benjamin Barber has put it “Should it be a place for commerce or a place for us?”⁹⁸ Third, these projects might actually be small steps towards a more egalitarian, plural and open society. Citizen consultations could especially help giving voice to young, women and politically marginalised ethnic minorities.

After having made this speech of defence over e-democracy in Tanzania, I will also try to problematise it somewhat. To start with, the issue of connectivity is not the only technical obstacle to e-democracy. Also in the industrialised world, it is acknowledged that there are major issues of accessibility, usability and security that e-democracy must tackle.⁹⁹ Even the least demanding form of e-democracy, information, is faced with large obstacles. There must be citizens that have the time and money it takes to access it, they must know that the information exists, and they must be motivated to access it.¹⁰⁰ Another major obstacle is the low user-competence in Tanzania. Rural people hardly have any experience of digital technology, and would demand extensive training to be able to participate in a citizen consultation.

One should also have in mind that ICT-projects in Africa have a very high rate of failure.¹⁰¹ One example is the Tanzanian Integrated Financial Management System that was brought to 27 pilot districts. Non of the districts had managed to close the financial year in the new system, and a consultancy-report especially pointed at the lack of ownership as a reason for this.¹⁰²

A greater concern is however if there would be institutional ownership within the government for e-democracy. There are most likely constraints on to what extent it wants to increase transparency and citizen influence.¹⁰³ Both citizen panels and online publication might demand constitutional change; and thus a genuine interest from policy-makers. This interest is essential, as e-democracy should not be a gimmick; there must be a serious intention behind, and if a citizen panel is implemented, it must also have impact on policy-making.¹⁰⁴ Another

⁹⁸ Barber, Benjamin, [1999], “En plats för kommers eller en plats för oss? IT i demokratiteoretiskt ljus”, in SOU 1999:17, *IT i demokratins tjänst*, Demokratiutredningen.

⁹⁹ Coleman, Stephen & Gøtze, John, [2001], “Bowling Together - Online Public Engagement in Policy Deliberation”. www.bowlingtogether.net 2001-12-28.

¹⁰⁰ Heeks, Richard, [2000], “Government Data: Understanding the Barriers to Citizen Access and Use.” idpm.man.ac.uk/idpm/isps_wp10.htm 2001-12-28, p. 5.

¹⁰¹ Heeks, Richard, [2001], “Understanding e-Governance for Development”. idpm.man.ac.uk/idpm/igov11.htm 2001-12-28, p. 18.

¹⁰² “Review of Platinum Implementation in 28 LGAs, Debriefing Notes, 2 May 2001.”

¹⁰³ For a good discussion on different views on access to government information, see Heeks, 2000.

¹⁰⁴ Coleman & Gøtze, 2001.

risk it that the government would point at e-democracy and say “See what we are doing for democracy”, and use this as an excuse for not carrying out other democratic reforms. One must therefore always be clear on that e-democracy is a complement to “normal” democracy, and that fundamental political rights and institutions must be in place and respected.

Other concerns relate to democracy theory. Although most democratic governments would agree to publish information and have a public discussion forum, not all would agree that there should be online citizen panels. The idea of deliberative democracy does not have universal support, why this should be taken into account. Even if one supports deliberative democracy, Tanzanian citizens might not be the ideal participants. According to Jürgen Habermas, who is one of the main theorists behind the model, it is only when the individuals’ autonomy is secured, and their freedom is respected that there is a basis for rational participants in deliberations.¹⁰⁵ The authoritarian aspects of Tanzanian society, and the outspread poverty makes one doubt if people really are autonomous enough. Is it desirable to give common Tanzanians influence over complex and important political issues? Imagine a farmer from the small town of Kibaya, who might never read a newspaper, and with little knowledge about the surrounding world. Would he or his wife be able to take aspects like globalisation into account in their decisions? Let alone, do they even have a conception of politics as anything but “bringing in the goods” to the constituency? This is a difficult issue, where arguments easily can emanate in elitism. A solution could though be to concentrate on issues, in which a majority of the population has expert-knowledge, such as poverty or agriculture. The function of the panels would rather be to gather information about the condition in the country then ask for real policy-advice.

To conclude, given all these obstacles, e-democracy in Tanzania should probably focus on information, while deliberative applications should be considered as experimental.

¹⁰⁵ Eriksen, Erik Oddvar & Weigård, Jarle, [2000], *Habermas politiska teori*. Studentlitteratur, Lund, p. 155.

Is there e-democracy in Tanzania?

State institutions

Figure 3 Tool of analysis for institutions

Topic	Question
<i>E-readiness and future plans for Internet use</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How are computers and the Internet used within the institution? - Is there a web site, and if so, what content does it have? - Future plans for use of the Internet
<i>Target group for the web site</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is it for Tanzanians, Tanzanians abroad or foreigners? - What language is used?
<i>Democratic quality of the web site</i> <i>Institutional ownership of the web site</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - e-commerce, e-government or e-democracy? - Inform or consult? - Any indications of non-democratic use? - Is the initiative driven by an individual enthusiast, a donor or the institution? - Outsourced or home-made web site? - Financed by the institution or by donor? - Is the web site updated over time?

The following questions will give an insight into the appearance of e-democracy in Tanzanian state institutions:

First, *e-readiness and future plans for Internet use* is presented. The topic gives a basic idea of where the institution stands, and where it is heading when it comes to the use of the Internet. Here, it will be presented how the Internet is used within the institution. If possible, an estimate of the number of computers connected to the Internet is made. The existence and content of a web site is crucial, why web sites are visited and assessed. Plans for further development of the institution's use of the Internet are then handled. As it is difficult to assess how far in the process plans have come, they should be considered with some caution.

The target group for the web site can vary between Tanzanians, Tanzanians abroad and foreigners, for example investors or donors. The target group is important, since a domestic Tanzanian focus is a precondition for e-democracy. Use of English instead of Kiswahili means that many Tanzanians will find it difficult to use the web site.

