UNDERSTANDING PATTERNS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN TANZANIA

Inception Report

February 2005
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Executive Summary

This Inception Report is the first of three components for the DFID funded project “Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania” for the multi-donor Tanzania Governance Working Group (GWG) of the Development Partners to Tanzania. The objective of the study is to gain more in-depth knowledge about actual accountability processes between government officials, state institutions and ordinary citizens and a better understanding of the socio-economic and political context of Tanzania.

The task for this Inception Report has been to map the organisations, institutions and processes that mark different accountability relationships in Tanzania. We have done this along the dimensions of horizontal, electoral, societal and external accountability. We have distinguished between these four dimensions of accountability in order to understand how accountability might work differently at different levels of governance.

The table below summarises the findings of the mapping exercise against the background of the three common criteria of accountability relationships – transparency, answerability and controllability. We also apply a distinction between formal and informal accountability processes.

| Horizontal Accountability across the political and administrative system | • The Executive headed by a directly elected President is the most powerful institution of the political regime. The President appoints a wide range of key actors who are accountable to him.  
• The institutional framework provides for some checks and balances, but the formal ability of the Legislature and of special institutions of restraint to actually call the Executive to account is in practice rather limited.  
• From a formal perspective the institutional framework of horizontal accountability is weak. The strong presidential Executive overrides the Legislature’s mandate to exercise control and oversight.  
• The political system mixes elements of presidential and parliamentary democracy and thus does not give the democratic checks and balances that each system requires.  
• Control could still be exercised in an informal way through consensus building within the Executive or strategic alliances among majority party MPs. This however undermines transparency and perhaps answerability.  
• Executive powers at the local level are unclear and appear either to be overlapping, or there are executive elements at the district level without meaningful legislative oversight and control.  
• At the district level horizontal accountability appears to be entangled with informal societal accountability where party structures overlap with the exercise of executive and legislative powers. |
| Vertical Accountability through the electoral channel | • The electorate chooses in a transparent manner its representatives for the National Assembly and for District Councils. It also directly elects the President who in turn appoints all key civil servants at both the national and local government level, as well as some members of the Legislature.  
• From a formal perspective, both the Legislature and the head of the Executive are accountable to the Electorate. But there appear to be few meaningful constitutional provisions for the Executive to be
accountable to the Legislature.

- Thus, the system concentrates power in the hands of the Executive, which despite having been elected democratically faces virtually no constraints by the Legislature.
- Thus vertical accountability relationships are weak. Legislative representatives in the National Assembly are restricted in their control of the Executive and thus in their answerability for government policy decisions to the Electorate.
- Answerability and controllability of Executive power holders may be exercised in an informal manner, through links between politicians, civil servants and economically or otherwise dominant figures in society. This runs counter to transparency. This becomes awkward as the one and only form of vertical accountability through the electoral channel is to vote a bad government out of office – how informality hinders this from happening is relevant.
- A myriad of informal relations - particularly at lower levels of government - compromise the transparency of the electoral process (at least for the outside observer).
- At the district level it is also not clear how the legislative body (Councillors) relate to the executive branch of central government (Regional & District Commissioners)
- Controls through party machinery continue to be very important, and have partly been reinstated. But parties must also cater for grassroots interests and needs. There is a lack of knowledge on how this works.

**Vertical accountability through societal associations**

- Little is known about how informal societal accountability may or may not be exercised.
- Informal channels of voice of organised interests groups, and mass party organisations are not transparent, at least for the outside observer. Their affiliates may be able to exercise control and demand answerability internally.
- From the external perspective it is not clear what means of controllability and answerability the constituents of informal social organisation have and to whom these bodies are ultimately accountable. Neither are links to the formal political and administrative system and its resources well understood.
- If informal organisations receive popular support their social legitimacy could be greater than that of formal institutions or they can rely on formal institutions for access to economic and political power.
- There may be positive or negative overlaps between formal horizontal and vertical accountability and informal societal accountability.

**External Accountability**

- External accountability may support or override domestic accountability.
- Three important questions emerge:
  a) Have those institutional features that have enabled the Tanzanian government to be accountable to its development partners and implement successful economic and structural reforms undermined horizontal and vertical accountability?
  b) Have prevailing systems of informal societal accountability helped
the Tanzanian government to pursue and sustain its reform efforts?

- c) Are the existing formal and informal institutions underlying current horizontal, vertical and societal accountability sufficient and appropriate to ensure that the benefits arising from economic reform do not only reach a minority of privileged citizens, but translate into broader based socio-economic development?

We draw the following implications and conclusions for the design of Components 2 and 3 of this project:

**Component 2: Citizens’ relations to power holders**

The focus of Component 2 lies on achieving a better *bottom-up* understanding of citizens’ expectations of (political, administrative and societal) power holders, their perspectives on entitlements and the responses they face when acquiring public goods and services. Citizens may have a very different understanding of and experience with the accountability relationship from those to whom they delegate power.

The preliminary analysis conducted in this Inception Report suggests that informal accountability through social organisations is more important and perhaps even more legitimate for ordinary citizens than formal accountability through the electoral channel. It is not clear whether this is because vertical and horizontal accountability is weak, or because alternative accountability channels, for example through party organisations, have remained strong and valid.

To explore accountability processes on the ground in rural areas we have suggested conducting a micro survey and two ethnographic studies with special emphasis on the judiciary and the health care sector. We have suggested this emphasis because legal rights and health are fundamental public goods. We want to find out to whom do people turn if they need enforcement of rights and health care services. We want to use the experience of ordinary people with these services as a lens through which to understand more generally what are their expectations of government officials and which are the agents or agencies of accountability, if any, to which they turn in trying to protect their entitlements.

**Component 3: Values, incentives and power relations in the budget allocation process**

The focus of Component 3 lies on the values, incentives and power relations driving government and how this affects its accountability to citizens. Effectively, it involves an analysis of the *top-down* perspective. In the mapping exercise we have observed the following:

- There is a bias with respect to the formal processes of domestic accountability, in particular the electoral system and the relationships between different government agencies. Tanzania features a presidential democratic system without the checks and balances which such a system would usually require to effectively control the Executive. The National Assembly has, since 1992, had the power under the Constitution to pass a resolution to remove the President. However, a presidential democracy would normally include a far more extensive range of checks and balances, in which the separation of power is more pronounced and the President faces several constraints by usually more than one House or Legislative Assembly. Thus, the Tanzanian political and administrative system makes for generally weak electoral and horizontal accountability.

- Legislative and executive powers at the district level are rather unclear. There are executive elements at the district level (commissioners) for which there is no legislative control and oversight and for certain areas that fall under the jurisdiction of the district legislature, central government has a veto right through the Minister for Local Government.
We know little about how societal accountability processes, both at the national and at the local level inter-link with formal policy processes and at what stages and through which channels they matter for government decision making. Equally, we know little about how government uses (or perhaps even must rely) on societal accountability processes to garner broader based support and acceptance of its policy decisions, including the allocation of public funds.

Based on the above our proposals for Component 3 are as follows:

- We propose to analyse in more depth the formal horizontal accountability relationships for structural weaknesses in institutional checks and balances. This relates in particular to the public financial management system, in other words the custody of public funds. It will involve both analysis of legislation and discussions with national and local representatives on these issues.

- We propose to conduct semi-structured interviews with national political representatives and district level officers (Commissioners and Councillors) on their knowledge of and involvement in the budget allocation process. This would probe into issues such as how/whether Parliamentarians can ensure support at the local level through public provision of goods and services, whether there are inter-linkages between government and party based decision-making on budgetary policy issues, how the funding of district councillors and district commissioners and their executive and legislative tasks work in practice, and where overlaps and perhaps contradictions with respect to district level executive and legislative powers lie.

- We would set out to find out where the entry points for informal societal accountability to formal policy processes are. We would investigate this question by considering, through the semi-structured interviews, recent landmark political decisions with a view to identifying the motivations for those decisions and the balance of interests lying behind those decisions. In particular, we would propose to examine the decision-making processes underlying the removal of the UPE levy and other primary school fees, the abolition of the development levy for local governments, the re-introduction of fertiliser subsidies and the decision to devolve financial and personnel powers to LGAs.

Further information on the structure of components 2 and 3 and draft versions of the survey instruments to be utilised are presented in Annex. At the time of writing, the study team expect to follow the implementation schedule for the overall study, which was included in the Consortium’s revised technical proposal. A note with an update of the schedule and with further details on survey design will be presented to the Governance Working Group at the end of February 2005.
1. Introduction and Summary of Objectives

This Inception Report has been prepared as the first of three components of the DFID funded study *Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania*. The study is being conducted by a consortium led by Oxford Policy Management, UK on behalf of the Governance Working Group (GWG) of the Development Partners of Tanzania.

The purpose of the Inception Report is to present a preliminary mapping of the agents and institutions of accountability in Tanzania, to develop some preliminary hypotheses regarding the nature of accountability in Tanzania and, on this basis, to outline the proposed focus and approach for each of the pieces of field work to be undertaken within the study.

The report has been developed on the basis of an initial “brainstorming meeting” organised at CMI in Bergen, with drafting undertaken immediately afterwards by the participants at that meeting. Due to budgetary constraints, participants were limited to the European-based members of the study team – namely, Tim Kelsall from the University of Newcastle, Lise Rakner, Siri Lange and Vibeke Wang from the Christian Michelsen Institute, and Andrew Lawson and Evelyn Dietsche from Oxford Policy Management. Comments were subsequently received from Dr. Max Mmuya and Dr. Donald Mmari and have been incorporated into the final text.

The Inception Report has been drafted predominantly on the basis of the existing knowledge of the study team and by drawing on readily available research literature. It presents hypotheses to be tested, rather than any firm conclusions. As such, comments are strongly welcomed so as to ensure that subsequent work is suitably focused and contributes to the overall understanding of accountability processes in Tanzania.

1.1 Study Objectives

The Governance Working Group has recognised that there are limits to narrow technical approaches for bringing about sustainable policy reform and institutional change. Hence, the group has decided to undertake a comprehensive study on accountability to gain more in-depth knowledge about actual accountability processes between government officials, state institutions and ordinary citizens. The overall objective of the study, of which this inception report forms one of three components, is to assist the GWG in understanding the formal and informal political processes that guide policymaking and priority setting in Tanzania.

Research has suggested that the effectiveness of development assistance is compromised if technical reform initiatives do not sufficiently take into account domestic policy processes and the incentives which condition relevant stakeholders’ actions. The donor community recognises a) that country specific policy environments have been important in explaining differences in aid effectiveness and b) that donor-induced reform initiatives that are inconsistent with domestic policy objectives are unlikely to succeed.

Furthermore, many observers have argued that attempts to enhance domestic policy processes with mainstreamed tools such as PRSPs or MTEFs have suffered from a lack of accountability between governments and the domestic population. This has been true even when emphasis has been placed on the participation of civil society organisations. This points to the fact that interactions between different stakeholders in domestic policy processes (governments, donors, society and elite groups) are complex: external lobbying for inclusion of civil society organisations

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1 The consortium also includes the Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen (CMI) and REPOA, Tanzania as well as Dr. Max Mmuya and Simeon Mesaki of the Department of Political Science & Public Administration of the University of Dar es Salaam and Dr. Tim Kelsall of Newcastle University.

2 Sabine Weinzierl (OPM) has provided some research assistance.
in the policy dialogue may not be sufficient to address the gaps and discontinuities in the structures of accountability.

This conclusion confronts donor agencies with a number of problems:

- First, blue-prints and best practices focusing on formal processes and institutions no longer appear sufficient reference points to engage with the reality of development processes and the complexity of accountability and incentive structures.
- Second, donors therefore need to acquire more detailed knowledge about the dynamics of domestic politics and underlying social structures and conflicts. At the very least, there should be greater efforts to analyse how donor engagement affects governments’ relationship with the electorate and with political and economic elites at different levels.
- Third, there is little general knowledge on the political economy of domestic policy reforms and the motives and incentives conditioning domestic policy makers’ decisions and actions. Whilst there are a number of neat theoretical models that attempt to predict relevant stakeholders’ interests and incentives, their practical application is contentious.

The specific objective of this inception report is to present the background framework for analysing the values and incentives of political and administrative power holders vis-à-vis ordinary Tanzanians at different levels of government. It is aimed at providing a preliminary assessment of where conflicting interests and institutions may impinge on the quality of policy makers’ decisions and on the extent to which these are effectively implemented.

The primary audience is the Governance Working Group but the study could potentially be of considerable value to the Tanzanian Government as well. There are two main reasons why this should be so.

Firstly, the legitimacy of the Tanzanian Government relies on the effectiveness of the institutions of democracy. Whilst it might appear that there is some short-term advantage to the Executive in having weak structures of accountability, in the long run this can only undermine the legitimacy of the State, leading to reduced participation in democratic processes and, potentially, to the adoption by Tanzanian citizens of violent means of achieving their objectives. The Government has repeatedly stated its concern to strengthen the structures of democracy as a way of empowering citizens and promoting continued peace and stability. A better understanding of how accountability works in practice would surely enhance the effectiveness of actions in this area.

Secondly, the Tanzanian Government is pursuing many policies, whose implementation relies on a positive interaction between the State and the citizens of Tanzania. Domestic entrepreneurs are being encouraged to increase investment and employment creation; parents are being encouraged to send their children to school and to participate in the management (and sometimes construction) of their schools; villages are encouraged to take responsibility for the protection of their environment and their water supplies. Whilst all these policies have achieved some success, there is no doubt that with greater confidence and trust between the citizen and the State, there would be greater success. How can this trust be strengthened? How might the devolution of powers envisaged under decentralisation help this process? These are crucial questions for the Tanzanian authorities, on which the study – in conjunction with other ongoing research, may be able to throw some light.

1.2 The organisation and structure of the study

The study is divided into three components. Together they are designed to throw light on how structures of accountability operate in Tanzania and how they influence the quality and effectiveness of decisions on public policy and public spending. The sequencing of these components and the linkages between them are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Component One (this Inception Report) comprises a mapping of the principal accountability actors in Tanzania and their place within the institutional context. It presents an analysis of the different dimensions of accountability – vertical and horizontal, formal and informal - and a preliminary assessment of how effectively they operate. It provides an overview for the study as a whole and lays out hypotheses to be tested and refined through field work.

