

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA



**THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
PROGRAMME**

THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVIVAL PROGRAMME

I. Introduction:

The economic problems that Tanzania is currently facing have been caused by factors both outside as well as within our control. However, by far the most overwhelming have been the four factors which are outside our control, namely:

(i) *Petroleum price increases.* In 1972, we spent only 10 per cent of our export earnings in buying oil, whereas in 1981 60 per cent of our export earnings were spent on petroleum imports. In other words, in 1981 we had only shs. 40/- out of every shs. 100/-, from our export earnings, for importing other items like medicines, industrial raw materials, spares, fertilizers, farming equipment, motor vehicles of various kinds and other essential items, compared to shs. 90/- out of every shs. 100/- available in 1972 for importing similar commodities. Consequently our ability to satisfy extremely essential requirements for raw materials, spares, equipment and other commodities, other than oil, has fallen by about 55 per cent between 1972 and 1981.

(ii) *Increases in the prices of other imports.* It has been estimated that the increase in the prices of our imports, other than petroleum, has been about 240% between 1972 and 1981. This has actually meant that the purchasing power of the shs. 40/- out of shs. 100/- in 1981 left after oil imports was equivalent to only shs. 16/- in 1972 prices. This implies that whereas in 1972 we had shs. 90/- for each shs. 100/- of our export earnings for importing raw materials, spares, machinery and other essential items besides oil, in 1981 we had the equivalent of shs. 16/- out of every shs. 100/- for the same purpose, meaning a reduction in our ability to import of 82% between 1972 and 1981. It should also be emphasized that the 1981 oil imports were below the quantity imported in 1972 by at least 100,000 tons, even though its cost was more than tenfold compared to that of 1972.

(iii) *Stagnant or declining export prices.* In addition to the rapid increases in the prices of oil and other imports, the prices of our exports like coffee, sisal, cotton, cashewnuts, cloves, tea, pyrethrum, tobacco, diamonds etc. have either increased only modestly relative to import price increases, remained stagnant or even declined. The price of coffee, for example, which contributes about 30% of our foreign exchange earnings declined by more than 50% between 1979 and 1981. The overall effect of the decline in the prices of our exports was that whereas in 1972 we needed about 5 tons of tea to be able to purchase one tractor, in 1981 17 tons of tea had to be exported in order to purchase the same tractor. Thus, this is essentially what is meant when we say that we were

poorer in 1981 compared to 1972, since in 1972 we could obtain three tractors from our 17 tons of tea, while in 1981 for the same 17 tons of our tea, were able to buy only one tractor.

The three exogenous problems mentioned above are more than sufficient to explain satisfactorily, why Tanzania faces acute shortages of essential items made from industrial raw materials which we import from abroad; our industries working well below capacity (on average capacity utilization is around 25%) because of the shortage of imported raw materials; our hospitals being short of medicines and other essential supplies; schools without books and other educational materials; agriculture and livestock starved of fertilizers, insecticides, implements and drugs for veterinary services; as well as a transportation system in a state of disrepair for lack of equipment and spares. These problems are not unique to Tanzania as they afflict all oil importing developing countries, whether they are following socialist or capitalist development strategies. In general, these problems are the consequence of the present world economic order, in which the developing countries are progressively forced to sell their export products cheap and buy their imports dear. This kind of economic relation can hardly bring prosperity to its victims. The developing countries can neither set the prices of their own exports nor determine the prices of the industrial goods they import. In such a situation of worldwide crisis of a system, the allegation that Tanzania's economic problems may have been caused by her socialist policies is at best diversionary.

(iv) *Unfavourable weather.* The inadequate rains that started in 1979 had adversely affected agricultural production in general and food production in particular. The consequent food shortage has compelled us to set aside a sizeable proportion of our already meagre foreign exchange resources, inadequate even for the importation of industrial raw materials, spares and equipment, for purchasing food grain from outside. Thus, the food crisis has only made the already serious shortage of various essential commodities and services worse.

Nevertheless, while we attribute to the exogenous factors the largest proportion of our problems, there were also endogenous factors which aggravated an already precarious economic situation. Thus among these factors within our control must be included the decline in output and productivity in various productive sectors and services. Where the raw materials were available and the weather conditions were not particularly adverse, production continued to stagnate or even decline. Similarly, while there are fertile valleys and other areas which could be put under cultivation of both cash crops and food crops, they have not been adequately exploited. At the same time, there are many able bodied people who could be utilized productively, but are still unemployed for lack of effective human resource utilization plans. However, it is important to emphasize the fact that even if we could solve all the problems within our control, we would still be faced with the difficult economic situation. This

is evident from those developing countries which did not experience similar stagnation of agricultural production or other management problems.