Democratic quality of the web site means that intentions behind, and to some extent the content of the web site is considered. Is it e-commerce, e-government or e-democracy, according to my definitions? If there is e-democracy, how advanced is it? Information can be ranged from contact information to Green Papers. A further step would be to have possibilities for interaction. Finally, possible indications of non-democratic use are discussed. Such indications could be web content dominated by regime leaders, untruths about the opposition or the appearance of hate speech.

Since the assumption of this thesis is that Internet-usage is in its earliest stage, it is important to study the *institutional ownership of the web site*. When the Internet was a new phenomenon in the industrialised world, it was easy to find web sites for organisations that some enthusiast had put up, but that had not been integrated into the regular activities of the organisation.

Therefore, they were not updated and people soon lost interest in them. Ownership is thus a precondition for that the web site will be “alive” over time, but also for the possibility of the Internet to have an institutional impact. The first question asked is *whose initiative* was it to build a web site? More credit is given if it was the management rather than some individual enthusiast or donor that drove the process. The second question is if the *construction of the web site* was outsourced or not. The answer can have different meanings. An outsourced web site shows that the institution is prepared to invest hard cash into it, and it thus indicates ownership. A home-made web site does not necessarily have to mean the opposite. If competent staff is assigned to the task and given resources to work with, this could also be a sign of ownership. Third, *whose money* financed the web site and the necessary hardware? If only the institution’s money is used, it indicates stronger ownership. Finally, an *updated* web site might be the strongest indication for that the institution cares about it.

E-readiness and future plans for Internet use

The government has a quite short history of using computers. The level of e-readiness differs quite a lot between the ministries. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals even have their own web sites, while others only have a few computers. A more thorough examination of all the ministries can not be made here. Two general digital systems have however been launched in the Tanzanian ministries. The first is an Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) that is used by all ministries in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma via a wide area network, and the other an integrated HR and Payroll system.¹⁰⁶

There is today one National and one Government web site, both at the same web address. The National web site provides basic information about the country, with presentations of branches of business, tourism attractions, the political system, ongoing state-reforms and various topics related to the Tanzanian society. In time, there will also be profiles of Tanzanian companies on the site. The Government web site is a portal where ministries and their agencies are presented briefly, together with contact information and links to their respective web sites. One can also find the national constitution, some policy documents, press releases and speeches by the president. The two web sites were officially launched in December 2001, though both have been available on the net since May 2001.

A new government net is being built around the National and Government web sites, where all ministries will have one external web site and one internal. Staff in the ministries will be trained so that they can update the web sites themselves. There will also be communication between the ministries. There are plans for bringing computers down to government offices on regional and district level, connected via the landlines. There could even be ICTs on ward level, where the civil servants could use palm pilots.¹⁰⁷

The parliament bought some computers in 1994, and got another 26 from the UNDP in 2000. For the MPs, there is an Internet-café consisting of 7 computers and it has about 60 visitors during each day of session. In 2000, 180 MPs were given Internet-training. However, half of them did not come back to the parliament after the election the same year. Among the new MPs, 50 were IT-literate. Altogether, 200 of the about 300 MPs are IT-literate. The

¹⁰⁶ Ntiro, Simbo, [2000] “eGovernment in East Africa”.

www.ethinktanz.org/secretariat/DocArchive/EGOVERNMENTea.htm 2001-12-28.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Mr. Sawe.

parliament has some problems with Internet-access, as there is little capacity in the landlines to Dar es Salaam.¹⁰⁸

The current web site is from 1997 and has not been updated for years. According to the menus, information about most parliament issues would have been presented here, but little is available. A new web site is however about to be launched¹⁰⁹. Apart from general information about how the parliament works, the new web site will mainly consist of three databases:

- The first will contain bills and acts. All documents produced by the parliament since 1926 will be available in Adobe Acrobat-format. The task is quite large since all documents have to be scanned.
- The second is the Tanzanian Parliament Online Information System that will contain information about what is happening in parliament, for example debates.
- The third will be a database over the MPs, where as much information as possible will be available, including CVs. This database will only be available for authenticated users; that is government departments, political parties and people interested in politics.¹¹⁰

There are plans to increase Internet-connectivity for MPs in rural areas, so that they can work from home. Every MP would then be given his or her own computer. So far, a study has been carried out. There are also plans to increase the number of computers available in the parliament to about 100 from the end of 2002.¹¹¹

Target group for the web site

The Government and National web sites have a quite broad target group; they are for all in the world that can access the Internet. The Tanzanian public could however also be reached by CD-ROMs with the content of the web sites on it. These CD-ROMs would be distributed to areas where there is no Internet-access. This is however still only an idea. English is the first language used in the web site, but since the government wants to promote Kiswahili, all content is translated into this language.¹¹²

The Parliament web site is using English in its web site, as the parliament is trying to limit the use of Kiswahili as much as possible. This way it will be easier to communicate with other parliaments. According to the co-ordinator of the web site, the Tanzanian target group understands English. When the project of spreading the Internet to all MPs is completed, there will however be two language options; one English and one Kiswahili.¹¹³ So far, the web site seems to be focusing both on foreigners and Tanzanians that speak English.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Mr. Thomas Didimu Kashililah, Head of *IT, Research & Projects*, Tanzania Parliament, Dar es Salaam, 16 July 2001.

¹⁰⁹ It was about to be launched in July 2001, but because of difficulties, the new date is set to January 2002. A trial version is already available online.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Mr. Kashililah.

¹¹¹ Interview with Mr. Kashililah.

¹¹² Dr. Ngalinda, Co-ordinator of the Government and National Web site, Civil Service Department in the President's Office, Dar es Salaam 4 July 2001.

¹¹³ Interview with Mr. Kashililah.