Component Two provides a “bottom-up” perspective on the question of accountability. It seeks to improve understanding of the expectations which Tanzanian citizens have with respect to power-holders, of citizens’ perspectives on their entitlements and of the channels they use and responses they typically face from different types of power-holders in trying to protect their entitlements. It includes three elements:

- A micro-survey covering 90 people in three regions of Tanzania – Lindi, Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, which will assemble quantitative and qualitative data on citizens’ perceptions with regard to accountability and entitlements.
- Two ethnographic surveys to be undertaken in Arumeru, examining the interactions between users and providers of government services with respect to health and justice.
- A series of focus group interviews designed to throw light on the observations emerging out of the micro survey and the ethnographic surveys.

Component Three provides a “top-down” perspective, based on a set of semi-structured interviews with elected representatives at the national and local government levels. It seeks to understand how Members of Parliament and Local Government councillors perceive their responsibilities and how they balance out the potentially contradictory allegiances and accountability relationships with which they are faced. Amongst other things, it will seek to examine some recent land-mark political decisions such as the elimination of the UPE level and other primary school fees, the abolition of the Development Levy for Local Governments, the re-introduction of fertiliser subsidies and the decentralisation of financial and staff
management decisions to local governments. For each of these, it will attempt to create a picture of the balance of interests which drove these political changes and influenced their particular form and timing.

Further information on the structure of components 2 and 3 and draft versions of the survey instruments to be utilised are presented in Annex. At the time of writing, the study team expect to follow the implementation schedule for the overall study, which was included in the Consortium’s revised technical proposal. A note with an update of the schedule and with further details on survey design will be presented to the Governance Working Group at the end of February 2005.

Each of the component outputs of the study will be written up and presented to the Governance Working Group and in other fora for feedback and comment. The study team is well aware of the inherent difficulties which surround qualitative work of this kind and it will be important to ensure that the study’s observations are submitted to careful scrutiny before any conclusions are drawn.

The Final Report will synthesise the key conclusions and lessons emerging from the study components as a whole. It will draw out the implications for institutional and policy changes within the Tanzanian polity, as well for the design of supporting projects and programmes by Development Partners. It will make links with ongoing research work and, if appropriate, make recommendations for future research.

1.3 Linkages to related work

Despite its relatively ambitious objectives, this is in itself a relatively small study and could only be successful by making linkages to the wider body of work in this area. In preparation for the current study, DFID commissioned a literature review on accountability in Tanzania, which was compiled by Drs Tim Kelsall and Max Mmuya, who are of course members of the study team. The design of the study - in particular the inclusion of an ethnographic component - has been influenced in significant ways by that earlier work. The Governance Working Group are also overseeing two parallel pieces of work which should complement and inform the present study:

- Sida has commissioned Professor Goran Hyden to undertake a “Power Analysis of Tanzania”.
- The World Bank have commissioned Professor Mushi to undertake a risk analysis for PRS2, based upon a mapping of power relations and an analysis in terms of the Loyalty-Voice-Exit model of Albert Hirschmann.

In addition, there is a parallel process of research being undertaken jointly by REPOA and CMI to examine attitudes to local government and to local service provision.

The bibliography in annex provides a more comprehensive summary of the references which have been utilised for the purpose of Component One. As other work matures and as the study proceeds, this bibliography will certainly be enlarged. It will be important to take in to account and, where appropriate, incorporate the arguments and insights of existing reports to make this study as comprehensive as possible.

1.4 Report outline

Following this introductory chapter, the report is structured as follows:

- In Chapter 2 we outline our understanding of accountability; we consider why donors have put increased emphasis on democratic accountability and we explain how we structure the analysis along four key dimensions of accountability; vertical accountability divided into the categories of electoral and societal accountability, horizontal, and external accountability.
• In Chapter 3 we give a brief overview of recent political developments in Tanzania and summarise our understanding of the key challenges and questions arising in terms of democratic accountability in Tanzania.

• Chapter 4 contains a comprehensive mapping of democratic accountability along the four different dimensions of accountability. We describe the relevant organisations, institutions and processes, how these interrelate and how roles and powers have evolved in recent years.

• Against the background of the mapping exercise, the Executive Summary identifies the gaps and apparent contradictions in existing knowledge, as well as the instances where formal and informal institutions and different dimensions of the four accountability relationships appear to conflict. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, we suggest the foci for the second and third components of this study.

• The Appendices outline the methodologies for components two and three. They include draft outlines for the micro survey, the ethnographic studies and semi structured interview guides for key informant interviews.
2. What do we mean by Accountability?

2.1 Why focus on accountability?

‘The battle to reclaim democracy is going to be a difficult one. It is a battle that must range across continents and countries. It must not acknowledge national boundaries…….’


Ordinary citizens around the world are increasingly asking critical questions about the accountability, transparency and legitimacy of state institutions, government officials and policy processes. Non-governmental organisations and independent political commentators repeatedly emphasise the need to enhance the voice of citizens. The increasing focus on voice and accountability reflects both a higher level of expectations over what the democratic process should deliver and a greater public awareness of the shortcomings of governments and democratic systems around the world. In developing countries, this awareness has fuelled a growing discontentment with persistently poor economic performance and with the ineffectiveness of aid – a feeling expressed both by the citizens of these countries and by the development community. The resulting frustration with poor development outcomes has prompted a search for political explanations why decision makers choose seemingly sub-optimal policies and jeopardise national development prospects. A number of general recognitions have emerged:

- Politicians and the staff of public agencies operate under complex incentives. Even when guided by good intentions, these can result in poor policy decisions and negative economic and social consequences.

- Institutions and governance structures shape the incentives, interests and strategies of policy makers and condition the influence which competing stakeholders can exercise.

- Institutions and governance structures play an important role in shaping the prospects for economic growth and broad-based social welfare. Both are central to explaining differences in economic performance and often override all other explanatory variables. But whilst there is ample evidence that they are key, little is known about how efficient institutions emerge and whether and how these can be built.

- Furthermore, little is known about the compatibility of formal and informal institutions and to what extent their incompatibility may constrain the quality of policy outcomes. Legislative changes and capacity building may have strengthened formal institutions; yet, policymaking processes may continue to be determined by informal practices that often undermine formal institutions.

- The search for answers to these paradoxes has led the development community to shift focus to issues of accountability within government and between government and society at large.

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2.2 How do we define accountability?

In general terms accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right by acting or desisting from particular actions. The most basic accountability relationship is that between a person or agency entrusted with a particular task or certain powers or resources, on the one hand, and the ‘principal’ on whose behalf the task is undertaken, on the other. Accountability, simply put, is a two-way relationship of power. It denotes the duty to be accountable in return for the delegation of a task, a power or a resource. This duty can be discharged in different ways but all accountability mechanisms operate according to a logic based around three criteria:  

- “Transparency” requires that decisions and actions are taken openly and that sufficient information is available so that other agencies and the general public can assess whether the relevant procedures are followed, consonant with the given mandate;  
- “Answerability” denotes an obligation on the part of the decision-makers to justify their decisions publicly so as to substantiate that they are reasonable, rational and within their mandate;  
- “Controllability” refers to the existence of mechanisms to sanction actions and decisions that run counter to given mandates and procedures. This is often referred to as a system of checks and balances or enforcement mechanisms. The checks may take many forms, including “shaming” and praise. Impunity is the antonym of controllability: apportioning blame – and a corresponding punishment - for harm done is a crucial component of accountability.

The debate about what constitutes an accountability relationship is ongoing. Most authors, nevertheless, distinguish between vertical forms of accountability, in which citizens and their associations play direct roles in holding the powerful to account, and horizontal forms of accountability, in which accountability to citizens is indirect and is delegated within the state apparatus. In this study, we follow this broad distinction, but divide vertical accountability into societal and electoral accountability. We also add the role of external actors. Thus, we distinguish the following dimensions of accountability:  

- **Vertical accountability** refers to the relationship between citizens and their political representatives, or the state being held to account by non-state agents. Vertical accountability takes two forms:  
  - **Electoral accountability** - elections are the classical form of vertical accountability, in which citizens delegate political power to their political representatives and hold them to account through elections.  
  - **Societal accountability** denotes the more informal role of non-state agents checking governments’ powers via the media, vocal civil society organisations and popular protest. Societal accountability is expressed through associations lobbying governments, demanding explanations and threatening government with less formal

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sanctions, like negative publicity\textsuperscript{7}. We also find that it is useful to distinguish between societal accountability at the national level and at the local level.

- **Horizontal accountability** refers to the intra-governmental control mechanisms between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary and between different sub-entities of the executive, including Cabinet, line ministries and lower level administrative departments and agencies. In addition to courts and parliamentary oversight functions, this includes special institutions of restraint such as the auditor general, anti corruption commissions, human rights commissions, the ombudsman, etc.

- **External accountability** refers to the relationship between governments and international entities, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, bilateral donors and international regimes and organisations – such as the OAU, NEPAD or the East African Community. While formally accountable to the parliament and their electorate through a range of constitutionally defined accountability instruments, governments in aid dependent DCs may in practice prove more accountable to external donors since withdrawal of aid funds constitute a serious sanction.

\textsuperscript{7} Goetz and Jenkins (2005).
These dimensions of accountability are illustrated in simplified form above. Chart 1 in Appendix 1 presents a more complete illustration.

To understand patterns of accountability in Tanzania we have proposed an approach, which takes as its starting point the fundamental importance of accountability in democratic systems of government. Three interconnected perspectives on assessing the different dimensions of accountability are identified:

- **The formal institutional perspective** sees accountability enshrined in the legal and institutional foundations of state sovereignty and the political system at various levels of governance (for example national, regional, districts). Through the various dimensions of accountability laid out above, governments are asked to demonstrate transparently their record on implementing policy commitments and thus, formal accountability systems need to generate information on policies, resource allocation decisions, and performance.

- **The informal institutional perspective** puts emphasis on whether political and administrative institutions are legitimised by and accountable to the social foundations of political and economic elites and society, manifested through formal and informal socio-political links. This perspective does not presuppose that formal institutional arrangements are automatically corresponding with informal institutions.

- **The focus on stakeholders**, both individuals and collective, considers how different interest groups can positively or negatively influence policy and institutional change and why they might do so. It is important to recognise that stakeholders’ *de facto* influence is conditioned by their formal and informal institutional power.

An analytical approach to understanding accountability needs to focus on the interconnections between formal and informal institutions and processes to gain a deeper understanding of:

- Who is seeking accountability?
- From whom is accountability being sought?
- How are the powerful held to account?
- Where is accountability being sought?
- For what is accountability being sought?

We apply this approach in Chapter 4 below.
3. Historical and Political Background

This section summarises the historical and political context for the study of current accountability relationships in Tanzania. This background is important because historical experience shows that institutional change tends to follow a path that links present to preceding institutions. We have not attempted a thorough analysis of historical trends but rather a selective overview, aimed at identifying key issues for further exploration.

3.1 The legacy of *ujamaa socialism*

Like many other African states Tanzania came to independence with almost no local state structures besides those that were intertwined with traditional authorities. British colonial rule governed in an indirect fashion. Control over territory and people was exercised through local intermediaries, either by means of creating new authorities or elevating existing chiefs. The task of intermediaries was typically to maintain in-group control exercised through a system of patronage, allocating jobs, land, access to cash crops and exemptions from taxation and communal work.

After independence in 1961 and more particularly after the Arusha Declaration in 1967, President Nyerere stood at the forefront of the ideal-type *ujamaa* socialism, which aligned many organisations of the political elite with the ruling party. These political changes brought nationalisation of the economy, followed by top-down reforms of rural institutions – marketing boards and cooperatives and village-level institutions. The forced move of subsistence farmers into "development villages" represented the culmination of this centrally directed attempt at social transformation.

The degree of organisation and central control necessary to even contemplate such social changes was remarkable and it has left its mark on the structure of state institutions and, perhaps more particularly, on the structure of the ruling party, CCM. Nevertheless, these reforms caused discontent and adverse behaviour among those affected and, ultimately proved unmanageable. The failure of the villagisation programme combined with the ongoing difficulties of enforcing controlled prices and managing a centrally planned economy eventually resulted in a breakdown of the formal economy, including a breakdown of the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.

Economic collapse had a corrosive effect on the key elements of the formal rule of government and bureaucracy. It led to a radical change in the economic constitution of the country, embracing first informal liberalisation, with a large "black" economy emerging over the 1980s and being increasingly accommodated at the official level. Formal liberalisation of the economy was introduced gradually from 1986 onwards, with privatisation beginning in the 1990s.

One cannot overstate the depths of the economic collapse which Tanzania suffered in the early 1980s. It is thus all the more remarkable that the institutions of the state and of the party did not collapse with the economy. This places Tanzania in sharp contrast to Russia and several other Eastern European countries and, indeed, to other African socialist countries such as Guinea.

An abiding characteristic of the socialist rule of government and bureaucracy under Nyerere was its ability to counteract what might otherwise have been strong political cleavages. It retained this

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*The terminology is often confused but the move into "*ujamaa villages" over 1969 to 1973 was a voluntary process – even if local officials in their enthusiasm may have used coercive methods. A formal policy of enforced movement into "development villages" was implemented from 1973 to 1976. Villagisation was formally abandoned in 1982 in a decision widely seen as the beginning of the end of *ujamaa socialism* in Tanzania (Meyns, P; 2000).*
ability through the period of crisis and into the 1990s. We may attribute this success to three principal factors:

- The powerful vision of nationhood, which Nyerere and the party were able to create – *ujamaa na umoja*: a self-reliant, united nation with a common language, in which ethnic and religious differences were secondary to the common bond of being Tanzanian and being African.\(^\text{10}\)

- The extensive use of systems of patronage, right down to local levels, as a way of encouraging loyalty to the party.