II. The National Economic Survival Programme:

It is obvious that identification and analysis of our problems is necessary but never sufficient. What is also important are the measures and programmes which are intended to solve these economic difficulties. It was in that context that the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) was formulated. The basis of that programme was that we should do everything possible, and within our ability, to the maximum, before we approach others for assistance.

The National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) therefore was conceived and adopted by the National Executive Committee of the Party in May 1981. It is obvious that the preparation and implementation of NESP has received considerable attention from the Party, Government and the people as a whole.

In general, the National Economic Survival Programme specifically addresses itself to the current difficult economic situation caused by factors both beyond and within our control, and proposes action in six crucial areas:

(i) *Increase foreign exchange earnings* from exports of various commodities—agriculture, livestock, manufacturing, mining, forestry, wildlife, tourism and other services. In 1981 the target for foreign exchange earnings was shs. 6,185 million. That target was in turn assigned to different public and private institutions for their diligent implementation. Thus, foreign exchange targets were set for every product from coffee, cashewnuts, cotton, sisal, diamond, tobacco, tea, pyrethrum, leather, canned meat, textiles, cigarettees, timber, etc., because it was more than self-evident to us that the availability of foreign exchange, will enable us to solve a large proportion of our problems of shortage and non-availability of industrial raw materials, spares, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs, various transportation equipment, and other essential commodities.

(ii) *Greater care in the utilization of the meagre foreign exchange* which should also include raw materials, spares, equipment, machinery and other goods obtained through the use of foreign exchange. Thus, the use of foreign exchange, should first of all increase our capacity to earn further foreign exchange, whether through agriculture, industry, mining, etc. Secondly, the utilization of our foreign exchange should also enable us to save foreign exchange in future. Thus, diesel, water pumps, for example, should be converted into wind and solar powered pumps, especially for small-scale village requirements. Similarly major and dependable sources of electricity in the country should in future be

hydro-power and coal, which we have in abundant supply, instead of oil-powered thermo-generators. In addition, industrial boilers and kilns should use coal in place of oil. Lastly, wherever possible, raw materials, and spares which can be obtained within the country must be utilized in place of imports. These measures will not only cost considerable foreign exchange but also their realization is bound to take time. However, the important thing is to prepare appropriate programmes and begin to implement them.

(iii) *To reduce and ultimately eliminate the problem of food shortage through three interrelated approaches:*

- (a) The development of small-scale irrigation projects which will not involve large expenditures, particularly, of foreign exchange, in order to reduce the impact of adverse weather conditions. Similarly, as resources permit, large irrigation projects should also be developed by the Government, in accordance with the priorities of the Five Year Development Plan. As to the small scale projects, wherever possible, the emphasis should be on the utilization of locally available skills and resources.
- (b) The cultivation of drought-resistant food crops like sorghum, cassava, bananas, potatoes, is another way of reducing the incidence of weather. Thus, in those areas which are suitable for the cultivation of sorghum and cassava, the insistence on cultivation of maize or paddy merely wastes away people's efforts, because the likelihood of the latter withering away is much greater. In times of difficulties such as these, the last thing we can afford is to waste people's efforts.
- (c) There is also the important question of food consumption habits. The various sources of starch like maize, rice, wheat, sorghum, millet, cassava, potatoes, etc. are all as adequate for nutritional requirements, provided they are taken together with other types of food complements like meat, fish, legumes, vegetables and fruits. Unless we accept this reality it will take us a long time to eradicate the problem of food shortage, as often shortage of food is synonymous with lack of maize, rice and wheat.

(iv) *Government recurrent expenditure control* for ministries and regions, as well as parastatals. In this context, the most important requirement is the strict observance of budgetary ceilings as approved by Parliament. Wherever possible, every effort should be made to realize saving without any reduction in the goods and services provided by the Ministry/Region/Parastatal concerned. Thus, all ministries and regions, as well as Boards of Directors and their respective parent ministries are required to ensure that this objective is fully met. Similarly in future the growth of government recurrent expenditure has to be consistent with the growth of gross domestic product in the monetary sector.