Democratic quality of the web site

The Government and National web sites do not have an outspoken objective to strengthen democracy, though increased transparency and good governance is mentioned as one of the benefits.¹¹⁴ The National web site mainly consists of country information for tourists and investors, though there is also a description of the political system of Tanzania and some of its reform processes. By and large, I consider the National web site to be an example of e-commerce and e-government.

The Government web site has a more political approach. As it is today, contact information dominates the site. When asked about what kind of government information that will be published, the co-ordinator of the web site put emphasis on presidential speeches. But he also said that the staff of the web site is only publishing objective material, and that it was no place for propaganda. He ended by saying "Tanzania goes from all secret to all open."¹¹⁵ Indeed, the web site gives no indication of being a propaganda-tool, but it does not offer much information that can be used for political participation either. There are no Green Papers or White Papers available at this stage. Only a few ministries are represented in the publication-area, and the publications that are listed cannot be opened. There are a few reports that can be read under "what's new". Despite an outspoken objective to co-ordinate the government's publishing on the web site, more policy-documents can be found in the research database TZ-ONLINE.

According to the co-ordinator, there are no plans for online dialogue at this stage. To conclude, the Government web site contains elements of e-democracy, though in a very early stage. As it has only been operative for a short period, this is understandable. So far the Government web site looks more like e-government than e-democracy. If there is going to be a move towards greater e-democracy, more documents with importance for political participation must be published.

The Parliament web site is difficult to assess, since it has not yet been put online. What is known so far about the databases indicates that it can become an important tool for political participation. One question is however raised when it comes to authentication of users of the database over members of parliament. It seems plausible that a person that uses the database is interested in politics, which is the minimum criterion for being authenticated. Therefore, a process of authentication seems superfluous, unless there will be other unknown criteria for accessing the database. It should be the right of every Tanzanian to have equal access to information about his or her parliament, without having to be registered.

There will be a real-time chat on the web site, but there are no plans for citizen consultations at this point.

On the whole, the parliament web site seems to be a clear example of e-democracy. The use of English does however limit the number of Tanzanians that will be able to benefit from the site. A clearer focus on Tanzanians would be desirable. The web site could perhaps be considered to be an elite e-democracy project.

¹¹⁴ Planning Commission, President's Office, [2001], "Project proposal: Strengthening of the Tanzania National Website".

¹¹⁵ Interview with Dr. Ngalinda.

Institutional ownership of the web site

The National and Government web sites were initiated by President Benjamin Mkapa, after he had made a trip to Washington D.C. to meet with the World Bank and the IMF. He was there inspired to start up a national web site to support investment, tourism and good governance.¹¹⁶ The task was given to the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania, who decided to outsource it. An international tender was floated in 1997, and it was won by COSTECH and the COMNET-IT. The work did however not proceed very fast, so the task was taken back to the Planning Commission in the President's Office, where it has remained. A steering committee has been set up, as well as a technical team and a co-ordinating unit. The co-ordinator himself has done most of the construction work of the sites. Lack of staff and hardware has been obstacles in the construction process.¹¹⁷

So far, construction of the web sites has solely been financed by the government. To further develop the sites and maintain them, an application has been send to Sida.¹¹⁸

The web sites are being updated continuously. New press releases and speeches pour in now and then, all though it might not be worth the trouble to check the web site on a daily basis.

The overall impression of the National and Government web sites is that there is a strong institutional ownership for them. The fact that the government first outsourced construction and then took it back is good proof for this. The government has also decided that its web sites are not just side -activities, but core activities.¹¹⁹ Another example of the strong ownership is when the Prime Minister called the co-ordinator and threatened to fire him if he did not finish the sites on time (!) . Since the government has financed development of the sites, the recent application for donor support does not have to mean weak institutionalisation; it could rather be interpreted as that the government wants to assure that the web sites remain over time.

The parliament's first web site is a good example of a project with low institutionalisation. It was initiated and financed by the Ford Foundation that ran a larger program for civic education. The program also included a parliament radio programme and a magazine. Mr. Kashililah in the parliament administration had the responsibility for the web site. He updated the site three times, but when he went abroad for studies, no one in the administration felt any responsibility for the web site. Since then it has remained as it was in 1998.¹²⁰

The case with the new web site is different. This time, the parliament as an institution has been the driving force. It is the official policy of the parliament to go fully IT, and the speaker says that the parliament should provide as much information as possible to people. Most ideas do however come from Mr. Kashililah, as he is head of the department of IT, Research & Projects, and thus gets a lot of ideas from visiting parliaments in other countries.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Ngalinda.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Dr. Ngalinda.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Dr. Ngalinda.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Mr. Sawe.

¹²⁰ Interview with Dr. Ngalinda.

¹²¹ Interview with Mr. Kashililah.

So far no donor has been involved in the parliament automatization project, though there might be some interested. The work with the web site has been fully outsourced, and only the planning is made by the parliament.¹²²

To sum up, there seems to be a strong institutional ownership of the new parliament web site.

Analysis

When it comes to e-readiness and future plans, both institutions have come up with surprising initiatives. Both have produced pretty advanced web sites and both have initiated larger e-strategies. Now it just remains to see if they are implemented. It was though a bit odd that the parliament, that represents the people, has decided to have a foreign focus on its web site, while the government is using both English and Kiswahili, although the content largely is directed to foreigners. As one could expect, the parliament had a clearer focus on e-democracy on its web site than the government had.

What is most surprising about these e-initiatives is that the institutional ownership is so strong in both cases. They were initiated by the top, and they have been allowed to cost money, without any support from donors. The National and Government web sites are updated on a regular basis, although it could be more often, while the parliament web site has not been launched when this is written (March 2002).