- Extensive controls over the expression of political views through controls over the media and through the one party system. The constitutional reform of 1977 established a system which not only disallowed political parties but also required all major institutions, such as labour unions and cooperatives as well as major cultural and religious associations to be either members of the single party or affiliated to it.\(^\text{11}\)

The 1992 constitutional reform introduced a pluralist political system, based on multi-party competitive politics. Although in many ways, it was a logical step in the process of economic and political liberalisation, it would be difficult to argue that the CCM were forced into this change.\(^\text{12}\) Both in the timing and the form of the change Nyerere – at that time Party Chairman – was highly influential and indeed took many senior party members by surprise (including, it is said, President Mwinyi) when he announced the intention to move to multi-party democracy in a speech in early 1992. Nyerere himself justified the shift as the most effective way of reviving the party, which he saw as increasingly corrupt and monolithic and, as such, an obstacle to continued social development. He probably also perceived the potential danger of sharpened social conflict in future if the "political blockade" was maintained. (Erdmann, Gero; 2000).

For Tanganyika, at least, and possibly also for Zanzibar, the strategy of "guided democratisation" seems to have paid off. Certainly, it would appear to have preserved at least three key elements of the legacy of *ujamaa* socialism:

- The sense of nationhood remains a powerful unifying force, even without the very deliberate style of political management which originally generated it. Zanzibar is a major exception to this generalisation; yet it is only in Zanzibar that regionalism or factionalism is an important part of the political discourse.\(^\text{13}\)

- The CCM has been regenerated by the internal changes which the threat of electoral loss prompted and has largely retained its extensive network into rural areas.

- There continues to be broad-based respect for the state and for the institutions of the state – a level of respect and trust, which in the 1980s was very close to disappearing.

The continued high-level of respect for the state holds advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it means that its legitimacy is not in general under question; thus it can collect taxes, direct public spending and continue to play an important organising and mobilising role – for the construction and maintenance of social assets (schools, roads, water supplies) and the protection of the environment. On the other hand, it means that actions undertaken by state agencies or state

\(^{10}\) It should not be forgotten that the rhetoric of national self-reliance was part of a wider vision of solidarity and brotherhood between African peoples.

\(^{11}\) Mmuya, Max. (2000).

\(^{12}\) The meeting in June 1991 of pro-reform groups under the name of the National Committee for Constitutional Reform has been described as a landmark in the transition process (Mmuya, Max; 2000). It was clearly influential but it was essentially a group of students and academics, certainly not a mass movement, and the pressure for reform was some way short of being irresistible.

\(^{13}\) This is not too suggest that there is room for complacency. Max Mmuya (2000) points out that there is a danger of ethnic and religious differences becoming increasingly important within a multi-party context.
officials are rather unquestioningly accepted as legitimate. There are innumerable examples, especially from the border regions – Kagera, Rukwa, Kigoma, of controls being imposed illegally on the movement of food crops by district and regional officials long after the formal liberalisation of marketing. Rarely has such intervention been actively resisted and still less challenged in court.

A further legacy from the 1980s relates to the generalised acceptance of “moonlighting”. The decline in real wages within the public sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s was so dramatic that it was literally impossible for public servants to survive and feed their families without having secondary occupations. Indeed, the fact that most public servants had to trade in the “black” economy goes a large way to explain why it grew so fast in the 1980s, making official controls increasingly untenable. Many civil servants continue to have secondary occupations, which to differing degrees they need to attend to within public service hours. This is generally understood and accepted, and, overall, citizens’ expectations regarding the behaviour of public officials are less “purist” than might have been the case in the early years of the Nyerere period or than would currently be the case in most OECD countries. Certainly, there is not the sharp separation between public and private interests which public administration theory prescribes.

The nature of the relationship between citizen and state is one of the important areas of investigation of Component 2 of this study, which will permit a more up to date analysis of these hypotheses and their implications.

3.2 The effects of economic and political liberalisation

With the restructuring of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s, including progressive liberalisation and deregulation, began a new struggle for economic access and privileges among old and new elites and classes. Corruption is believed to have increased in the post-1986 period and certainly there is evidence of preferential access to foreign exchange or to production inputs being used to gain commercial advantage. Some of the old (parastatal) elites have re-vamped themselves as a new (commercial) elite and an increase in donor engagement has invoked a largely new, urban-based group of internationally focused professionals.

In the meantime, there are signs that marginalised members of the old elite have formed a new rural based elite that features in new and old district and village-based institutions. All of these elite groups compete for political power. In this endeavour they engage with the popular segments of society in efforts to gain support. Observers note that at present such engagement appears sporadic, rather than forming strategic alliances that could induce fundamental (positive as well as negative) changes in Tanzania’s social make-up.

In general those considered at the bottom of the social strata have yet to benefit from the shifting pattern of elite conflicts. Not surprisingly, non-elite social groups typically lack self-organisation, information, education and possibly strategic foresight to engage in political processes. Whilst some self-organisation is observed, little is known about how these processes take place, and how they might be constrained from forming strategic alliances with elites that could further mutual interests.

In the political system great powers lie in the executive, from the national level down to the local administrative level. With the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) taking up the initiative to open up for democratisation, it also had the opportunity to have a strong influence on the rules of the game. Some observers see this as restraint on the political transition. For example, Tripp points out that the CCM “launched the liberalisation process only because they believed they would be able to stay ahead of the game, and that, by taking the initiative they would enhance the CCM’s credibility over the opposition”\(^\text{14}\). Political restructuring has maintained a state bias in favour

of the ruling party and the party nomination system. The opposition is generally weak in fulfilling the formal parliamentary role, although some individuals have performed very well.

Opinion surveys, such as the *Afrobarometer* attest that the electorate does not have a clear idea what the responsibilities of their representatives ought to be. There is a dichotomy between encouragement of civil politics and (neo) patrimonial counter-trends on the other hand, the rationale of which is difficult to capture from outside. Critical voices have pointed out the effects that donor money has had on accountability relationships within the country. External actors have focused on government’s internal (horizontal) accountability, but externalising accountability (to donors) may have contributed to undermining vertical accountability to the electorate and to society.

### 3.3 Overview: a stalemate in the socio-political landscape?

In sum, Tanzania faces a number of political challenges. Taken together, it might be said that these constitute something of a “stalemate” in the socio-political landscape. Political reform has been described, with good reason as being “in eclipse” (Mmuya, 1998) and neither internal societal nor external forces of accountability appear to be having very much impact on this situation:

- **Restructuring over the past decade has opened up political liberties.** But it does not appear to have generated the sort of change in power relations which might trigger the formulation of new socio-political regimes. The political and administrative elites have basically remained the same, their vested interests being to maintain the status quo of power and structures.

- **The tradition of the Executive as a strong and dominant force has been upheld and poses a challenge to the deepening of democracy.** This is both because of the continuing influence of the Executive in the appointment of the statutory office holders within the judiciary and the special institutions of restraint (CAG, etc) and because of the relative weakness of the Legislature relative to the Executive.

- **Political institutions at both the national and the district level of governance have remained weak.** There are few incentives for the Executive to strengthen these.

- **Donor funded initiatives to strengthen the functioning of the State have been very partial in their impact and may have inadvertently served to undermine accountability.** For example, the Ministry of Finance has been strengthened but other equally important institutions, such as the Judiciary or the National Assembly have not received the same attention, although they are crucial for the maintenance of checks and balances. Initiatives and tools such as the PRSP have been constructed to include civil society participation in the Executive’s policy discussions, but have not involved the National Assembly to the same extent. This may have contributed to the marginalisation of the Bunge.

- **Finally, despite greater political liberties the level of interaction between the government and state institutions on one hand and poorer sections of society on the other hand has remained low.** ‘Civil society’ is heavily dependent on donor funding and some economically important segments of society as well as the vast majority of non-elites have no real political representation. They therefore have no influence over improvements in the economic and social regime.

Interestingly, such stalemate situations are well researched historically. Those who have studied in-depth social transformation and economic development in Europe, East Asia and elsewhere stress that cross-national differences in strategic alliances among political elites and between...
political elites, economic elites and mass-based non-elites deliver the most convincing explanation why industrialisation and economic development has taken off more rapidly in some countries and failed to do so in others\textsuperscript{16}. The general lesson from such research is that more egalitarian socio-economic development occurs when the interests of those who exercise political power are consistent with a long-term economic perspective, which gives prominence to broad-based socio-economic welfare – for example as a pre-requisite to continuing social stability or as a basis for the development of a consumer market.

The crucial question for Tanzania then is whether a strategic alliance of power groups is emerging or has the potential to emerge, which would have the incentive and interest to adopt such a long-term economic perspective. In order to answer this question, there is a need for better insights into:

a) the formal and informal linkages between political representatives, the Executive, the administrative apparatus, society and elite groups,

b) the effects of globalisation and economic change upon these relationships; and

c) the effects that external accountability can have on these.

Components 2 and 3 of the study are intended to yield insights in these areas. In order to do this they will examine both national and local relationships and dynamics. One of the significant change factors in Tanzania is that economic and political restructuring has increased the importance of district level organisations and political power. This may have triggered new political dynamics and has made this level crucial for MPs to seek support. It has also strengthened patrimonial politics and may perhaps have led to ethnic trust being used for clientelistic purposes\textsuperscript{17}. Again components 2 and 3 will be able to throw light on the reality and nature of these tendencies.


4. Mapping Institutions, Stakeholders and Processes of Accountability

This chapter maps current accountability relationships in Tanzania, introducing key stakeholders, processes and institutions of accountability. The mapping exercise is based on a desk study of relevant Tanzania experience, information and material. It draws on a review of existing literature, reports and surveys on Tanzania’s political and administrative institutions and systems, its polity, its social fabrics and structures and its external relations with international, governmental and non-governmental agencies. A comprehensive bibliography is included in the Annex.

The chapter is structured in four main sections:

- **Section 4.1** describes organisations and institutions through which *horizontal accountability* is exercised. This includes the Executive, the National Assembly, the Judiciary and three institutions of restraints – the National Audit Office, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau and the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance.

- **Section 4.2** gives an overview of the *vertical accountability relationship through the electoral channel* at different levels of governance. This includes the national electoral system, the political system at the district level and the workings of the Electoral Commission. We also comment on multiparty politics and on the funding and organisation of political parties.

- **Section 4.3** describes organisations through which vertical accountability may be exercised more informally via organised interest groups and broader based social movements. We distinguish between *societal accountability* at the national and the district/local level.

- **Section 4.4** comments on *external accountability*. It summarises the Tanzania government’s relationship with multilateral and bilateral donors and explores whether external accountability has reinforced or undermined domestic accountability.

4.1 Horizontal Accountability – Political and Administrative System and Processes

4.1.1 The Executive

The Executive comprises the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The President is elected directly by popular vote and his powers of appointment are extensive. He appoints the Chief Justice, other judges, key Civil Servants, including Principal Secretaries, at government headquarters all the way down to the District Executive Director in the local governments (Ewald 2002:5). The President also appoints the top commanding officers in the armed forces. Furthermore, the President has the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers at will.

Cabinet consists of 27 Ministers and 17 Deputy Ministers. Cabinet ministers are appointed from among the MPs and retain their seat in Parliament - *the Bunge* - while they serve as members of government\(^{18}\). Although the 1977 Constitution provides for collective ministerial accountability,

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\(^{18}\) In Tanzania “Parliament” and “National Assembly” are not used identically. Parliament refers to the President together with the National Assembly, while the National Assembly refers to the legislative body only. Here, these concepts will be used interchangeably as synonyms with the legislative branch of government.
Cabinet is only partly subject to the confidence of the Assembly. The Bunge has the option of a vote of no confidence for the Prime Minister but not over Cabinet ministers. Collective accountability of the Cabinet vis-à-vis the Assembly is thereby undermined by the latter’s inability of enforcement. On the other hand, it should be noted that from 1992, under provision 46a of the Constitution, the National assembly can pass a resolution to remove the directly elected President.

The Tanzanian Cabinet is of considerable size. When President Mkapa entered his first presidential period he reduced the number of ministers, but it has steadily increased since 1995 (Wang 2005). This has reinforced the familiar pattern of bloated governments vis-à-vis a marginalised position of the legislature. Kelsall (2002:612) notes that there is a tendency to co-opt particularly outspoken MPs into Government, thus moderating parliamentary debates. A small group of cabinet ministers close to the President sets the cabinet agenda. Other ministers are not very influential (Ewald 2002). Observers have suggested that cabinet reshuffles have been used strategically as a means of preserving and enhancing the position of ethnic and regional representatives in the upper echelons of government19.

The President also appoints the Prime Minister, who must come from within the ranks of the majority party in the assembly (or, if no political party has a majority, enjoys the support of the majority of the Members of Parliament). His appointment must be approved by a resolution of the Assembly supported by a majority vote of MPs.

In terms of administrative structures there are presently 19 ministries. The Tanzania Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the President’s Office – Public Service Management (PO-PSM, formerly the Civil Service Department, CSD) have emerged as central ministries within the political and administrative system and are key to donor-funded administrative reform programs. The MoF has gained importance as the governmental locus of power serving as the primary link between the state and the donor/creditor community (Harrison 2001:664).

Administrative structures are generally described as “extremely hierarchical, centralized, and characterized by an elitist attitude and weak capacity” (Ewald 2002:7). The administration is significantly politicized and certain positions appear to be appointed on the basis of party affiliation. Ministers generally have little ability to control and steer their own ministries (Mmuya 1998). Control functions are concentrated in and limited to the Principal Secretaries, the Deputy Principal Secretaries and departmental directors, all of whom are appointed by the President.

The availability of disciplinary measures over the use of public funds appears to be inadequate. It has been pointed out that the Principal Secretary of Finance lacks the authority and has not been adequately empowered to ensure that his/her colleagues as Accounting Officers of other line ministries implement the recommendations put forth, for example, by the PAC or the LAAC (Naschold and Fozzard 2002:37). Furthermore, although the public service has been cut to size, it is not a professionalized service (Hyden 2004). Retention of qualified staff has been a challenge, because private sector remunerations are more generous.

4.1.2 The National Assembly

The National Assembly – the Legislature – stands in the midst of two accountability relationships. Whilst it is accountable to the electorate (vertical accountability), the Executive is accountable to

19 A careful balancing of the regions was effected in the appointments to the 1995 Mkapa Government. This has generally been taken as a conscious effort to redress the perceived religious and regional imbalances of the Mwinyi era. A pattern of organizing into regional blocks has also been observed in Parliament (Kelsall 2002:612).
the Legislature (horizontal accountability). These are the “checks and balances” of democratic systems of governance. The description of the Executive in the previous paragraph suggests that the Tanzanian politico-administrative system does not feature a system of checks and balances that allows for a strong Legislature.