(v) *The development plans must also bear in mind the requirements of NESP and enhance the country's capacity for self-reliance.* In particular, development programmes should enhance our foreign exchange earning capacity, reduce our excessive dependence on imported industrial raw materials, and increase food supply and other essential commodities, whether these are for normal consumption or for productive purposes. Thus, at all levels from the village to the nation as a whole, our development plans must put greater emphasis than hitherto, on consolidating overall production, completing ongoing projects and using the existing production capacity and investments fully, before embarking on any new projects. This also implies that the good tradition of implementing village projects, wherever possible through self-help should be encouraged more aggressively than previously. The point emphasized in NESP is that due to our difficult economic and financial situation, and the consequent acute shortages of construction and other building materials, vehicles and equipment, our capacity to implement new projects has been severely curtailed. Thus, the available and limited investment capacity should be utilized carefully in order, first and foremost to consolidate and increase production.

(vi) *Proper incentives to farmers and workers, in order that they fulfill their targets, should include not only remunerative producer prices and equitable wage levels, but also the availability of essential items for daily requirements.* Thus, it is for that reason that an important element of the NESP for 1982, is to ensure whenever possible, the availability of adequate foreign exchange for the importation of raw materials and spares needed by industries which produce essential items for the general population. In view of the fact that foreign exchange is extremely limited, while the list of essential items is almost limitless, this task is anything but easy.

III. National Economic Survival Programme of 1982:

Before outlining the National Economic Survival Programme for 1982, as approved by the Government and the National Executive Committee of the Party, it is important to give a very brief account of the performance of the National Economic Survival Programme for 1981. In the first place, although the 1981 NESP was launched in May, 1981, the targets covered the whole twelve month period of January to December, 1981. Similarly, as the programme was launched for the first time, the preparations needed for effective implementation were less than adequate. In addition, some aspects of NESP were fully articulated than others, in terms of what specifically had to be done.

Despite those initial difficulties, it was extremely heartening that up to September 1981, the target for foreign exchange earnings of shs. 6,185 million had been achieved at 71%. It would now appear that when the data for the whole January—December 1981 period has been properly analysed, achievement would be 85—90 per cent of the set target for

1981. This performance, with all the shortcomings and inadequate preparations, undoubtedly demonstrates the capacity of all Tanzanians to respond to any challenge in defense of their national independence and sovereignty. Thus, the Tanzanian peasants and workers deserve praise for their profound understanding of the real causes of their present economic difficulties and for rejecting superficial diversionary and erroneous explanations, which have recently been gratuitously offered from various external circles.

Thus, in view of the experience gained from implementing the 1981 NESP, the 1982 NESP will place special emphasis on four important areas, namely:

(i) Considering the fact that inadequate foreign exchange resources for the importation of industrial raw materials, spares, equipment and other essential commodities still explains more than proportionately the current economic difficulties facing the country, special emphasis continues to be placed on increasing our foreign exchange earnings in the 1982 programme. In order to satisfy basic and irreducible requirements for normal recurrent imports as well as imports for rehabilitation, excluding development projects in 1982, foreign exchange equivalent to shs. 8,131 million would be required. Thus, for economic survival to have operational and practical meaning, the target for foreign exchange earning for 1982 has to be equated to what is required to meet our basic requirements, recurrent and for rehabilitation, namely shs. 8,131 million. The 1982 programme envisages a much larger contribution from livestock exports than previously. Overall, the 1982 targets exceed those of 1981 by shs. 1,946 million or 31%. However, the target of shs. 8,131 million is by no means unrealistic, since the source of every shilling in that target has been identified. Thus, in some areas, we have to increase significantly the output of goods and services, in others we shall even have to forgo some commodities produced domestically like cement, textiles etc. in order to export them so that we can import among other things, medicines, educational materials as well as diesel for water pumps in the villages.

(ii) The 1982 NESP has also incorporated targets for marketed surpluses of important food crops, to be purchased by the National Milling Corporation (NMC). Those purchases by NMC are expected to be additional over and above the normal food requirements of farmers themselves. Thus, the target for marketed food surpluses are at least 338,710 tons for 1982. This total is made up of maize—172,800 tons, rice/paddy—36,830 tons, wheat—30,270 tons, cassava—47,150 tons, and sorghum—51,660 tons. Those targets for food crop purchases have also been assigned to the various regions, according to their potential for producing the respective food crop. These targets are quite achievable, as they call for no more than 50 tons per village (out of the over 8,000 villages in the country). Finally, the NESP for 1982 has also directed all

Crop Authorities, like the Sisal Authority, Cotton Authority, Tobacco Authority and Cashewnut Authority, etc. to produce food, at least, for their own workers.