Political parties

Figure 4 Tool of analysis for parties

Topic	Question
<i>E-readiness and future plans for Internet use</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How are computers and the Internet used within the party? - Is there a web site, and if so, what content does it have? - Future plans for computers and the Internet in the party
<i>Target group for the web site</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is it for Tanzanians, Tanzanians abroad or foreigners? - What language is used?
<i>Democratic quality of the web site</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inform or interact
<i>Party ownership of the web site</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initiative driven by individual enthusiast, donor or the party? - Outsourced or home-made? - Financed by the party or by donor? - Is the web site updated over time?
<i>Policy issues</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Should there be censorship of the Internet? - What is the democratic potential of the Internet in Tanzania?

This tool of analysis is quite similar to the one used for state institutions, though some questions have been changed or removed, and the new topic of policy issues has been added.

Under *E-readiness and future plans for Internet use*, the same things are measured as for institutions. The same is true for *Target group for the web site*.

¹²² Interview with Mr. Kashililah.

Democratic quality of the web site is however different. Here it is assessed if the web site provides information and means for interaction to its members, or if it is rather a campaign site. Both intention and practise is assessed, as not all web sites have been launched when this is written. It is of course difficult to judge how interactive elements will be used and if they will have any real impact on the party. The very presence of a discussion forum or a chat page must though be seen as steps forward.

Institutional ownership of the web site is the same as for state institutions, though one could expect that there are smaller possibilities for internal funding, as well as smaller financial possibilities for outsourcing. Furthermore, it is easier for an enthusiast in a party to keep a web site updated than it is in a parliament.

The topic *Policy issues* will bring some light over what the parties believe about e-democracy. As mentioned initially, the results should not be considered as hard scientific data, but rather as measures of knowledge and interest among the parties interviewed. There might be a correlation between how active the party is in using the Internet, and how radical they are in their policies. Because of the close connection between the state and CCM, government policies will be interpreted as CCM policy.

The parties are asked about the *democratic potential of the Internet in Tanzania*. This includes general beliefs about e-democracy, if it is for now or tomorrow, how the government should use e-democracy, and what levels of government that should be using the Internet in general. The attitude to *censorship* is of great importance, since the absence of it is of fundamental for e-democracy. With a media climate that is characterised by self-censorship, the Internet could really be a tool for freedom of expression. When the studies were carried out, there was some political debate in Tanzania on censoring the Internet.

E-readiness and future plans for Internet use

CCM has a few Internet-connected computers in their headquarters in Dodoma and one in their sub-headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Most regional offices only use computers for word-processing. There are plans to computerise regional and district offices and to create an intranet within the party. Today, radio is used for communication within the party. The party has a web site that was launched in spring 2001. It contains the election manifesto of 2000, the party constitution, names of party functionaries and an organisation chart. There are also menus for “what the papers say”, current events, press releases and speeches by the chairman. Most of these sections are however empty, or just contain old material. There are plans to expand the web site with a discussion forum. The company that manages the web site argued that the party should wait with the discussion forum until the site was stable enough.¹²³ The web site is easy to find through a standard search engine.

CUF has about six computers in the party. They are found in the headquarters on Zanzibar and in the main office in Dar es Salaam. No region or district offices have computers. Financial restraints as well as low IT-literacy within the party are the reasons for this. When it comes to political discussions online, Zanzinet is used by some party members. Zanzinet is not run by CUF, but individual members use it for education on democratic issues. Sometimes discussions are even carried out in Kiswahili. Individual members also use e-mail for exchanging information and ideas. The party uses the Internet for contacting organisations

¹²³ Interview with Mr. Albert Missana, IT Officer at the CCM headquarters, Dodoma, 10 July, 2001.

outside Tanzania, like human rights organisations, the EU and the UN. Despite insight in the advantages of anonymity when discussing on the Internet, CUF's spokesperson argues that the main reason for the party using the Internet is that it saves time and makes things easier.¹²⁴ CUF has had a web site since 1999. It contains names of party functionaries, contact information, policy documents, links to human rights organisations, reports on human rights violations in Zanzibar and some articles discussing the politics in Tanzania. The web site is difficult to find through a standard search engine. CUF would like to increase its use of technology. The party is organising its office to use more ICT, and it is encouraging its members to undertake computer studies. CUF is also setting up an NGO that will work with ICT and promote opposition parties.¹²⁵

CHADEMA has two computers; one in the parliament office and one in the party headquarters. The lack of funding is the main reason for this. The party has a very basic web site containing contact information and a scanned party-document.¹²⁶ There are no difficulties in accessing this site, and it is easily found in search engines. There is however a new site planned, which will contain the party constitution, the history of the party, strategies, information for how to become a member, information about current events in the party and information about the elected board. It will also offer free e-mail. No interactive components have so far been included in the web site, but there might be a chat if the bandwidth and space allows for this.¹²⁷ In the future, CHADEMA will try to attract educated members through becoming an online party.¹²⁸ It is easy to find the web site through a standard search engine.

NCCR has just installed its first three PCs in the party headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Another 30 have been ordered and will be spread to party offices throughout the country, starting with the regional offices. A web site was launched during the autumn 2001. It contains the party's new strategic plan, party policies, the party constitution, the party history, press releases, party news, a request for donations that includes a budget for how donations will be used, contact information, organisation schedules and the names of all national party functionaries (some with pictures). It is possible to join the party via the Internet. There will also be a discussion forum.¹²⁹ It is difficult to find the web site through a standard search engine.

NCCR is the party with the best-articulated plans for using the Internet. It plays an important role in the party's Strategic Plan, where one can read how computers and Internet will be rolled out to the party offices, following a set time schedule. The plan further mentions training of party leaders and staff and the need for increased communication within the party, both horizontally and vertically. The web site is also mentioned under the section on public relations.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹²⁵ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹²⁶ Interview with Dr Aman Walid Kabourou, Opposition Leader in the parliament and Secretary General of CHADEMA, Dodoma, 10 July 2001.

¹²⁷ Interview with Mr. Eliawon Philemon, Web designer CHADEMA, 18 July 2001.

¹²⁸ Interview with Dr. Kabourou.