The Bunge is composed of 232 directly elected members from single member constituencies (first-past-the-post system), 5 members elected by the Zanzibar House of Representatives, 49 women representatives (indirectly elected) and 10 presidential nominees – amounting to a total of 295 MPs. The Attorney General is an ex-officio member of parliament. The Speaker of Parliament heads the Tanzanian Bunge. Since the last elections in 2000 the leading party, the CCM, hold almost 88% of all seats in Parliament, up from 78% seats in the first multi-party elections in 1995.

Before the second election to the multiparty union parliament in 2000, the number of indirectly elected members was increased. First, the proportion of indirectly elected women in the House was raised from 15% to 20% in 1996. These seats are distributed proportionally according to the number of seats a party has won. The number of women’s special seats should constitute no less than 20% of the total number of seats. In the 2000 general elections all but three of these women’s special seats went to members of the ruling party. Second, the 13th amendment to the Constitution in February 2000 - only a couple of months before the election - re-instated the practice of presidential appointees, which had been constitutionally abolished in 1992 as part of the introduction of the multiparty system. This constitutional amendment has enabled the President to appoint 10 MPs to the 2000-2005 Parliament (Peter 2001:30; Biddle et al. 2002:17). Observers note that the motive behind the restoration of power to appoint members to parliament is a means to ensuring the control and dominance of the ruling party.20

The Assembly holds four sessions a year in the Bunge building in Dodoma. Three of these usually last for about 10 working days, while the budget session lasts for about 40 days (Tanzania Parliament 2002:8). Parliamentary committees typically meet in Dar es Salaam in the week before parliamentary sessions take place. The MPs spend much time commuting between Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, and their constituencies. This has created the practical problem that bills to be discussed in sessions do not reach MPs in time and this impinges on the quality of parliamentary debate (Biddle et al. 2002:22).

The quality of MPs’ work is further hampered by a basic lack of research information. This is mainly down to budget constraints, which leave the parliamentary library with a shortage of trained staff and with difficulties to get hold of relevant new material (Bunge News 2000:23; Biddle et al. 2002:29). MPs also complain about inadequate working tools, such as a lack of secretaries, offices and access to computers. Legal impediments instituted under the one-party system are still in operation, and make it difficult for the MPs to access information. The same legal provisions hamper access to government information and transparency more generally. For example, the government tightly controls the distribution of information to the media through the “defence of the public interest norm” stipulated in the Newspaper Act (Biddle et al. 2002:26). Civil service regulations and standing orders also constrain public officials from releasing information (Biddle et al. 2002:26).

The Bunge comprises 13 standing committees and 8 departmental committees. The latter were established in 2001 to take a closer look at government estimates and are of permanent in nature, meeting only during budget sessions. There is also the possibility of establishing quasi-judicial ‘probe’ committees. These can be seen as a useful supplement to the established committee

20Two of the appointees had recently defected from the opposition before joining the ruling party. Among the appointees was also a CUF member. This latter appointment was perhaps an effort to create oppositional goodwill (Biddle et al. 2002:17).
system and have been formed on a number of occasions (Kelsall 2004). Most of the standing committees are more or less organized according to policy subjects and linked to one or more ministries. There is a clear rank order among the standing committees, with the Public Accounts Committee and the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee holding a special position among the MPs (Wang 2003).

Committees can summon officials to stand before them and a few have habitually exercised the right to do so. Some committees are now also allowed to conduct public hearings. But as the Speaker asserts (2000b:6), because of scarce funding this is only applicable to a few selected bills of particular importance or interest where the Speaker authorizes the use of this mechanism. It is a general problem that lack of funding, skills and effective enforcement mechanisms prevent committees from adequately attending to their workload and to carry out proper oversight (Rutashobya 2004:28). Building MPs’ expertise is weakened by the arrangement whereby the standing committee membership can only last for 2 1/2 years.

A worrying characteristic of the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature is the lack of institutionalised possibilities for the Bunge to communicate dissatisfaction with the Executive in a manner that entails real political costs. This becomes particularly evident during the budget process. Ewald (2002) argues that a series of administrative reforms not least promoted by the donor community have contributed to a marginalization of the position of Parliament (and other accountability actors). Thus, he states that an “iron triangle” has developed between the Presidency, the MoF and donors around budget work. While the technical capacity of the MoF has been strengthened and the participation of civil society organisations at various stages of the budgetary process have been acknowledged, for example through the PRSP process, the crucial role of Parliament as the representatives of the people of Tanzania has been significantly ignored (Gould and Ojanen 2003).

The Bunge is largely excluded from participating in the preparatory stage of the budgetary process, whilst certain NGOs have been granted a voice in the process all the way from the preparatory stage to the oversight of policy implementation (McGee et al. 2002:65-66). Thus, parliamentary approval of the Finance Bill comes close to a mere formality. Parliament can only recommend changes within the parameters set by the MTEF and its role is reduced to debating the budget at a fairly detailed level, rather than impacting on crucial broader policy proposals.

The accountability function of the Assembly is furthermore undermined by strong party discipline (Kelsall 2004). Party group organization within the ruling party is institutionalized, which is not necessarily the case for the opposition. The whip system and the CCM party caucus have become forceful organs to make ruling party MPs toe the party line. According to Tanzania’s electoral law MPs cannot cross the floor in Parliament. This provides parties with an effective disciplinary mechanism that can evoke expulsion from the party. Expulsion in practice means having to resign.

21 Probe committees have for instance been established in relation to cases which have ended with the resignation of ministers, most notably the 1996 resignation of Finance Minister Simon Mbilinyi, and the 2001 resignation of the minister for Industries and Trade, Iddi Smiba. With respect to the former, it has later been claimed that Mbilinyi was ousted from office because of frictions within the CCM (Kelsall 2002: 606).

22 Some of the committees that have been active with respect to this are the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) and the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee (FEAC).

23 The Speaker of Parliament holds a strong position within the party and is known for preserving and cultivating ties with the forces in the upper echelons of the CCM. He is no longer an MP but due to a recent constitutional amendment he has been allowed to continue as Speaker. A recent study refers to dissatisfaction among the MPs with this arrangement and several regard it as a sign of further executive dominance over parliament (ARD/USAID 2003:24).
from the parliamentary seat and thus there are strong disincentives to do so. With strong party
discipline and no public inner-party criticism allowed, parliamentary debates are often superficial.
Compared to the one-party era, the vigorousness of debate in the plenary has diminished. As
argued by the Speaker of Parliament, Pius Msekwa:

“it is therefore absolutely naïve for anyone to expect that the majority ruling party members of
Parliament will do anything which might result in their government's proposals being defeated. It is a
moral obligation for them to support the government of their party on the floor of the House… it is
misleading to talk about free expression in the National Assembly by the MPs” (Msekwa 2000:76 &
117).

The constitution grants the President extensive powers of dissolution of the Assembly, which
further weakens the accountability function of the Bunge. There are, for instance, no limits on the
number of times the Assembly may be dissolved. Dissolution of the Assembly would, however,
require the call of a new presidential election. The President also holds a package veto, which can
only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. If this happens, and a bill is still not
acceptable to the President, he would have to call new parliamentary and presidential elections.
Neither case has occurred to date.

The constraints placed on the workings of Parliament are considerable and reinforced by strong
ruling party discipline. An improvement in the accountability function of the Tanzanian Legislature
can, nevertheless, be observed in the multiparty era relating to the strengthening of the committee
system and a slight improvement in available resources and better skilled MPs (Wang 2005).

4.1.3 The Judiciary

Observers hold that the judiciary does not have a strong position vis-à-vis the Executive in
Tanzania. However, higher ranks of the judiciary are commonly regarded as competent and
moderately independent (ARD/USAID 2003; Gloppen 2003; Ewald 2002). Moreover, the direction
of change over the last decade has been towards increased judicial assertiveness (Gloppen 2003).

The court system is of hierarchical structure with the Chief Justice at the top. The higher courts,
the Court of Appeal and the High Court comprise only 43 judges (including the Chief Justice). The
President appoints the Chief Justice, while the judges of the Court of Appeal are appointed by the
President on advice of the Chief Justice, and High Court judges are appointed by the President on
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. The President is not committed to follow the advice and
has occasionally ignored the list of nominees. The strong involvement of the President in the
appointment procedures is considered a problem for judges’ public confidence. Judges are
appointed for life and can only be dismissed for misconduct or incompetence. A commission of
inquiry consisting of three judges (one from another Commonwealth country) recommends to the
President who must abide by the advice (Gloppen 2003:125-126) The small size of the judiciary
has enhanced the importance of individual personalities particularly Chief Justices, such as Nyalali
(former) and Samatta (current) who have been very prominent (Gloppen 2003).

Whilst cases are still rare, courts have on occasions ensured that power-holders have not
overstepped their constitutional powers. Politically significant cases include the 2002 5 million TSh
judgement requiring elections petitioners to deposit 5 million TSh as security and the 1994 Mtikila
case which lifted the ban on independent candidates. Other cases are the Peter Ng’omango ruling
which made it easier to sue the government and the Pumbun case which has constituted a
precedent for handling ouster clauses (Gloppen 2003:115-116). The authority of the Courts has
not always been respected as Parliament has amended laws to overturn rulings. Parliament for
instance overturned the ruling in the Mtikila case by re-introducing the clause (ARD/USAID 2003;
Gloppen 2003). The lower echelons of the courts i.e. the Regional Magistrate Courts (108), District
Courts, Magistrates (206) and Primary Courts (653) are reputed as being rife with corruption and are generally held in low esteem. Political influence has been cited as a problem (see, Gloppen 2003) but acute scarcity of resources and low pay are additional explanations of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the lower courts (ARD/USAID 2003; Ewald 2002).

4.1.4 Special Institutions of Restraint

The National Audit Office (or by its more general name - Supreme Audit Institution) is an important organisation within horizontal accountability, its primary purpose being to oversee the management of public funds and the quality and credibility of governments’ reported financial data. The Tanzanian equivalent, the Controller and Auditor General (CAG), has been in operation since independence. It submits the audited accounts of government to the Parliament through the MoF (Rutashobya 2004:22). The President appoints the Auditor General who heads the CAG.

In its practical work, the CAG is constrained by the lack of financial independence and the lack of independence over human resource management decisions. The Executive decides over its budget and in terms of remuneration it is unable to offer competitive terms and conditions compared to private sector accountancy firms because it is bound to civil service salaries. The practical relevance and influence of audit reports is often compromised by lack of timely information. Although capacity has increased in recent years and the timeliness of some of its reports has improved the CAG still fails to report to statutory deadlines (Tax 2004; PRBS/PRSC Review 2004). This applies in particular for the accounts of local governments (Rakner and Wang 2005). Serious shortfalls are also noted on the follow up side. CAG reports point out a number of recurring problems, the rectification of which Parliament and the PAC have been unable or unwilling to enforce upon the Executive (Simpson 2004; Rutashobya 2004).

The donor community has partly been seen as responsible for the poor performance of the CAG. Public financial and administrative reform initiatives within the framework of the PRSP (i.e. PFMR) have been centred predominantly on Government ministries and have not taken into account that the capacity of the CAG as the independent oversight body is built up at the same pace. This has sidelined the office and thus also undermined parliamentary oversight. Lack of trust in the work of the CAG is demonstrated through donors’ practice to hiring in private audit firms to audit projects, by-passing the CAG rather than assisting to build its capacity. The National Audit Office finds that although an increasing amount of donor funds is channelled through the national budgetary process, keeping funds in separate accounts hampers the NAO’s ability to keep track of funds and audit expenditure comprehensively (Rakner and Wang 2005).

In line with a general externally evoked trend in a number of more recent democracies, new special agencies of restraint have been established in Tanzania to oversee and guard against executive power. These include the Prevention of Corruption Bureau and the Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance.

Tanzania has one of the longest serving anti-corruption agencies in the world. A predecessor to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau - the Anti-Corruption Squad – was already established in 1975 and was revitalised in 1998 (Langseth and Stapenhurst 1997). Since then the budget for this entity has steadily increased, more staff have been hired and PCB offices have been established in all mainland regions (ARD/USAID 2003, Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002). Although a study on anti-corruption mechanisms in Southern Africa commends that PCB officials have not experienced government interference in their work (Matsheza and Kunaka 2000), this view is

24 The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1971 provided for the establishment of the Squad, but did not take effect until 1975.
highly contested. Pope (1999) finds that the PCB has by and large failed in its effort to combat corruption.

The PCB reports directly to the President and its Director General as well as directors are appointed and can be removed by the President (Shayo 2003). By being located within the President’s Office it has been in no position to tackle serious corruption involving actors close to the Presidency. This is confirmed by Heilman and Ndumburo (2002) who report that high ranking officials have on occasions interfered in PCB investigations, and that the decision to take action against people is strongly influenced by their position and political connections. Few cases have actually led to conviction. This can partly be explained by the PCB’s dependence on the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and that the burden of proof in corruption cases has been high (ARD/USAID 2003).

The Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) was formally founded in 2001 and is a combined ombudsman and human rights commission. The previous ombudsman was called the Permanent Commission of Enquiry (PCE) and was established as early as in 1966. Its operation was confined to investigation of violation of principles of good governance. In 2000 the PCE was abolished and replaced by the CHRGG to allow for the investigation of human rights issues as well. The Commission is mandated to preserve and promote human rights and principles of good governance. The formal framework (Act No. 3 2001) ensures the relative independence of the Commission, but its work has so far been constrained by a huge backlog of cases inherited from the PCE, amounting to more than 300025. In 2002 the CHRGG was still in the process of hiring core staff, and no staff had yet been assigned to the human rights division26. The Commission is categorically prevented from investigating the President.

Graph 2 in Appendix 1 illustrates the institutions of horizontal accountability.