(iii) On Government and Parastatal recurrent expenditures, every Government ministry, department, region and parastatal is required to strictly control their expenditure. The objective is to ensure that approved budgetary ceilings are scrupulously adhered to and, if possible, there should be saving without curtailing production or services of the institution concerned. This requires that those who have been charged with responsibilities in ministries, regions and parastatals must ensure, day by day, that these ceilings are adhered to. The need to refrain from conspicuous consumption, extravagance and wasteful spending should be seen as an important component of the survival programme.

(iv) The efforts to meet the basic requirements of the general population for essential commodities, is also an important element of the 1982 NESP. Thus, the Government has identified a number of commodities and products for which relatively adequate foreign exchange would be allocated for the procurement of the necessary raw materials and spares for their production. The list of those most essential items has been divided into three groups, according to whether 100%, 75% or 50% of the estimated requirements would be met.

IV. Conclusion:

That the NESP targets for 1982 are ambitious is indisputable. The overriding consideration of the whole concept of the economic survival programme is that we can alleviate, if not solve completely, our economic difficulties, if first and foremost, we tapped our own resources, material, human and others to the maximum. Thus, to that effect, every Tanzanian, whether in village, factories, and offices has been assigned tasks to carry out and targets to fulfil. Indeed, there is not even a single target in the economic survival programme for 1982, which is beyond fulfilment provided everyone plays his part. The economic survival programme, is therefore an action programme against despair or submission. It is truly a call to overcome our difficulties through cooperation, hardwork and self-reliance. The economic survival programme is a positive input to the struggle to consolidate our independence as well as our ability to determine our own destiny, in accordance with the requirements and wishes of our people. It is, therefore, an important tool for our liberation.

**NATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVIVAL PROGRAMME
PROJECTED EXPORT TARGETS FOR 1982**

Name of exporter	Product	Actual Export		
		Target 1981 (Sh. mill.)	Jan.—Sept. 1981 (Sh. mill.)	Target 1982 (Sh. mill.)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Coffee Authority Tanzania	Green Coffee	1,327.00	1,030.13	1,400.00
2. Tanzania Sisal Authority	Sisal Fibre	430.12	182.21	330.00
3. Tanzania Cotton Authority	Lint Cotton	586.20	373.47	606.00
	Seed Cake	40.00	27.55	37.07
	Cotton Seed	—	6.77	5.00
4. Cashewnut Authority	Raw nuts	214.80	283.80	—
	Kernels	233.69	168.31	440.52
	CNSL	10.58	4.59	5.89
	Powder Shell	2.15	1.96	2.19
5. Tanzania Tea Authority	Tea	214.67	103.59	172.00
6. Tanzania Pyrethrum Board	Crude Extract	28.70	9.62	21.80
	Powder	2.00	0.54	0.50
	Dry Marc	1.50	1.09	1.81
7. Tobacco Authority of Tanzania	Tobacco	247.63	101.69	280.75
8. GAPEX	Cardamon	7.60	7.85	20.00
	Cocoa Beans	19.20	13.76	17.29
	Sesame Seed	15.00	6.73	15.00
	Beeswax & Honey	—	—	15.00
	Kapok	—	—	3.30
	Pesian Peas	—	—	15.50
	Minosa extract	—	—	10.20
9. Sugar Development Corporation	Sugar	18.80	7.00	—
10. National Milling Corporation	Various	35.11	2.50	35.40
11. NAFCO	Cocoa Beans	—	—	0.75
12. TAFICO	Prawns	20.40	2.21	10.00
13. Tanganyika Wattle Extract	Wattle Products	25.00	12.16	25.17
14. TANTIMBERS	Timber Products	37.70	16.31	30.35
15. TAWICO		—	—	21.00
16. Dar Ocean Products	Prawns & Lobsters	—	0.41	1.50
17. Nyanza Salt Mines	Salt	34.40	22.10	38.10
18. Williamson Dia- monds Ltd.	Diamonds	239.00	163.30	233.00