¹²⁹ Interview with Mr. Mbatia.

¹³⁰ NCCR-Mageuzi, 2001.

UDP has one computer, but it is not connected to the Internet. Plans for a web site are also in the pipeline, though there might be some time before they will be realised. Finance is the main obstacle to overcome. The aim of the web site will be to deploy information about the party, for example by publishing a party program, leadership profiles and weekly plans of what is going on in the party. There might also be a discussion forum. One of the party leaders has tried online discussions arranged by the Friedman Norman Foundation in Germany, which is an organisation that is close to the German Liberals.¹³¹

TLP has one computer in its headquarter in Dar es Salaam, but it is not connected to the Internet. The party has only received government funding for a year,¹³² and it can not even afford a printer or a telephone line. “You cannot expect much from the opposition under such circumstances” as the secretary general says. The TLP will however purchase more computers, and next year there might be an Internet-connection. Donor-funding would be very much welcome.¹³³

Target group for the web site

CCM's web site is more for people outside Tanzania, than inside. It is mainly focusing on Tanzanians abroad. Because of the low connectivity in Tanzania, and with most users concentrated to Dar as Salaam, the Internet is of little importance for the party, as a medium for reaching the masses. The language used on the web site today is a mix of English and Kiswahili. The plan is to have one English and one Kiswahili version.¹³⁴

CUF mainly has an international aim with its web site. It is mostly for Tanzanians abroad and international organisations like Amnesty International, the UN and the EU. One of the main tasks is to inform about human rights violations in Tanzania. The combination of low political interest among people and low connectivity gives the Internet low priority for CUF.¹³⁵ The party web site is available in both English and Kiswahili, though some material is only available in one of the languages.

CHADEMA argues that when not even the party leaders have access to e-mail, it is not realistic to try to communicate with the wider population. The target group is instead parties and politicians, especially abroad. In the future, CHADEMA will try to become an online party, in order to attract new members.¹³⁶ According the CHADEMA's web designer, the main language in the new web site will be Kiswahili, even though he will also try to provide an English version.¹³⁷ This is somewhat contradictory to the target groups identified by the secretary general.

NCCR is the party with the most domestic target group for its web site. The party's Strategic

¹³¹ Interview with Mr. Amani Jidulamabambasi, Member of Central Committee UDP, and Mr Dadi Kombo Maalim, Deputy Secretary General UDP, Dar es Salaam, 21 July, 2001.

¹³² Government funding is distributed after seats in parliament.

¹³³ Interview with Mr. Harold Jaffu, Secretary General TLP and Mr. Shunashu Alex, Deputy Director Administration TLP, Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2001.

¹³⁴ Interview with Mr. Missana.

¹³⁵ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹³⁶ Interview with Dr. Kabourou.

¹³⁷ Interview with Mr. Philemon.

Plan mentions the web site as a tool for increasing public acceptability. As increased Internet-connectivity within the party organisation is an objective, one can also assume that the web site will be used internally in the party. This is however not expressed straight out.¹³⁸ The NCCR web site offers most of its content in both English and Kiswahili versions.

UDP's web site will mainly be for Tanzanians abroad and for the outside world. It will be available in both English and Kiswahili.¹³⁹

TLP has no web site, and there are still no plans in the pipeline. If the party had had a web site, it would have focused on people abroad, because of the low connectivity.¹⁴⁰

Democratic quality of the web sites

CCM mostly offers basic information on its web site, and the discussion forum has not yet been launched. The site could so far not make much difference for the internal party democracy, as it is badly updated and several pages lack content. The use of Kiswahili is a plus though.

CUF has a web site with several policy documents and political articles. There are also links to documents from organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about the human rights situation in Tanzania. Overall, CUF's web site is more generous with information than the CCM web site. Also here, there is a lack of an official discussion forum. It is positive that both English and Kiswahili are used.

CHADEMA's current web site offers little more than contact information and a party document. As with UDP, it remains to be seen what CHADEMA's coming web site will contain.

NCCR's web site is quite generous with information. It is positive that the site focuses on Tanzanians, and connected party members can easily access both the party's policies, the Strategic Plan as well as the names and pictures of their elected representatives. This makes it a democratic tool for party members, though the discussion forum is not yet in place.

Party ownership of the web site

CCM's web site was initiated by the technical staff of the party. The construction of the site was outsourced, though it was difficult to make the party fund it. No donor has been involved in the work (CCM is not associated with any political international).¹⁴¹ The fact that the party has spent quite some money on the web site indicates ownership. On the other hand, the site is often down and several sections are empty, while others have not been updated since the site was launched. The funding must also be put into perspective with CCM's comparatively large financial resources. It thus seems that the ownership could be stronger, though I would by no means characterise it as weak.

¹³⁸ NCCR-Mageuzi, 2001.

¹³⁹ Interview with Mr. Jidulamabambasi and Mr. Maalim.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Mr. Jaffu and Mr. Shunashu.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Mr. Missana.

CUF's web site is often unreachable, though it has been quite well updated when it has been accessible. CUF has so far been dependent on donors when buying technology, mainly from the Liberal International.¹⁴² I have not managed to get information on who initiated the web site, and if the construction was outsourced or not. Because of this lack of information, it is difficult to assess the party ownership. For a strong ownership speaks the facts that CUF has had its web site since 1999 and that the party elite in CUF are frequent users of both e-mail and the web. Still, the web site is not available online.

CHADEMA's first web site was initiated and hosted by the Democrat Union of Africa (part of the right wing International Democrat Union). It has not been updated since it was launched. Some individual party members initiated the new web site. A son of a CHADEMA-member makes it, since the party could not afford to have it made professionally.¹⁴³ The web site seems to be a project driven and implemented by enthusiasts. As the party has not provided the necessary material for the web site, little progress has been made in constructing the web site. Also the fact that the secretary general has a foreign target group for the web site, while the web designer is making it in Kiswahili implies that the party ownership could be stronger.