The above overview of key actors, institutions and processes of horizontal accountability indicates that the Executive is by far the most powerful political institution in Tanzania. The directly elected President appoints a wide range of key actors who then become accountable to him. Although the institutional framework provides for some checks and balances, the Legislature’s formal ability to actually call the Executive to account is weak. So is that of the special institutions of restraint. We conclude that from a formal perspective the institutional framework of horizontal accountability is flawed. The strong presidential Executive overrides the Legislature’s mandate to exercise control and oversight. However, such control could be exercised in an informal way through strategic alliances, for example among majority party MPs. In general it is perceived that Parliament’s responsibility to hold the Executive to account has been strengthened with the introduction of multi-party democracy. A positive development is also traced with regard to the higher courts and the CAG. Nevertheless, there remain both structural flaws in the division of powers between the Executive and other parts of the state and practical constraints arising out of the predominance of the ruling party.

25 Even after the PCE was formally abolished in 2001 the public was invited to bring complaints to it.
26 Data based on interviews (carried out by Vibeke Wang) with CHRGG staff in Tanzania 2002.
4.2 Vertical Accountability through the electoral channel

4.2.1 The Electoral System

Most Tanzanian Members of Parliament are elected to Parliament from 232 single member parliamentary constituencies\(^{27}\). The electoral system is based on the first-past-the-post principle. This system is also employed in local government elections where candidates stand in 2411 local wards\(^{28}\).

In addition to electing Members of Parliament, Tanzanian voters elect the President by direct vote. The 1995 elections stipulated that for a candidate to win the presidential election more than 50% of total votes cast had to be won. This requirement was abolished through a constitutional Amendment prior to the 2000 national elections. Thus a candidate can presently win by simple majority (Peter 2001:30).

Tanzania represents a dominant party system where the same party, CCM, has remained in power since independence. CCM's presidential candidate, Benjamin W. Mkapa received an overwhelming majority of votes in both the 1995 and 2000 union parliament elections, receiving respectively 62% and 71% of votes cast. In both elections, opposition parties have failed to form a united front. Prior to the 2000 legislative elections the opposition disintegrated and saw its parliamentary representation reduced. The CCM dominance is similarly pronounced at the local level.

Furthermore, the electoral system skews the distribution of parliamentary seats in relation to votes received, illustrated by the fact that in the 1995 general elections CCM received 59% of all votes cast, but won nearly 80% of the seats in the Assembly (Ewald 2002).

4.2.2 Political Representation at the District Level

In 1999 Tanzania initiated a Local Government Reform (LGR) programme, which is still under implementation and has suffered from a slow start. The aim of the reforms was to devolve decision-making authority to district authorities. The Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are referred to as the administration of those entities “operating on a local level, functioning through a representative organ known as the Council, and established by the law to exercise specific powers within a defined area of jurisdiction” (Baker and Wallevik 2002:16). LGAs are autonomous and can be distinguished between urban Councils and rural District Councils. These councils are the supreme decision-making body at the district level.

Councillors are elected at the ward level. One councillor is elected for each ward through a popular and secret ballot, similar to the electoral system applied in the national parliamentary elections. A fixed quota of one-quarter of all council seats are reserved for women who are appointed by their political parties on the basis of the number of seats won by the parties. The Member of Parliament of a council's constituency is also a council member. District councils are responsible for social service provision, road maintenance, planning, agricultural extension and livestock management. Further, they have the power to make bye-laws, which is most often exercised in respect of taxation and local public order issues. The approval of the Minister for Regional Administration and

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\(^{27}\) As have been referred to earlier there is also some element of proportionality involved.

\(^{28}\) Tanzania is also divided into 26 regions led by Regional Commissioners, but these are not important electoral units.
Local Government is required. In practice this gives the minister large discretionary powers. Bye-laws must be in conformity with the Constitution.

In terms of capacity the elected District Councils are often said to be weak. Councillors are frequently discredited as "illiterate local power brokers who cannot be trusted to deal with the technical task of governing a modern administration" (ARD/USAID 2003:38).

The chief executive officer at the LGA level is the District Executive Director (DED) in rural councils or the Urban Director (UD) in urban areas. He is the secretary of Council meetings, and despite having no voting rights, may have considerable power and influence over council matters via agenda setting. Thus the personal relationship between the Executive Director and the Council Chairperson is quite important.

Below the LGAs are the Kitongoji (hamlets), which were formally established in 1992. They are the smallest administrative units in a District Council and are not considered a local government authority. The Mtaa (a street or block) is the parallel unit in an urban area. The chair to the kitongoji committee is elected on a political basis. To the mtaa committee the chair as well as a secretary and the other members are elected on political basis. The functions of these committees are to drum up support for development initiatives at the grassroots and in a sense to be the mouthpiece of local people in the development planning process. Concerns are communicated to the committees, which in turn discuss them. The expressed priorities in local development and service delivery are then passed on to the village council or, in urban areas, the Ward Development Committee (Baker and Wallevik 2002).

The Village Councils are the rural local authorities within a ward. It is in effect a village government and has responsibility for the day-to-day running of the village. The chairperson is elected, and so are a number of other members (not more than 25). There are also preferential seats for women. The Village Executive Officer (VEO) is the secretary to the Village Council, but has no voting rights. The Council also has the authority to make bye-laws. It is required to consult the Village Assembly, but the views of the VA are not binding. The proposal must then be submitted to the District Council and upon its approval, the bye-law comes into effect. Note, however, that in addition to the Council, the Minister also has overriding powers of village legislation (Shivji and Peter 2000).

The Village Assembly is a meeting where all adult villagers are invited to attend and functions as an information forum. The chair and secretary of the assembly is the VEO. The Village Assembly is said to lack tax raising powers, ability to hold executive officers to account, and power to legislate (Shivji and Peter 2002). Village chairs and the council are not subject to popular vote.

The Ward Development Committee acts as an important intermediary organ between the District or Municipal Councils and the Village or Urban councils. Among other things, it coordinates development initiatives and social service plans; supervises their implementation and elects the VEOs (Baker and Wallevik 2002).

At the village level there are also Ten Cell Leaders. The Ten Cells are part of the former CCM government hierarchy and thus part of the party structure. Every hamlet or village chooses a person to be the CCM party representative to take care of and solves local matters. The continued use of Ten Cell Leaders, for example in the electoral registration process further blurs the distinction between political representatives, civil servants and party structures. Local people are uncertain as to whether Ten Cell Leaders hold party or government positions (Kelsall 2004b). The picture that emerges is that the lower levels of governance have not become more responsive and

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29 This ministry is now place within the President’s Office.
accountable to villagers because administrative leaders are first and foremost accountable to district authorities (ARD/USAID 2003:39; Shivji and Peter 2000).

Parallel to Local Government Authorities, the central Executive expands to the local level via Regional and District Commissioners who are the executive representatives of central government at lower levels of government. Regional Commissioners (RC) are appointed by the President and are the principal representatives of government within the region. Their main responsibilities are to maintain law and order - the RC has the power to arrest and detain; determine the direction for implementing government policies; and, to facilitate and assist LGAs in the region. There are no elected representatives at this level. At the district level there are 130 administrative districts, led by District Commissioners (DC) whom the President also appoints. Their task is to assist the Regional Commissioner in the discharge of his/her duties, mainly in maintaining law and order in the district.

Accountability and credibility of district administrations has been low and these entities have sometimes simply been considered as agents of central government (Ewald 2002). Technical officers at the district level are commonly little qualified and in particularly there is a shortage of auditors and accountants.

Administrative decentralization has led to the substitution of provinces/regions by districts as the vital level of public administration (Gibbon 1998:49). As the central state has withdrawn from this level of governance which under the previous regime was considered among its key responsibilities, there has been a significant increase in the provision of basic social services and infrastructure by non-state actors ranging from various donors and NGOs to locally organized private vigilante groups (Kiondo 1994:50-54). Medium and large-scale capital investment has also undergone a localization process, and made additional resources available for political and economic activity at the district level.

Some observers argue that with the retreat of the state, the “spoils” character of the Tanzanian political elite has escalated. Economic liberalization has increased the elite’s incentive for self-enrichment (Kelsall 2002:608) and has accelerated informal politics and a de-classing of the elite (Gibbon 2001:842; Gibbon 1998:49; Kelsall 2002:610-611; 2000:549). Members of the elite who did not manage to position themselves strategically with the advent of economic liberalization were retrenched and often returned to their old villages, where they may have engaged in economic activities. Kelsall (2000:550) maintains that the search for new sources of wealth is discernible in struggles for control of local non-state institutions, which provides access to considerable resources. Alongside the increased flow of donor resources at this level, districts have emerged as the crucial focus point for MPs.

4.2.3 Multiparty Competition

Under the current system the multiparty MPs are dependent on building a solid base of local following to win the election, which is different from the situation under the one-party system before 1992. The current system has considerably altered MPs outlook on their representation of voters. The electorate now plays a decisive role in choosing contestants. Significantly, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the CCM can still re-rank or nullify people’s preferences, but it does so in a more transparent and careful manner (Biddle et al. 2002:19). As primary elections within the CCM are more open and competitive, the level of formal party funding has been scaled down. Incentives for “buying” and bribing the electorate have been strengthened.

The electoral laws have in fact been conducive to corruption. Since the first multiparty elections on a national level, the handing out of treats and gifts has been widespread during the election
campaigns (Kelsall 2002:611). In 2000, Parliament passed a law legalizing “hospitality” (takrima) by the contenders to political office. Experiences from the 2000 general election show that many ruling party leaders utilise this in order to win elections. Heilman et al. (2001:16) report of numerous press accounts of candidates with plastic bags of money and fights breaking out among campaign staff and supporters over the allocation of such money. Irregularities and corruption charges were reported at both council and parliamentary level (Biddle et al. 2002:20). As a consequence of this, it has become more expensive to stand for election and this is likely to have an impact on who is able to stand.

The political power of MPs is to a large extent based on their constituency networks, and their contacts in the government and the civil service. When a MP visits his/her constituency, the personal needs of the constituents are often what matters. MPs are asked and expected to assist constituents with various kinds of problems, such as transportation, school fees, finding work etc. This represents a significant change relative to the one-party system. An orientation toward the district is now essential. With the competitiveness of politics having become fiercer it now seems just as important as having the right party connections or holding a central position within party structures.

### 4.2.4 Political Parties

When the multiparty system was adopted in 1992 the ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) was formally separated from government. Transition of the political regime took place under the guidance of the CCM and has given the political leadership of the ruling party the opportunity to control the process. In general, economic reforms and liberalisation have been faster and more profound than political reforms and have preceded these by a number of years (Harrison 2001; Therkildsen 2000). Political and administrative elites have basically remained the same and have maintained the status quo of political power structures (see, Ewald 2002; Kelsall 2002). The tradition of the Executive as a strong and overly dominant political force backed by the party prevails.

The main opposition party is the Civic United Front (CUF) with its stronghold on Zanzibar. Additional opposition parties represented in the 2000-2005 Parliament are *Chama cha demokrasia na maendeleo* (Chadema), United Democratic Party, the National Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), and the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP). Observers note that most opposition parties lack a comprehensive political programme; are conflict ridden, centred on individuals, have a narrow social base, and are urban biased (Whitehead 2000; Ewald 2002; Mmuya 1998; ARD/USAID 2004). This strengthens the position and standing of the CCM.

Parties’ ideologies are set out in party programs, but are generally loosely defined, bearing little practical relevance to party politics.

*Party financing* with public funds is dispersed proportionally according to the number of seats a party holds in the legislative assembly. The amount the opposition receives is therefore scant and parties not represented in Parliament do not receive public party financing at all. As the CCM has more members than any other party it also collects a larger amount of member fees. More significantly, the CCM is able to draw on its networks within the national and local elite. The opposition parties sometimes receive contributions from individuals and informal groups of businesses, but do not have the same elaborate network of contacts as the CCM. At the local level candidates sometimes finance parts of their own election campaign. CCM members tend to be more well-off than their counterparts from the opposition (Kelsall 2004b).
Donors have at times directly supported political parties, for example by the Dutch IMD or by German political foundations and the Swedes are currently contemplating similar initiatives. While such support has mostly targeted opposition parties, the CCM benefits from indirect external support to the Government through the strong linkages between the state and the party (see, Kelsall 2004b; ARD/USAID 2003).

Internal party organization of the CCM is more elaborate and institutionalized than that of the opposition. Some members of the opposition also have succeeded in establishing quite sophisticated organisational structures, but these often break down when it comes to actual decision-making. Decisions are then personalized and made at the top, by-passing lower party structures. Limited means prevent the opposition from fielding candidates in all constituencies and calling large national party conferences. The CUF is the only opposition party with a strong presence on Zanzibar (and is not very strong in mainland Tanzania). All other parties are focused on the mainland. Internal turbulences have taken place within all parties and in many instances have not been solved in accordance with party provisions (Kelsall 2004b).

The CCM is separated into the Party Congress, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the Central Committee (CC) of the National Executive Committee at the national level. The CC is known to be the centre of power where policy decisions are made. A similar division into three party organs – The Regional Conference, The Regional Executive Committee and The Political Committee of the Regional Executive Committee - is found at the regional level. However, these organs have little impact. The district level structure parallels that of the national and regional level with a District Conference (political organ), District Executive Committee (executive organ), and a Political Committee of the District Executive Committee. To garner support for elections the two party institutions the Party Youth Commanders (national and regional elite) and the Party Clan Leaders Elders (local level) are also important.

Party candidate nominations within the CCM are de jure transparent. Candidates hand in their nomination forms either to the ward office (to the local level councillor), the district office (the MP) or to the head office (presidency). Final selection is made by the District Office, the National Executive Committee and the National Party Congress respectively which are to take into account the advice of Political Committees that cast preferential votes. The nominees then compete against each other in internal party elections, with the winners normally proceeding to contest multi-party elections. There is ample scope for informal influence and corruption during the nomination processes and Kelsall (2004b) for instance indicates that delegates to Political Committees are subject to manipulation.

4.2.5 The Electoral Commission

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) comprises seven members who serve for five years, and the President appoints the members. The chairperson has to be a judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. One member of the NEC has to come from the Tanganyika Law Society. Interchangeably the chair and the vice-chair of the commission must be drawn from the mainland and Zanzibar. The Director of Elections is the Secretary to the Commission and is appointed by the President upon the recommendation by the Commission (Iversen 2001). According to the 1977 Constitution (Art. 75) the NEC is an independent and neutral institution and is responsible for the registration of voters and the delineation of parliamentary constituency boundaries and the supervision and co-ordination of the presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. The delimitation of constituencies can be reviewed once every ten years. The NEC is organised into seven electoral committees, each headed by one of the seven NEC members and includes political parties and representatives from public and private institutions, as well as individual citizens (Lodge et al. 2002).
Despite constitutional independence, the NEC is compromised by the fact that the President appoints the Commissioners. The commissioners have no guaranteed security of tenure and neither the Constitution nor the Elections Act secures funds for the Commission. The NEC is dependent on the Government for funding, operating fiscally as a department of the Office of the Prime Minister (Lodge et al. 2002).