Name of exporter	Product	Actual Export		
		Target 1981 (Sh. mill.)	Jan.—Sept. 1981 (Sh. mill.)	Target 1982 (Sh. mill.)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
19. New Almasi Ltd.	Diamonds	15.00	12.40	15.00
20. Tanganyika Diamond Cutting Company	Polished Diamonds	92.00	54.90	72.10
21. Tanganyika Gemstones	Gemstones	5.50	3.40	6.20
22. Tanganyika Meerscheum	Pipes and Ornaments	1.20	0.81	2.00
23. STAMICO	Mica, Tin, and Gold	3.70	1.65	46.50
24. Agip (T) Ltd.	Gas and Oil	36.00	22.30	36.00
25. British Petroleum (T)	Gas and Oil	30.00	2.30	7.00
26. Mobil Oil	Gas and Oil	12.00	34.15	85.90
27. HANDICO	Handicrafts	4.48	1.42	5.00
28. Friendship Textile Mills	Textiles	—	—	12.00
29. Mwanza Textiles	Textiles	—	—	13.00
30. Tanganyika Dyeing and Weaving (Sunguratex)	Textiles	—	—	4.00
31. Musoma Textiles	Textiles	—	—	31.00
32. Kilimanjaro Textiles	Textiles	—	—	4.00
33. Variety Products	Foods, Mattresses	31.80	—	43.00
34. ALUCO	Aluminium Products	23.00	—	21.00
35. STEELCO	Steel Sheets	—	—	8.00
36. PIPECO	Pipes	6.00	—	1.00
37. Sunflag	Textiles & Yarn	30.00	2.24	20.00
38. Cotex Spinning Mills	Yarn	5.40	3.15	15.00
39. Atoz Clothing	Garments, Suiting Materials & Bed Covers	20.00	4.50	25.00
40. Amboni Plastics	Plastic containers	3.10	1.19	3.00
41. Banco Products	Mattresses & Glue	3.00	2.50	30.25
42. Metal Products	Aluminium ware	4.00	0.08	5.20
43. Tanzania Cigarette Co.	Cigarettes	42.00	22.93	50.00
44. Tanzania Shoe Company	Shoes	5.00	1.48	15.00
45. Morogoro Tanneries	Tanned Leather	6.00	3.56	13.67
46. Mwanza Tanneries	Tanned Leather	14.00	3.59	5.00
47. Tanzania Tanneries	Tanned Leather	3.00	11.12	24.00
48. Morogoro Shoe Company	Shoes	—	0.14	20.00
49. Tanzania Tea Blenders	Blended Tea & Coffee	74.50	27.75	70.00
50. Tanganyika Industrial Corporation	Sisal Twine & Rope	—	14.95	18.85
51. Tanganyika Carpets Co.	Carpets	—	—	3.00
52. Fidahusseini	Bees Wax	2.00	1.37	3.00
53. Matsushita Electric	Batteries & Radios	35.00	21.07	40.00

Name of exporter	Product	Actual Export		
		Target 1981 (Sh. mill.)	Jan.—Sept. 1981 Sh. mill.)	Target 1982 (Sh. mill.)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
54. Tanzania Codage Ltd. (TTRW)	Twine and Rope	—	—	100.00
55. Tanganyika Tegry Plastics	PVC Pipes	4.00	0.60	16.00
56. Tanzania Saruji Corp.	Cement	54.00	4.59	20.00
57. Kioo Ltd.	Glass ware	10.00	6.51	15.00
58. Henkel Chemicals	Glue/Chemicals	7.00	5.00	15.00
59. Yuasa Battery		2.99	1.12	3.00
60. HOSCO	General Merchandise	40.00	57.20	50.00
61. Tanganyika Instant Coffee Company	Instant Coffee	7.00	3.17	10.00
62. General Tyre (EA) Ltd.	Tyre & Tubes	10.00	3.69	13.00
63. PANAFEN Group	Various Products	—	0.27	20.00
64. Philips Radio	Batteries/Radios	—	—	5.00
65. VOIL	Vegetable Oil	—	4.33	5.00
66. Rajani Industries	Vegetable Oil	—	15.00	40.00
67. H. K. & Sons	Bed Components	—	—	3.50
68. Afro-Cooling	Radiators	—	—	7.00
69. Lake Soap	Soap	—	—	40.00
70. Tanzania V Cables	Cables	—	—	3.00
71. Raha Beds		—	—	1.80
72. Mansoor Daya	Pharmaceuticals	—	—	16.00
73. Melplast	Crockery	—	—	24.00
74. J. V. Synthetics		—	—	24.00
75. CALICO Textiles	Textiles	—	—	3.00
76. Coast Textiles	Towels	—	—	8.00
77. Tanzania Fishnets		—	—	5.00
78. TAZARA	Transit Cargo	125.00	102.10	195.00
79. Air Tanzania Corporation	Air Transport	85.00	19.40	50.00
80. Tanzania Railways Corp.	Transit Cargo	38.20	12.00	50.00
81. Tanzania Harbours Authority	Cargo Handling	205.00	306.70	330.00
82. Zambia/Tanzania Road Services	Transit Cargo	80.00	44.80	80.00
83. Tanzania Tourist Corp.	Tourism	110.00	96.20	125.00
84. Other Services	Services	120.00	665.90	700.00
85. *Other Exports		—	—	1,586.00
			Total	... 8,131.1