NCCR's web site is made by party members. Though no information has been obtained about who initiated it, it is clear that there is a strong party ownership for the site as it is today. As mentioned, the web site and ICT play an important role in the Strategic Plan. The plan even mentions the need for a webmaster to maintain the site over time. As it has not been online for very long, it is difficult to assess how well updated it really is. NCCR also stands out since it is the first party to have invested in a large number of computers for their regional offices. According to the party leader, all funding comes from party supporters.¹⁴⁴ This investment is a sign of strong ownership for the use of ICT in the party. However, as in most parties it seemed that the level of awareness about the ICT-projects varies within the party leadership. Hopefully, the planned ICT-training can change this.

TLP and **UDP** are at a too early stage in the development of a web site to be assessed.

Policy issues

CCM

Censorship: A week prior to the interview with the CCM press-secretary, president Mkapa made a statement that could be interpreted as if censorship was desirable when it came to pornography in Internet-café's. The press secretary however explained that the party had urged Internet-café owners to exercise self-censorship regarding pornography. According to him, the party is not for censorship of the Internet, and does not even think there would be resources to do it.¹⁴⁵

Democratic potential: When it comes to the democratic potential of the Internet, CCM argues that the Internet is still in an early stage in Tanzania, and that it will only have an impact in the future. Therefore consultations are rejected as unrealistic.¹⁴⁶ Since CCM is the only party

¹⁴² Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹⁴³ Interview with Dr. Kabourou.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Mr. Mbatia.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with the CCM Press secretary, Dar es Salaam, 17 July 2001.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with the CCM Press secretary.

that has a real political influence, government policy will also be considered here. The National and Government web sites were initiated by president Mkapa, though there has so far not been much of e-democracy showed there. It is however clear that the sitting government supports transparency, at least in its cameral form. To widen the picture further, an interview was made with the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Communication and Transport that is responsible for the national ICT-policy. He was not aware of the concept of e-democracy, but thought that ICT would bring more transparency. E-democracy did not seem to have any outspoken role in the work with the national ICT-policy.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted that the MOCT had only had its task for a few weeks when the interview was made.¹⁴⁸

CUF

Censorship: CUF argues that pornography is incompatible with African values, and that an independent government body should censor part of it. The body should monitor rather than control. Also other illegal content should be censored, such as pictures of people that have been killing each other. “They will educate something that will not be very useful to people. It has negative impact on boys in USA” according to the CUF spokesperson. The party admits that censorship might bring risks for democracy, why there has to be a good law for monitoring.¹⁴⁹

Democratic potential: CUF argues that it will take time until the Internet can have an impact on democracy in Tanzania. Still, there is hope within the party that the Internet can help to change attitudes among the political elite, and make them more open to democracy. “The government has to establish a policy for using the Internet as a mean of communication for strengthening democracy”¹⁵⁰. CUF also thinks that the government should be transparent and publish all information that is relevant. One example given is the budget discussions that take place in an internal committee in the parliament, where no press is allowed. Another example is the Hansard, which can take a year to print on paper. The Internet could also be used for citizen consultations.¹⁵¹

CHADEMA

Censorship: CHADEMA does not think that there should be any censorship of the Internet.¹⁵²

Democratic potential: The party considers the Internet to be a very important medium for improving democracy. There are obstacles, like lack of electricity, but the Internet is growing rapidly in the country. “Politically weak could get their voices heard by the powerful. Direct communication could also reduce the tribal importance”, according to the secretary general. He also says that the Internet could be used for increasing participation in politics. One should push the local government to increase Internet-usage. When asked about the importance of consultations, the secretary general argued that there could be access provided for a few computers in every district. This would not just be for consultations, but also for other issues.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Mr. Salim H. Msoma, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Communications & Transport, Dar es Salaam, 23 July 2001.

¹⁴⁸ I also had an appointment with the prime minister, but it was unfortunately cancelled.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Mr. Mohamed.

¹⁵² Interview with Dr. Kabourou.

¹⁵³ Interview with Dr. Kabourou.

NCCR

Censorship: According to NCCR, all aspects of the openness of the Internet are not good, especially for children. Therefore the party thinks that there should be censorship of pornography. There is however a risk that censorship can go beyond and censor other things.¹⁵⁴

Democratic potential: The NCCR thinks that the government should go ahead with use of the Internet in the political process. Low connectivity should not be a reason for refraining from e-democracy. “Those who can manage the Internet should use it” says the party’s spokesperson. The government should publish all that is not secret on the Internet, like the Hansard, investment data, crops prices and tourism information. When asked about citizen consultations, the NCCR spokesperson said that it was not a bad idea, and that there could even be civic education given online. The party thinks that the government should use the Internet in region and district offices, though ward level would be impossible because of lack of electricity.¹⁵⁵

UDP

Censorship: UDP does not want censorship of the Internet, of any material what so ever, as long as it is within the law. It is the private freedom to watch pornography.¹⁵⁶

Democratic potential: The UDP thinks that anonymity and lack of censorship are among the main advantages of the Internet. This is of great value in Tanzania, where no newspapers are consistently trustworthy with news, as they all adjust to government views. But the spokesperson says that the Internet will only have a democratic impact in the future, as there is a lack of infrastructure. The government should start with publishing the law and constitution. There should also be day to day information about proceedings in government and districts. All arrests made should also be published, as there are many human rights violations, both towards parties and normal people. “Some are on national level, some are on local level, some are out of ignorance”. There should also be a possibility to comment on laws before they are made, and even to comment on privatisation of land and parastatals; “We don’t want the things Mugabe is doing to happen here”. All levels of government should use the Internet, but the education sector, the police and the attorney general should be prioritised.¹⁵⁷

TLP

Censorship: According to TLP, every development has its problem. Sexual material should be censored, as sexuality is confidential in Africa. But if one starts censoring one thing, others might follow. The party sees this as a problem.¹⁵⁸