Tanzania does not have a permanent voters’ roll and no system of national identity cards. It may, therefore, be relatively easy to manipulate registration figures, which again, may provide the CCM Ten Cell leaders with prominent roles in the verification of personal identity, leaving ample space for a biased election administration (Iversen 2001; Kelsall 2004b).

A common criticism of the 1995 elections was that elections were free but not fair. Others concluded that the NEC had badly mismanaged the elections and doubted its impartiality. By contrast, in 2000 operating under improved financial conditions, the NEC was praised by domestic and international election observers for its conduct of the elections. The Zanzibar elections, however, were poorly conducted. Both on Zanzibar and the mainland, observers noted that the Commission kept quiet on the unbalanced media coverage of political parties and could have taken initiatives to ensure a more balanced political environment (Iversen 2001:11).

Appendix 1 Table 1 illustrates the central organisations for electoral accountability at the national and local level. Graph 3 shows the vertical accountability relationships described in this chapter.

The above mapping of vertical accountability through the electoral channel shows that the electorate transparently chooses its representatives for exercising legislative powers at the national and the district level. Yet, these representatives are restricted in their answerability to the electorate and in their control over the Executive. The Electorate also directly elects the President who in turn appoints all key civil servants at both the national and local government level, as well as some members of the Legislature. From a formal perspective the vertical accountability relationships are weak. Again, however, answerability and controllability of political power holders may be exercised in an informal manner, through links between politicians, civil servants and economically or otherwise dominant figures in society. The myriad of informal relations - particularly at lower levels of government - compromises the transparency of accountability relations, at least for the outside observer. Strong top down controls through the party machinery appear to be very important still, but at the same time there are signs that the ruling party as well as opposition parties must cater for grassroots interest. This hints at alternative forms of vertical accountability, which we will try to explore below.
4.3 Societal Accountability – National and Local

Historical experience suggests that persistence and change in strategic alliances between elite groups and between elite groups and non-elites as well as the formal and informal institutional access that these groups have to political decision-making processes are important in conditioning socio-economic outcomes. The interests of different factions of the elite and their social power bases may be diverging or converging, and their abilities to exercise influence manifests differences in power. Above, we have raised the importance of MPs support at the district level in rural areas and the intermingling of executive powers and party politics at the national and local level perhaps as a historical legacy. These examples are important in the context of what we refer to as societal accountability.

This next section maps key organisations of the Tanzanian polity and assesses their influence on domestic policy processes at both the national and the local level.

At a national level the societal map is well populated by different stakeholder organisations such as media organs, business associations, religious organizations, trades unions, NGO networks, international, national and government or party-organised NGOs, research institutes and national branches of district development trusts. It also includes the national mass organisations of the CCM and perhaps temporary and ad hoc organisations such as electoral monitoring groups (TEMCO) and presidential campaign teams.

At local level, the societal accountability map features many groups relating to ethnic membership, ‘traditional’ authority and the clan system; religious belief; district development trusts, local NGOs and local committees of different kinds, including water committees and parents and teachers associations. It also includes local party organisations, which can stretch from the regional, to the district to the Ten Cell level; individual MPs; district councillors and councils, and ad hoc groups such as local electoral campaign teams.

The wide range of groups included in the societal accountability map vary in influence, importance and degree of organisational capacity. Among political parties, CCM is the best institutionalised and a majority of the population may turn to the party for support in day to day matters. Certain trades unions, such as the Teachers’ Union, have larger memberships and greater prominence than others. NGOs such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme are leaders in campaigning and lobbying on women’s issues. And the Lutheran and Catholic churches have a stronger collective voice than do the charismatic churches. At local level, the picture may vary from district to district. Some have quite prominent district development trusts; in some the clan system retains more influence than in others. We attempt to illustrate in tabular form the degree of influence that different organisations exercise.

We also note that the visibility of an organisation is not necessarily a good indicator of its influence. Informal networks can wield much influence by linking politicians and civil servants with powerful groups and individuals in society. They may be able to influence the content of policy decisions and legislation, the award of business tenders and contracts, the discretionary application of government regulations, the use of aid flows and the outcome of election campaigns. In turn, “noisy” formal organisations may not really matter for government’s incentives and responsibility vis-à-vis the broader public nor for the daily livelihoods of the majority of the population.
4.4.1 Organised Interest Groups at the National Level

Business Associations

With the liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy, business associations have grown in influence. The two most important are the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), and the Confederation of Tanzanian Industry (CTI). A measure of their recognition is that they receive routine consultation in pre-budget talks, though whether they have the clout to change policy is unclear (Heilman and Lucas 1997). Perhaps more influential, especially in the areas of imports and tariffs, tax exemptions (legal or illegal), government contracts and the privatisation process, are informal groups of businessmen, politicians and civil servants. Little is known about the size, composition or permanence of such groups or about the circumstances in which they are able to deflect policy from the government’s stated aims. It is possible that personal connections among different sections of the elite are pressed into service around specific issues or contracts, with the resulting ‘interest groups’ being relatively ephemeral. Also of interest is the CCM’s business wing, Sukita. In previous years this has been seen as a vehicle in which to peddle influence.

Media Organs

Since political liberalisation the private media in Tanzania has grown in scope and influence. Media houses such as IPP Media, the Nation Group, the Habari Corporation and smaller outlets produce more than three dozen titles in both Kiswahili and English. They have eroded the domination of government and CCM publications, such as The Daily News, Mzalendo and Uhuru. In urban areas newspapers are widely read and play an important role in communicating information from government to society, in bringing issues to public attention, especially through the lobbying activities of NGOs, and in airing social and political debates. In Swahili newspapers, controversial issues are often commented upon in the form of satirical cartoons, which may be far more critical of government and government officials than regular newspaper articles (Lange 2002:277). These papers also commonly contain more frivolous articles; indeed certain titles are almost wholly devoted to sex, crime and witchcraft stories.

Newspaper owners are often careful not to antagonise government, which has created concerns about their independence. For example, media mogul Reginald Mengi, owner of IPP, has generally cordial relations with the CCM; others have had a more fraught relationship: in 1999 Majira was temporarily banned following publication of a ‘seditious’ article, and in 2001 the saga over Habari owner Jenerali Ulimwengu’s citizenship was interpreted by many as an act of intimidation. There are also concerns about the prevalence of ‘cheque-book’ or ‘brown-envelope’ journalism, with journalists reputedly paid to print favourable stories about prominent politicians, or to drop negative ones. Although investigative journalism is in its infancy, recent results from a citizen survey have revealed that a substantially higher percentage of Tanzanians now believe that reporting a case of corruption to a journalist is more effective than reporting it to the police, local authorities or the MP (Fjeldstad 2004:33).

National newspapers have limited penetration in rural areas, and there are very few local papers, in spite of the emergence of regional press clubs (ARD/USAID 2003). Given the importance of information to the ability to hold somebody to account, one would expect this to cause a serious accountability deficit. However, most rural Tanzanians access information through the radio. In spite of the emergence of at least 22 private radio stations, the content of news remains dominated by the government owned Radio Tanzania (Barkan 2000).

In 1999, Tanzania had 7 terrestrial and 17 cable TV stations (Kelsall 2004). A small minority of Tanzanians own the television industry and much content is imported. Debate programs like Kiti
Moto (Hot Chair) on the independent television channel DTV attempt to discuss issues like corruption and accountability in a critical way. The overall impact of TV in this area is unclear. The extent to which media institutions take part in public debates on accountability appears to be limited by self-censorship. The same is true when it comes to the broadcasting of controversial music or songs that criticise the political system (Lange 2002:275). The Media Council, a voluntary, independent and non-statutory organisation oversees the sector and aims at defending press freedom and ensuring media integrity through compliance with a journalistic code of ethics.

Religious Organisations

Tanzania is a deeply religious society, and many Tanzanians use a religious idiom to account for their day to day actions. Muslims have their own representative council, BAKWATA, which does have links to the government. Recent appointments to BAKWATA have generated protest from radical Muslims criticising the organisation as conservative and politically supine. Christian denominations are grouped under the Christian Council of Tanzania. Some years ago Tanzanian bishops issued a pastoral letter decrying the state of governance in the country. Churches, in particular the Lutheran church, have been active in civic education. The charismatic churches are also gaining in popularity, and certainly have a profound impact at the level of the individual. Nevertheless, given their potential influence, religious organisations intervene in national political debates rather rarely.

NGO Networks

NGOs have mushroomed in Tanzania since the onset of economic and political liberalisation. A number of networks help coordinate their activities. There are two umbrella organisations in Tanzania: TACOSODE (Tanzania Council for Social Development), which has historical associations with the government and TANGO (Tanzania NGO Network), which was founded in the late 80s with donor assistance. The recent NGO Act established an NGO Council. Other networks have grown up around specific issues. For instance, the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development originated at the time of the Jubilee 2000 debt cancellation campaign.

International NGOs

World Vision Tanzania, Oxfam Tanzania, Save the Children Fund, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Foundation and Friedrich Naumann Stiftung/Foundations are among the more prominent NGOs in Tanzania. These organisations rarely lobby or criticise government directly. They exercise their influence through working with Tanzanian partners, economically and socially empowering individuals and communities, in the case of WVT and Oxfam, or building capacity in political parties and raising the level of political awareness, as with the foundations.

National NGOs

Presently more than 2 700 NGOs are registered in Tanzania. They can be divided into Advocacy NGOs, Service Delivery NGOs, and Community Based Organisations (many of which may escape registration). Conceivably even the least overtly political CBOs, such as a local bee-keeping society might influence policies and government decisions via their internal organisation and methods. More noticeable are metropolitan organisations such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, Hakielimu and the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, which lobby government and campaign on diverse issues. The more prominent NGOs are now involved in annual CG meetings, although commentators have argued that their role may be tokenistic.
In the area of legislation, national NGOs have made some impact: for instance on the 1999 Land Act and the NGO Act itself. Whether their input will be borne out in practice is difficult to know. Generally speaking, the visibility of these groups may tend to exceed their actual influence. Most national NGOs are dependent on donor finance, have extremely narrow membership bases, and have a limited geographical reach. Nevertheless they should perhaps not be dismissed out of hand. Despite their weaknesses there are few other organisations competing for the role of ‘public watchdogs’ (on NGOs, see Kelsall 2001; ARD/USAID 2003; Lange 2000, Tripp 2000; Mercer 2003; Gould and Ojanen).

**CCM Mass Organizations**

The mass organizations of the ruling party are a legacy of the one party-state’s colonisation of civil society in the socialist era. These include Vijana, the youth organisation, UWT, which comprises women, and Wazazi, the parents’ association. These organisations wield influence primarily through organisational structures of the CCM itself. It is rare for these organisations to make public statements on policy issues. And it should not be forgotten that their function is distributional as much as it is representational.

**Trade Unions**

Since 1965 when the Tanzania Federation of Labour was co-opted by the Government, trade unions in Tanzania have been weak. The Trade Union Act was reformulated in 1998 and 2001 and there are now two umbrella unions. The Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) has 12 affiliated member organisations, including the influential Tanzania Teachers’ Union (TTU), Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE), Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO), and Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO). Tanzania Federation of Labour (TFL) has four affiliates, including Industrial and General Workers Union in Tanzania (IGWUTA) and Dock Workers Union Tanzania (DOWUTA). The majority of the trade unions have a low membership base and appear to have little influence. Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) complain that local authorities ally with mining companies and hamper the union’s efforts in organising mineworkers (Lange, forthcoming).

**Research Institutes**

Faculties within The University of Dar es Salaam, together with private research foundations such as ESRF and REPOA are at the cutting edge of intellectual life in Tanzania. They influence the policy process through their role in knowledge production. Upon external initiative some are formally involved in policy processes, such as the PRSP or the MTEF process.

**District Development Trusts**

District Development Trusts are a Tanzanian equivalent of West African ‘home-town associations’. Most have both local and national branches, which serve to link local communities with their members in the diaspora. Most solicit funds locally and nationally, using them ostensibly for local development (Kiondo 1995).

**4.3.2 Organised Interest Groups at the Local Level**

We note that while national features of the societal accountability map are somewhat clearer, knowledge of the local accountability landscape is sketchy. The expectations of rural people, the means by which they try to make public power work for them, the ways in which local officials may
be able to evade responsibility to local people and the different paths to securing services, are but dimly known.

In a study of local level "civil society" Kiondo (1994) shows that citizens’ organizations are frequently extensions of individual survival strategies and somehow linked to the state through patrons or brokers. Hence, he speaks of “the new politics of patronage and brokerage” (Kiondo 1994:77). He found patrons’ motives be mostly political, either in the sense of gaining votes or augmenting influence and status in regard to the clients or the community. Kelsall (2000:550; 2002:611) and Gibbon (1998:49) support this view and point out that local support is essential for securing national power. Key local politicians are increasingly found to play the role of broker in their home communities, establishing links between the groups of clients and a patron — the MP.

Also cloudy is knowledge on the channels that link the local level to the national level. Alongside the local administrative system - and the extent to which it is accountable to local people or to central government - we believe that the roles of MPs, of party organisation and of district development trusts are crucial to understanding the exchange of voice and resources between central government, district headquarters and towns and villages in the country side.

In spite of the incompleteness of the picture it is possible to identify a variety of potentially influential actors. These can be grouped under the following headings: traditional authorities, religious organisations, ethnic trust funds, local NGOs, branches of international and national NGOs, and local cooperative societies and committees.

**Traditional Authorities**

Traditional authorities have no formal governmental role in Tanzania yet they are prominent features of the organisational landscape. Though the picture varies geographically, most ethnic groups have an organisational structure combining elements of inheritance, appointment, and election. Most Tanzanians are members of clans, that is, groups that trace their inheritance to a real or fictive ancestor. Clans tend to have a certain degree of solidarity, often forming committees and appointing or electing elders. The latter frequently play a prominent role in dispute resolution, in particular in the areas of land and marital affairs. Moreover, they are important opinion leaders and are courted by political parties at election time. CCM, for example, now has its own clan organs.