*Additional export earnings resulting from more exports of cattle, cement, textiles, leather, prawns and sale of sugar.

**SECTORAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
PROGRAMME**

Sector	Foreign Exchange Earning (Million Shs.)	Percentage
(a) Agriculture	3,434.97	42.2
(b) Natural Resources	88.02	1.0
(c) Mining	412.90	5.1
(d) Petroleum and gas (re-exports)	128.90	1.6
(e) Industries	950.27	11.7
(f) Services	1,530.00	18.8
(g) Other commodities	1,586.00	19.5
Total ...	8,131.10	100.0

SUMMARY

	Earning	Percentage
(1) Commodities (a) + (b) + (c) + (e):	4,886.16	60.0
(2) Re-exports (d):	128.90	1.6
(3) Services (f):	1,530.00	18.8
(4) Other commodities (g):	1,586.00	19.5
Total ...	8,131.10	100.0

ANNEXURE 3

**FOOD CROP PURCHASES: PROJECTION (1981/82—1982/83) AND ACTUAL
(1/6/1981—23/12/1981)**

Region	Crop	Actual Purchase Projections 1981/82 (Tons)	NMC Purchases (June— December 1981) (Tons)	Purchase Projections 1982/83 (Tons)
DAR ES SALAAM/ COAST	Paddy	30	—	600
	Maize	800	39	1,300
	Cassava	—	2	—
	Millet	—	15	—
Total Dar/Coast		830	56	1,900
MOROGORO	Paddy	500	243	1,250
	Rice	—	1	—
	Millet	1,000	16	1,500
	Maize	6,000	386	8,000
	Wheat	60	—	—
	Beans	—	829	—
Total Morogoro		7,560	1,475	10,850
TANGA	Paddy	60	18	80
	Rice	—	6	—
	Maize	8,300	1,342	12,400
	Millet	300	35	400
	Beans	—	1,839	—
Total Tanga		8,660	3,240	12,880
MTWARA	Paddy	80	—	350
	Maize	1,800	5	2,400
	Millet	1,500	24	2,400
	Cassava	7,200	6,453	17,000
	Finger Millet	—	134	—
	Sorghum	—	31	—
Total Mtwara		10,580	6,647	22,150
LINDI	Sorghum	—	1	—
	Paddy	140	—	280
	Maize	1,200	359	1,900
	Millet	800	68	2,000
	Cassava	900	—	1,500
Total Lindi		3,040	428	5,680

ANNEXURE 3—(contd.)