Democratic potential: TLP believes that the Internet can increase the knowledge about what is happening in the outside world. This is especially important for political leaders, the spokesperson argues. As it is today, Tanzanian laws are often incompatible with what is

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Mr. Mnegeta J.B. Bhakome, Director of Campaign and Election Program NCCR, Dar es Salaam, 20 July 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Mr. Mnegeta J.B. Bhakome.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Mr. Jidulamabambasi and Mr. Maalim.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Mr. Jidulamabambasi and Mr. Maalim.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Mr. Jaffu and Mr. Shunashu.

happening outside Tanzania. TLP thinks that this could change if the government used technology more. The Internet could also be used for reporting human rights violations internationally. "Little is known about these things outside Tanzania, since the local press is in the hands of the government." When asked about the Internet as a forum for debate and consultation, the TLP spokesperson pointed at the problem of democratic values among people in Tanzania, and argued that increased knowledge through exchanging thoughts would improve this. When it comes to government usage of the Internet, TLP thinks it should start at district level, as this is the level where development takes place. "Most of the improper conduct of the government is carried out here; it is not a problem on national level. For example, all decisions regarding permissions to demonstrate are decided here. The Internet could change the culture on a local level to become more democratic and transparent."¹⁵⁹

Analysis

In the interpretation of the results, some help will be borrowed from the theoretical framework of Internet use and strategies in political parties, presented by Stephen Ward. It should be noted that Ward's assumptions are very open, and that this is not an attempt to falsify them.

To start with *e-readiness and future plans Internet use*, CUF and NCCR are currently the parties that are the most advanced users of the Internet. This contradicts Ward's assumption, that parties with a large proportion of members and supporters of high socio-economic status will have a better-developed Internet-strategy. Most offensive were instead poor people's NCCR, and CUF, that gathers much of its support from the relatively poor Zanzibar-islands. CHADEMA and UDP, that have clear business profiles, have not come as far in its Internet development. One would expect parties with close ties to the private sector to better be able to appreciate the potential of the Internet. In relation to its size and resources, CCM is also lagging behind. Ward's assumption, that ICT should be more central in communication strategies and more embedded in the party organisation in younger than in older parties, seems to be a reasonable explanation here. This does however not hold water for the opposition parties, as the relatively new TLP is marginalised in Internet use. Here, the thesis that parties with more organisational capacity will develop more sophisticated strategies than those with low capacity seems to be true. TLP has suffered hard from recent internal struggles, and is poor of resources.

When it comes to *target groups*, all parties except for NCCR focused on people outside Tanzania. This is not very surprising considering the low connectivity. Still, many saw future potential in the medium, like CHADEMA's idea of attracting more educated members.

The democratic quality of the web sites is so far characterised by information. NCCR and CUF are the most generous in providing information. CUF is so far the only party that uses the Internet for political discussion, though there was an interest in discussion forums also among other parties. Ward's assumption, that closed political systems should develop innovative and protest activity online does not seem to apply to the case of Tanzania, as web content overall was limited and there was little protest. This could be because Tanzania is a reasonably open society, but also because the high user costs are neutralising online protest.

When measuring *party ownership*, NCCR stands out because of their investment in hardware and the role of the web site in the strategic plan. Also CUF's leadership showed interest and

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Mr. Jaffu and Mr. Shunashu.

knowledge about the Internet, and it has historically been the leading ICT-party in Tanzania. However, the fact that the web site has been impossible to reach for a few months makes one wonder about the ownership. Though CCM paid a lot of money for their web site, it seems to be largely ignored by the party leadership. Together with CHADEMA, they seem to have the less anchored web sites, mainly driven by individuals. UDP is difficult to assess, as they have hardly started their work. Overall, the party ownership is still stronger than what one could expect. Except for a few computers to CUF, donors mainly seemed to have provided inspiration.

Let us finally turn to *policy issues*. When it comes to being visionary about the Internet and democracy, there is no clear connection with how much the parties use the Internet themselves. Any real comparison between the parties is hard to make here, as the length of the interviews varied, as well as the ICT-knowledge of those interviewed. It was perhaps not so surprising that all parties were in favour of increased transparency, and that no one really opposed citizen consultations (though CCM found it to be a bit early for Tanzania). Interesting was however that UDP could specify that people should be allowed to comment on law proposals and privatisation issues over the Internet. Likewise, it was interesting that CHADEMA's secretary general argued that citizen consultations could be carried out even at this time, as well as that TLP thought districts should be prioritised for state use of the Internet. This indicates that the parties have a quite radical view of the Internet, despite all the limitations in connectivity. Still, only NCCR had a Tanzanian target-group for their web site. This shows some dissonance between theory and practise.

There was also a general belief in the intrinsic powers of the Internet, such as reducing the importance of ethnicity, making people more open to democracy and overall changing culture. CUF's spokesperson had the clearest views on how the Internet works as a medium, probably since he was a keen user himself. This optimism could be interpreted as a belief that technology will bring modernity, and thus weaken the neopatrimonial state.

On the whole, CCM seemed a bit more conservative than the other parties. This could be because the CCM spokesperson had little experience of the Internet himself. But also, it is quite obvious that the opposition has more of a reason to wish for transparency, increased participation and systems for reporting human rights violations, than the party that has been in power for the last 40 years. What is surprising is however that CCM opposed censorship, while the liberal CUF, together with TLP and NCCR were in favour of it. CCM was accompanied by the rightwing-oriented parties UDP and CHADEMA. Both UDP and CHADEMA have a focus on property rights and individual integrity, which could explain their stands. Despite their liberal approach, CUF, TLP and NCCR are obviously more oriented towards so called "African values". In reality, it seems unlikely that Tanzania would develop the capacity to censor the Internet, as one has not even been able to produce a national ICT-policy so far. Still, poor countries like Vietnam are trying to obtain this capacity.