Clan committees constitute an alternative locus of accountability to that provided by the state. In some ethnic groups, age-sets exist alongside clan committees, playing a complementary role, and in others they outstrip the clan in importance. Beneath the clan, at a more basic level of organisation, extended families may also enjoy a measure of solidarity, acting influentially, for example, in village council elections. A range of other associations such as dance societies, traditional healers, ‘witchdoctors’ or other ritual experts, vigilante groups such as sungusungu, and secret societies, is also associated with ethnic groups. People may enrol these different actors in their attempts to solve problems, resolve disputes, take revenge, get ahead economically or socially, and so on, and because of this they can be considered significant transmitters of accountability (Masanja, 1992, for local level studies, see Kelsall 2003b, 2004c). Each of these bodies may have a distinct language of accountability related to ethnic traditions, though little research has been done in this area. What is not clear is how traditional authorities link up with formal government organisations.

**Religious Organisations**

Religious organisations are major players at local level. As has already been noted, many Tanzanians habitually account for their actions in religious terms. There is often a high degree of
overlap between religious authorities and secular politics, such as when village councils are virtually extensions of mosque politics. The mainstream Christian churches in particular are often important service providers, accountable in some measure to their congregations. Religious leaders are important opinion leaders and wield considerable influence in resolving disputes. Though their importance is plain, little is known about the impact of local level religious organisations on accountability generally (but see Samoff 1974; Baroin 1996, Kelsall 2004c). Why, for example, do they not play a greater role elevating moral leadership and probity within district councils?

Ethnic Trust Funds

The boards of District Development Trusts can read like a ‘Who’s Who?’ of local politics: they often enrol local politicians, clan elders, religious leaders, successful businessmen and cooperative society employees. They solicit funds from the diaspora, cultivating national politicians, businessmen and civil servants, and they may also raise funds locally, for example through agricultural levies. They are also bases from which to conduct political campaigns. Because they link national and local levels of the political system, ethnic trust funds are key channels in the accountability relationship between people and political office holders; yet surprisingly little is known about the influence and organisation of ethnic trust funds (but see Kiondo 1995; Baroin 1996; Kelsall 2004).

Local NGOs and branches of international and national NGOs

In some areas NGOs play a prominent role in service provision. For example, World Vision Tanzania claims to deliver services to over three million Tanzanians. In the areas in which it works it erects a parallel development administration. ‘Concern’ works in a similar way. A potential topic of inquiry is the accountability of structures such as these, and their mode of interaction with government. Local NGOs also have a strong presence in other areas: take for example the members of the pastoralist land rights movement in Arusha (Igoe 1999).

Local Cooperative Societies

In some areas, for example the Lake zone, agricultural cooperative societies remain major economic players. They clearly have an impact on local livelihoods and can be the focus for intense political struggle (Gibbon 1996; Ponte 2004). Little is also known how local cooperative societies link to the formal political and administrative system.

Local Committees

Local people typically organise committees of various kinds to assist in the performance of social duties or development activities. Worthy of mention are Parents’ and Teachers Committees, water committees, irrigation and furrow committees and wedding committees. Because they assist in the organisation of the social and economic life of the community, because they discharge of certain responsibilities, and because they play a role in monitoring the performance of others, they are candidates for inclusion in a thorough study of accountability. We know little about how these committees are formed and funded and how they acquire capacity.

In Appendix 1, Tables 2 and 3 summarise different organisations of societal accountability and their likely influence on domestic policy processes.

The above analysis of actors and institutions of societal accountability at the national and local level suggests that we know very little about how alternative methods of vertical accountability may
or may not be exercised. We are aware of the important role of the media to disseminate information and the normative influence which religious organisations and various NGOs may at times be able to exercise. Other than their participation in more recently established consultative processes, we are uncertain about the informal and corporatist channels of voice, which business associations and trade unions may have. We know less even about the continued importance of party based mass organisations, district development trusts, traditional authorities and local committees. People’s reference to these organisations are indicative for the popular legitimacy or political and economic power that these organisations hold, but would also suggest that people may have informal means to demand accountability in ways that overlap - in a positive or negative way - with formal government institutions. We also know very little about how informal organisations are funded and whether there are overlaps with the formal political and administrative system.
4.4 External accountability – Tanzania’s Foreign and Donor Relations

4.4.1 Background

Tanzania has been a recipient of development assistance since the late 1960s and remains an aid dependent HIPC country. Currently, about 20 percent of government expenditure is financed through direct budget support and HIPC debt relief, not taking account additional external funding channelled directly to sector ministries or specific projects, to global initiatives (GFMAT) or to non-governmental organisations. Thus a large part of Tanzania’s foreign affairs are dominated by its relationship with multilateral and bilateral development partners.

In parallel with this, Tanzania has maintained a tradition of active involvement in regional and continent-wide organisations, such as the East African Community (EAC), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and more recently, NEPAD. However, Tanzania has yet to enter into the sort of regional commitments, which would give significance to these channels of external accountability although they do, in general, appear to be increasing in importance. Nevertheless, this chapter focuses on Tanzania’s more recent aid history and the current landscape of multilateral and bilateral donor relations in terms of their relevance to the external accountability relationship.

4.4.2 Multilateral Programmes

During most of the 1990s aid inflows under multilateral programmes came in the form of programme aid provided to support the Balance of Payments with one important condition, to remain on track with the IMF programme. These programmes were financed by several multilateral agencies, including the European Commission, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), Structural Adjustment Credits (SACs) and Structural Adjustment Support Programmes (SASOs) were typically subject to structural reform conditions. In most cases these conditions were not directly linked with the use of the funds. Tanzania formally adopted a Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF in 1986. Still under one party rule the economic recovery programme achieved macroeconomic stability and introduced a wide range of structural reform programmes until the early 1990s, when the country experienced a series of macroeconomic set-back from 1991 to 1994 coinciding with the time of political restructuring.

A World Bank case study on ‘aid and reforms in Tanzania’ suggests that this set back - during which the country went “off-track” - was caused because the government became reluctant to continue with the economic reform programme as agreed with the IFIs. Subsequently, donor support was temporarily withheld until 1995 when the new Mkapa regime managed to restore reform efforts. According to the World Bank’s assessment, structural adjustment and the monitoring of government’s performance played an implicit role in the restoration of the reform programme through the withdrawal of assistance but it also recognises that conditional policy measures have been a major source of tension (Bigsten et al 1999).

In particular the 1995 Helleiner report, which resulted from a mediation process between the Tanzanian government and its donors, stressed the underlying imbalance in government-donor relations, which undermined sovereignty and government ownership of economic management.


\[31\text{ One of the results of this report was the establishment of an Independent Monitoring Group as a mediating instrument of accountability and performance monitoring.}\]
The Tanzanian government’s reluctance to continue with a neo-liberal economic reform programme disappeared in 1995 after Mkapa became President in the first multiparty elections. Sustained government commitment to economic reforms triggered Tanzania’s eligibility for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative in 2000, making it one of the first countries to benefit from a permanent reduction in capital owed and a surge in additional donor inflows. Donors and government agreed that these additional resources would increase budgetary expenditure allocations to social and other priority sectors, including rural roads, the judiciary and HIV/AIDS related activities.

Tanzania’s multilateral development partners have appreciated the direct and open dialogue in which they have engaged with the Tanzanian government since the mid 90s. According to their assessment this has made apparent the need for greater coordination between donors, government and other national constituents. It has led the World Bank to take the lead in mobilising Consultative Group Meetings in 1997, to which the President, Cabinet, trade unions, NGOs and the private sector become part to jointly interact with the donor community.

Under the framework of the multilateral assistance programmes, central government institutions, most notably the Ministry of Finance, have received support to capacity building programmes. This is said to have brought about better government ownership of major components of the policy dialogue and government’s involvement in drafting key policy documents including public expenditure reviews.

The IFIs note that at times there have been problems in meeting conditionality criteria on structural reforms, partly linked to domestic political pressures and party to inadequate technical capacity. But they also stress the success of their non-confrontational partnership approach in working with the Tanzanian government. As important lessons learned they put that through open debates and participatory approaches it has been possible to make a wider segment of the society understand the need for reform and generate broad ownership of the reform process by domestic stakeholders. Furthermore, the government has had the ability to rally public opinion in support of the reform programmes and this has ensured sustainability and credibility.

In sum, the IFIs stress quite explicitly that the exercise of external accountability has been crucial to sustain government’s reform efforts and that the inclusion of further national stakeholders from the private sector, NGOs and trade unions through consultative and participative processes has helped in easing favourable domestic pressures on the government.

4.4.3 Bilateral Aid Relations

When former socialist bloc countries and China reduced bilateral aid levels in the 1980s, bilateral assistance from OECD countries gained in importance. Like in many countries, uncoordinated bilateral aid relations put a high constraint on limited administrative capacity on the side of Tanzanian government organisations and resulted in significant duplications, different reporting systems, parallel project management systems and off-budget aid flows.

Observers note that open and direct discourse with the Tanzanian government has helped considerably to promote better donor coordination and a general movement towards harmonisation of processes. Perhaps not least in light of the World Bank’s coordination efforts many bilateral donors have become engaged in collaborating around multilateral programmes as well as coordinating assistance amongst themselves in joint programmes. The Nordic countries in particular stand out as having a special coordinated relationship with Tanzania and they have been at the forefront of changing aid relations by signing a Partnership Agreement as early as 1996. Other donors, such as the UK, the US and Germany have traditionally taken a harder line and made their disbursements conditional on their individual assessments of World Bank and IMF judgements.
The efforts of many bilaterals to participate in joint programmes is constrained by the need to be accountable to their home constituencies and to report in some detail on the use of aid allocations. To some extent this explains the varied responses that bilateral donors have shown to the more recent move towards providing general budget support under the broad framework of multilateral programmes. Strategic foreign policy issues and economic interests are sometimes also in the background of aid allocation decisions.

The first five bilateral development partners to undertake joint efforts to provide pooled external funding came in the form of the Multi-lateral Debt Fund (MDF). This was not yet unearmarked budget support but served to provide interim debt relief while Tanzania tried to fulfil their requirements in order to obtain HIPC relief.

In October 2001 nine Development Partners (DP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which established the Poverty Reduction Strategy monitoring framework, which marked the entry point for Tanzania to obtain budget support32. Since 2002 these funds have been channelled through a unified Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) supporting the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy. The PAF works with a limited number of conditions along three dimensions: i) satisfactory overall progress in implementation of the PAF, on which all PRBS disbursements are conditioned; ii) ‘prior actions’ which constitute trigger conditions for all or part of the World Bank’s PRSC disbursements; and iii) performance against the PFM and service delivery indicators agreed for the EC ‘variable tranches’33.

Recent investigations for an evaluation of the experience with the provision of GBS to Tanzania have shown that for bilateral donors it has been an importance objective of involvement in the PRBS to increase the opportunity for influence over the Government through participation in policy dialogue – in other words ‘to buy a seat at the table’ and perhaps to participate in the leverage over Tanzania which the IFI’s appear to enjoy. In practice, the experience with the PRBS in Tanzania confirms the wider literature on conditionality (Killick, 1998; White, 1999; Tarp & Hjertholm, 2000; Dollar & Svensson, 2000). The broad consensus across these studies is that it is domestic political considerations that are the prime factor in determining the path and speed of economic and political reform and that, in general these domestic considerations have proven immune to donor pressures.

Thus, the move towards General Budget Support is justified primarily by its positive effects on the efficiency of the budget process, on the reduction of transaction costs and on increased ownership over the policy and budgetary process. With increased ownership (by the Executive) comes a clarification of responsibilities – in that donor agencies can no longer be blamed for the failure of development policies, and therefore a strengthening of domestic accountability.

In sum, a general theoretical argument for providing aid in the form of budget support says that it not only strengthens government ownership and capacity but also domestic accountability. Yet empirical assessment qualifies this expectation indicating that the link between budget support and reinforced domestic accountability is not automatic. Much hinges on political processes and how those are shaped and structured by the formal and informal institutions of accountability. The key question that arises from this discussion is whether external accountability overrides domestic accountability relationships, or whether the two dimensions can be mutually reinforcing. In the Tanzanian context it is a legitimate question to ask whether the political institutional framework that, at least in part, enables the Tanzanian government to maintain a constructive external accountability relationship vis-à-vis multilateral and bilateral donors may in fact have contributed to the relative weakness of domestic vertical and horizontal accountability? A strong Executive able

32 Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
to implement contentious structural reforms, to control potential reluctance by some stakeholders and to rally for visible public opinion may well face a trade-off when seeking accountability vis-à-vis its domestic constituencies. Weak formal institutions of both horizontal and vertical accountability suggest that the government’s popular legitimacy works through more informal societal accountability.
Appendix 1  Graphs and Tables
Chart 1  Dimensions of Accountability Relationships

- External agents (Donors, IFIs, etc.)
- Government
- Judiciary
- Special Institutions of Restraint
- Parliament
- Civil Society
- NGOs
- Political Parties
- Media
- Electoral Channel
- The People
Graph 2  Horizontal Accountability – Legislature and Executive at the National Level
### Table 1  Electoral Accountability – Organisations and their Influence

#### Electoral Accountability at the National Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Prominent Examples</th>
<th>Influence*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>• CCM</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl. Party Conferences)</td>
<td>• CUF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chadema</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TLP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NCCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TLP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Groups</td>
<td>• Parliamentary plenary</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parliamentary committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party Caucuses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional and other parliamentary blocs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Individual MPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc Groups</td>
<td>• Presidential campaign teams</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Organisations</td>
<td>• Tanzania Electoral Commission</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TEMCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Electoral Accountability at the Local Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Prominent Examples</th>
<th>Influence*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>• Regional, District and Ward Offices</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional and District Conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ten-Cells</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party Youth Commanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party Clan Leaders/Elders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Councils and Councillors</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>• Election campaign teams</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc groups</td>
<td>• Election campaign teams</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Here Influence is construed as the ability to affect society’s prevailing ideas and distribution of resources. Influential groups are ones from which Citizens may directly seek accountability from influential groups, or may seek accountability through them to hold others to account. The values assigned in this table are preliminary nature and may be subject to confirmation in Components 2 and 3.
Graph 3  Vertical Accountability through the Electoral Channel