Region	Crop	Actual Purchase Projections 1981/82 (Tons)	NMC Purchases (June— December 1981) (Tons)	Purchase Projections 1982/83 (Tons)
ARUSHA	Maize	21,400	2,816	42,600
	Millet	1,440	676	2,240
	Wheat	17,200	20,205	19,400
	Beans	—	859	—
Total Arusha		40,040	24,556	64,240
KILIMANJARO	Maize	5,100	40	12,000
	Paddy	300	48	1,500
	Rice	—	1	—
	Wheat	4,800	330	5,900
	Millet	400	115	500
Beans	—	389	—	
Total Kilimanjaro		10,600	923	19,900
DODOMA	Maize	14,700	4,373	20,700
	Millet	20,500	7,891	26,000
	Sorghum	20,500	4	—
	Beans	—	100	—
	Paddy	—	—	200
Total Dodoma		35,200	12,368	46,900
SINGIDA	Maize	1,200	218	1,900
	Millet	1,100	106	2,100
	Wheat	—	66	—
	Beans	—	3	—
Total Singida		2,300	393	4,000
TABORA	Maize	4,000	1,135	5,400
	Paddy	1,500	92	3,000
	Rice	—	6	—
	Millet	2,500	11	5,400
	Beans	—	10	—
	Cassava	5,000	—	9,300
Total Tabora		13,000	1,254	23,100
KIGOMA	Cassava	150	1	350
	Maize	400	382	600
	Paddy	340	184	600
	Millet	110	—	130
	Beans	—	322	—
Total Kigoma		1,000	889	1,680

ANNEXURE 3—(contd.)

Region	Crop	Actual Purchase Projections 1981/82 (Tons)	NMC Purchases (June— December 1981) (Tons)	Purchase Projections 1982/83 (Tons)
RUKWA	Maize	12,000	15,941	15,800
	Paddy	170	73	700
	Millet	300	63	400
	Finger Millet	—	12	—
	Cassava	1,800	1,453	2,300
	Beans	—	973	—
	Total Rukwa		14,270	18,515
MWANZA	Maize	1,700	7	2,100
	Millet	200	—	400
	Cassava	5,000	28	10,000
	Paddy	360	40	3,000
	Rice	—	2	—
	Beans	—	—	—
	Total Mwanza		2,760	77
MARA	Maize	2,400	20	3,000
	Paddy	120	124	140
	Millet	500	63	900
	Cassava	200	—	400
	Beans	—	4	—
	Finger Millet	—	5	—
	Total Mara		3,224	216
SHINYANGA	Maize	800	228	1,300
	Paddy	2,000	95	5,000
	Millet	1,800	20	3,000
	Cassava	2,500	56	2,400
Total Shinyanga		7,100	408	11,700
KAGERA	Maize	500	12	300
	Millet	60	1	70
	Paddy	70	—	80
	Wheat	200	—	350
	Cassava	1,300	23	2,300
	Beans	—	4,559	—
	Total Kagera		2,130	4,595

ANNEXURE 3—(contd.)

Region	Crop	Actual Purchase Projections 1981/82 (Tons)	NMC Purchases (June— December 1981) (Tons)	Purchase Projections 1982/83 (Tons)
IRINGA	Maize	10,500	32,240	17,800
	Millet	500	70	1,000
	Wheat	3,100	4	3,800
	Beans	—	289	—
	Paddy	20	4	300
Total Iringa		14,120	32,607	22,900
MBEYA	Maize	5,800	7,008	8,600
	Paddy	15,500	3,396	19,400
	Rice	—	9,309	—
	Finger Millet	—	5	—
	Millet	2,200	1,385	3,000
	Wheat	350	2	420
	Beans	—	372	—
Total Mbeya		23,850	21,477	31,420
RUVUMA	Maize	9,100	17,895	14,700
	Millet	120	17	220
	Paddy	80	30	350
	Sorghum	—	21	—
	Wheat	150	—	300
	Cassava	1,000	204	1,600
	Beans	—	187	—
	Finger Millet	—	13	—
Total Ruvuma		10,450	18,367	17,170
Grand Total		210,714	148,477	338,710

IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE GOODS

One Hundred Percent (100%) Availability

GROUP A:

1. Toilet and laundry soap
2. Kerosine
3. Matches
4. Table salt
5. Sanitary towels
6. Agricultural implements
7. Vehicle tyres
8. Bicycle tyres and spares
9. Ammunition for vermin control

Goods obtained through special arrangements

10. Staple cereals—maize and rice
11. Petrol
12. Medicines and hospital equipment

Seventy Five Percent (75%) Availability

GROUP B:

13. Vehicle and radio batteries
14. Torch and radio batteries
15. Containers—various kinds
16. Electric bulbs
17. Pressure lamps and hurricane lamps
18. Tailoring accessories (buttons, zips etc.)
19. Milk and infants' foods

Fifty Percent (50%) Availability

GROUP C:

20. Tooth brushes and tooth paste
21. Baking powder
22. Toilet paper
23. Corrugated iron sheets
24. Nails (all kinds)
25. Razor blades.