When the interviews were made about *policy issues*, the parties were also asked how Internet-connectivity should be increased. All parties answered more or less the same thing, namely that the government should invest in infrastructure, bring the Internet to schools and libraries, and that there should be a tax cut on computers (which had already been decided by the government). Only CCM and CUF had ICT-sections in their party programs. This could be an expression of that these parties are the most institutionalised, and therefore have better formulated policies over all.

Some conclusive remarks

Let us sum up some of the results gathered in the empirical study. To start with, it was surprising that so many Internet-initiatives were found both in state institutions and political parties. There seemed to be a strong ownership for the Internet-initiatives within state institutions, and they were financed without donor support. Though the political parties had varying levels of ownership for their web sites, it was interesting that donors also here played a limited role. Donors have over all mainly seemed to provided inspiration and ideas, rather than cash.

Despite all this ownership, few initiatives were aiming at Tanzanian citizens. Although this is negative for the occurrence of e-democracy in Tanzania, it must be interpreted as that there is a desire to reach out to people abroad. Tanzania is apparently trying to become part of the new network society, and see new, brighter sides of globalisation. Interesting was also the attention given to Tanzanians abroad. The Tanzanian political elite seems to consider them as important nodes for networking.

On the whole, e-democracy in Tanzania can be considered to be in its initial stage, focusing on information. What we are witnessing are several interesting experiments that so far have little impact on politics. Still, the steps are important, and further developed they could play an important role in the democratisation of Tanzania.

It is striking that so much has happened relating to ICT and politics in 2001; the work with the national ICT-policy took off, the National and Government web sites were launched, the construction of the new parliament web site was finalised (although it was not launched), CCM and NCCR launched their web sites and NCCR ordered 30 new computers. The Internet-café's in Dar es Salaam are proof of that the Internet is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania. Apparently it took some time until the technological opportunities had a breakthrough in the political world.

When these lines are being written, an interesting experiment is taking place in Tanzania. From the end of 2001, the independent research foundation ESRF and the Front Against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania (FACEIT) have been running an online discussion forum on how corruption could be stopped. The debate will serve as input in an Annual Corruption Report that has been ordered by the Tanzanian government. The organisers write that:

“In order to achieve our goal, we search for the dialogue with people from different walks of life, with a wide experience in political, economic, social, cultural and ethical matters in Tanzania.”¹⁶⁰

Indeed, we seem to have the first known example of an open citizen consultation in Tanzania, that will give advice to policymakers. The discussion has been interesting and quite lively. One can wonder if people would have been so outspoken face to face, on such a delicate issue as corruption. Hopefully it will inspire a further use of such discussion forums in African politics.

¹⁶⁰ Anti-corruption Forum www.tzonline.org/anticorruption/index01.htm 2001-12-29.

What about institutional and organisational change?

This thesis only aimed at gathering some first knowledge about the existence of e-democracy, not to evaluate its effect on institutions and organisations. It could however be interesting to give some comments on this issue.

The pessimist perspective on e-democracy, that argues that we are not very likely to see any dramatic changes on institutions, must be considered with some caution in non-consolidated democracies. In a transitional democracy like Tanzania, institutional change takes place when a citizen is able to read a passed law or a Green Paper online. This is a revolution of political affairs, and an important step towards democracy. From this light, it is perhaps not so strange that representatives for the opposition parties expressed such high beliefs in the intrinsic power of the Internet. Still, the reinforcement thesis most probably holds water when it comes to involving citizens in policy-making in Tanzania.

When it comes to organisational change mediated by ICT, little can be said from my thesis. It would however be interesting to evaluate the impact by the new government Intranet in Tanzania, and the applications accompanying it. In the political parties, it is mainly NCCR's ICT-project that calls for attention. How will the 30 new computers be used? Will there be a party Intranet? Will local party-clubs get more influence over party policies? Will women's voices be better heard? How networked can a party in the developing world become?

Where should research go from here?

When performing the field studies, a few observations were made about the people that were working with ICT in parties and institutions. Hardly surprising, I did not come across any women. A large proportion of those encountered however belonged to the Chagga ethnic group from the Kilimanjaro region. Also in the eThinkTank, one could notice Chagga -people among the leadership. One reason for this is of course that both NCCR and CHADEMA has its base of support among Chagga -people, but also that Chagga's generally have a higher level of education than other Tanzanians. It could however be interesting to further study ethnic aspects on Internet-users. Who are the participants in online discussion forums like Zanzinet, Tanzanet, the eThinkTank or the Anti-Corruption Forum? What is their ethnicity, gender and class? Are there any rural participants? The same question could be asked about general usage of the Internet in Tanzania. And what are peoples interest when surfing, generally? The picture should also be widened to include other countries in East Africa and beyond. Is Tanzania a unique case with online parties? Do other countries have advanced parliament web sites? Some comparative studies of political use of the Internet in Africa would be very interesting.

A topic of great interest is how democratic transitions relate to modernity and the network-society on a more general level. Can a country that is not yet modern enter the network-society? Will increased use of the Internet really threaten neopatrimonialism? These and many more questions are necessary to ask if we are going to understand what the global network society means for people in the South.

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TANGO	www.tango.or.tz
Tanzanet	www.tanzanet.org
Zanzinet	www.zanzinet.org
eThinkTank	www.ethinktanktz.org
TZ-ONLINE	www.tzonline.org
Anti-corruption Forum	www.tzonline.org/anticorruption
Tanzania News	www.tanzanianews.com
Africa Online	www.africaonline.com

Government Organisations

National web site	www.tanzania.go.tz
Parliament (old)	www.bungetz.org
Parliament (new, trial)	www.bunge.go.tz

Political parties

CCM	www.ccm.or.tz
CUF	www.cuftz.org
CHADEMA	www.framework.co.za/dua/tanzania/chadema.html
NCCR-Mageuzi	www.nccr-mageuzitz.org