- **President**
  - Appoints
  - District Commissioner’s Office
- **District Commissioner’s Office**
  - District Commissioner
  - Village Assembly
  - Ward Development Committee (elected ward councillor)
- **The Electorate**
  - 232 Constituencies “first pass the poll”
  - 49 Women Representatives (Indirectly elected)
- **Political Parties**
  - National Level
  - District Level
- **Divisional Secretary**
- **Chairman of Kitongoji (hamlet)**
- **Mtaa (small urban area)**
- **Village Council “Village Government”**
- **Local Government Authority (LGA)**
- **Urban Council**
### Table 2  Societal Accountability at the National Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Prominent Examples</th>
<th>Influence*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Business Associations| • Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry (TCCIA)  
• Confederation of Tanzanian Industry (CTI)  
• Sukita (if still existing)  
• Informal networks of businessmen, politicians, civil servants | High                |
| Media Organs         | • IPP media newspapers (eg The Guardian, Financial Times, Nipashe)  
• Habari Corporation (Rai, Mtanzania, The African)  
• Nation Group Newspapers (eg The East African, The Citizen)  
• Govt owned newspapers (eg Daily News, Sunday News, Uhuru)  
• Other newspapers (eg Majira, An-Nuur)  
• IPP electronic media (eg ITV, Radio One)  
• Govt owned electronic media (eg Radio Tanzania, TBC)  
• Regulatory organs (eg Tanzania Media Council) | Moderate             |
| Religious Organisations | • BAKWATA  
• Christian Council of Tanzania  
• Roman Catholic Church of Tanzania  
• Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania | Low                |
| NGO Networks         | • TACOSODE  
• TANGO  
• Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development  
• FemAct | Low                |
| International NGOs   | • World Vision Tanzania  
• Oxfam Tanzania  
• Save the Children  
• Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
• Friedrich Naumann Stiftung | Low to Moderate      |
| National NGOs        | • Tanzania Gender Networking Programme  
• Tanzania Media Women’s Association  
• Hakielimu  
• Hakiardhi  
• Hakikazi  
• Lawyers’ Human Rights Committee  
• Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team  
• Journalists’ Environmental Association of Tanzania  
• Tanzania Women’s Legal Association  
• Tanzania Law Society | Low to Moderate      |
| Cooperatives         | The Tanzanian Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives |                    |
| Trade Unions         | • Trade Union Congress of Tanzania  
• Tanzania Federation of Labour | Low to Moderate      |
| CCM Mass Organizations | • Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania  
• Wazazi  
• Vijana | Low to Moderate      |
Research Institutes
- University of Dar es Salaam
- Repoa
- Economic and Social Research Foundation
- REDET

National branches of District Development Trusts

*Here Influence is construed as the ability to affect society’s prevailing ideas and distribution of resources. Influential groups are ones from which Citizens may directly seek accountability from influential groups, or may seek accountability through them to hold others to account. The values assigned in this table are preliminary nature and may be subject to confirmation in Components 2 and 3.

Table 3 Societal Accountability and the Local Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Prominent Examples</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Authorities</td>
<td>Clan committees, Age groups, Extended households (boma), Dance associations, Traditional healers (waganga), Vigilante groups (eg sungusungu), Secret societies</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisations</td>
<td>Churches (incl church development committees), mosques, Charismatic preachers, Muslim brotherhoods (Qadiriyya)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Trust Funds</td>
<td>District Development Trusts</td>
<td>Moderate to High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs and branches of international and national NGOs</td>
<td>World Vision Tanzania, KIPOC, Ilaramatak</td>
<td>Low to Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>Agricultural cooperative societies, Savings and credit cooperatives, Livestock cooperatives, Mining cooperatives, Industrial manufacturing cooperatives</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Committees</td>
<td>Village Adjudication Committee, Village Land Council, PTA committees, Water committees, Irrigation/Furrow committees, Wedding committees, Local Militia (mgambo)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Here Influence is construed as the ability to affect society’s prevailing ideas and distribution of resources. Influential groups are ones from which Citizens may directly seek accountability from influential groups, or may seek accountability through them to hold others to account. The values assigned in this table are preliminary nature and may be subject to confirmation in Components 2 and 3.*
Appenlix 2 Component 1 – Design of Ethnographic Studies and Micro Survey

A2.1 Objectives

The mapping of horizontal and vertical accountability in the previous chapters focusing heavily on formal top-down accountability processes has been used to help frame the questions for the micro-level survey. The aim of Component 2 is to tessellate the top-down data from the mapping exercise with a sophisticated picture of how ordinary Tanzanians relate to governmental and non-governmental structures - in other words - with the practice of accountability from bottom-up. The general assumption from this perspective is that informal forms societal accountability from local power holders is more important than formal vertical and horizontal accountability.

A2.2 Approach and Methods of Enquiry

Component 2 consists of two parts: a micro-level survey and an ethnographic survey of the land and justice sectors.

The micro-level study will survey 90 citizens in three regions of Tanzania. A senior researcher will spend three weeks conducting interviews in each region. The aim will be to record the views of a representative sample of the Tanzanian population: women, men, old, young, Christian, Muslim, wealthy and poor. Simeon Mesaki will conduct interviews in Mwanza and Kilwa, in Lindi region; Max Mmuya will interview in Dar es Salaam. Mmuya, will write up the results of the survey.

The survey instrument begins specifically with a focus on health and justice issues, broadening to a more general discussion of accountability. It comprises a combination of closed and open questions, with the closed ones designed to quantify citizens’ experience of interaction with the different local institutions identified in the mapping exercise. In addition, these questions will provide a point of comparison to the ethnographic data. If, for example, the ethnographic survey finds that rural people tend to prefer clan forums to local courts when it comes to settling certain kinds of dispute, it will be useful to know whether this pattern is replicated in other areas. The open questions are designed to be discussed in a more conversational style. The aim is to elicit opinions about ideas and mechanisms of accountability that can feed into a narrative account of local accountability, complementing or qualifying the ethnographic data. For this Tim Kelsall will take responsibility.

The ethnographic study will involve one senior researcher (Siri Lange) and three junior researchers working on the health sector, and one senior researcher (Tim Kelsall) and three junior researchers working on the justice sector, for a total of four weeks (to include training). Jehova Roy Kaaya, an experienced local research assistant will act as one of the junior researchers and also as the team’s link man to the District, preparing the logistics for the team’s arrival. Max Mmuya and Simeon Mesaki will recruit the other junior researchers from among students in the Department of Sociology at the University of Dar es Salaam. Tim Kelsall will supervise five days’ intensive training, assisted by Siri Lange. The aim is to supplement their training at the University of Dar es Salaam with the latest materials in teaching ethnographic methods and with practical experience of ethnographic study. Students will be introduced to the aims and methods of ethnography, in particular skills associated with ethnographic observation and note taking. Students will be sent into the field to conduct pilot studies, and their notes will provide the basis for further discussion and training.

After training, the junior researchers will take to the field proper. In the health study, a junior researcher will be based in a sub-village in Arumeru, interacting for three weeks with families
Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania

experiencing health problems. Another junior researcher will be stationed at a district hospital for three weeks, observing interactions between clients and service providers. For three weeks another junior researcher will shadow a district health officer. Siri Lange will shadow the junior researchers on a rotating basis. She will also meet for daily de-briefing sessions with the junior researchers. The senior researcher will also respond to issues as they arise, by interviewing high level district officials, politicians or other individuals identified as being influential.

A similar approach is anticipated for the justice sector. In this study, one junior researcher will be based in a particular sub-village and will shadow two or three families involved in different types of legal disputes, including possibly a land dispute. The researcher will record strategies used to secure redress, and the attitudes to authority invoked. Two other researchers will be based respectively in a local district court and in a district police station, recording the nature of the interactions between the users and providers of justice services. Tim Kelsall will shadow the junior researchers on a rotating basis. He will also meet for daily de-briefing sessions with the junior researchers and respond to issues as they arise, for instance by interviewing court magistrates, high level district officials or politicians. The aim is to arrive at a sensitive analysis of accountability issues, generating new data on vertical (electoral and societal), horizontal and external accountability.

In parallel with this ongoing ethnographic work, which is expected to be carried out from a base in Arusha, the two senior researchers will organise a small number of focus group interviews. These will be based around themes or issues identified in the Inception Report and/or emerging from the initial ethnographic work.

It is inevitable that the very presence of the ethnographers will impact upon the processes observed. For example, it is probable that service providers will be more responsive to clients in the presence of a researcher than they otherwise would. To take an obvious example, they may be less likely to accept or solicit bribes. Similarly, clients may be either more or less assertive in the presence of a researcher. Ethnographers attempt to minimise the inescapably biased nature of the research process through a variety of strategies, eg 1) building trust – by being present at an ethnographic scene over a period of days or weeks and by talking sympathetically to actors, a good ethnographer wins acceptance and encourages those she observes to speak and act in a less guarded way, 2) Participation – by adopting a participant attitude (for example waiting in a hospital waiting room as though a patient), the ethnographer can to some extent blend into the background and observe interactions close to the way in which they would normally occur (note it is not our intention to do ‘undercover’ research), 3) Conversations off-stage: an ethnographer may introduce himself to a client and ask that he be allowed to observe an interaction, eg a doctor’s consultation. After the interaction he may draw the patient aside and ask how it differed from previous interactions. It is probable that, having shared an experience with the researcher, respondents will give richer accounts than they would in a ‘cold interview’ situation. 4) Confidentiality: research subjects can be assured that their identities will remain protected. This should assist in normalising behaviour. In addition, junior researchers will meet with the senior researchers on a daily basis, and this will be an opportunity for oversight, instruction and advice.

The aim is to build up a picture of the relation of poor people to service providers, assessing the voices of the poor, the channels they use to exercise “voice” and the responsiveness of service providers, and identifying the existing mechanisms for holding service providers accountable for their priorities and policies. In to the language of policy: How do poor people conceive of their relationship to authority? What strategies and social channels do they employ to improve their circumstances? What are the various different agencies, governmental and non-governmental with which they come into contact? What is the face-to-face character of interactions between service providers and clients? What challenges do service providers themselves face from the economic, social and political environment? How do they conceive of their role towards clients? Insight into these questions is expected to be acquired gradually, providing a nuanced picture of accountability in the health and justice sectors.
A2.3 Time Frame

The Micro Survey of Component 2 will be undertaken over February and early March with a draft report available in the first week of April. A briefing on the survey will be provided to DFID, Tanzania by Dr. Mmuya and Dr. Lise Rakner, the Team Leader, who will be in Dar es Salaam to initiate work on Component 3. The report on the micro survey will be finalised by the first week of April 2005.

The Ethnographic surveys of Component 2 will be undertaken over 28th of March - 25th of April with draft reports on the justice and health sector accountability issues available by mid May. A briefing on the surveys will be provided to DFID, Tanzania by Dr. Kelsall on the conclusion of field work.
Appendix 3  Component 3 - Design of Key Information Interviews on values, incentives and power relations in the budget allocation process

A3.1 Objectives

The focus of this component lies on the accountability relationships between political and administrative power holders and the citizens whom they serve. The component tries to explore what the values and incentives of and the power relations between politicians and bureaucrats are, particularly with respect to the budget allocation process. Public finances lie at the heart of the political contest over power and influence. Studies elsewhere have shown that incompatibilities between formal and informal institutions, and between power holders’ interests and the collective interest are likely to feature in this area.

A3.2 Approach to Component 3

The Tanzanian budget process is often upheld as a strong and near perfect example for its neighbouring countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. There are a number of recent studies describing the Tanzanian budget process and how it has been improved through various public financial management reform initiatives (ODI 2003; Daima Associates Limited/ODI 2004). Key reform elements highlighted are for example the participatory public expenditure reviews, which form part of the annual MTEF and budget cycle. This stakeholder consultation process has provided an appreciated tool to provide information to (budget support) donors, and an open and participatory forum for discussing a broad set of budget issues. Assessments of Tanzania’s reform efforts and the quality of its public financial management system have generally been positive and have qualified the country for general budgetary support from a number of multilateral and bilateral donors (Bigsten et al 1999; Rutashobya 2004).

There are also critical voices. Some observers have been sceptical about the formal mechanisms for participatory dialogue such as those of the PRSP and the PERs. It is argued that established partnerships and coalitions tend to resemble staged performances in public participation, largely bypassing and undermining democratic oversight institutions such as parliament (Gould and Ojanen 2003). Another critical areas is that elaborate reforms focusing on the front end of the budget cycle have been undermined by a cash budget system, which was introduced with the objective to achieving overall fiscal discipline. Like in many other countries the cash budget system has had damaging side effects on the efficient use and allocation of government resources, channelling scarce resources toward relatively un-productive activities. Cash budget systems provide the opportunity and sometimes make it a necessity to prevent the budget from being implemented as approved. This can undermine accountability when stated policy intentions cease to be pursued and spending is reprioritised during the course of the fiscal year without the necessity to seek parliamentary approval34.

This mixed record highlights an important challenge. Democracies are inherently confronted with potential conflicts between three core elements of democratic governance. These are a) decisions made by majority, b) rule of law and c) efficiency. Strengthening one of these element often leads to de-emphasising one or both of the other elements. For example, in past decades donors have promoted reform agendas that emphasised efficiency insulating certain areas of public policies to allow the executive or particularly created agencies to get things done. Only since it has been

realised that this also provided opportunities for unproductive rent-seeking and corruption has the emphasis shifted to oversight and fiduciary assurance, highlighting public finance legislation and internal and external control procedures. Which elements of democratic governance to strengthen to fine-tune a sustainable balance is a context specific matter, which again requires deep insights into the political economy domestic policy processes.

The mapping exercise conducting through this inception report has made three observations critical to this component:

- First, there is a bias with respect to the formal processes of domestic accountability. This applies for the electoral system, but also the relationships between different government agencies. Tanzania features a presidential democratic system without the checks and balances which such a system would usually require to effectively control the Executive. In effect virtually unconstraint executive power as otherwise only found in Westminster systems of parliamentary democracy concentrates in the hands of the President. The President is not accountable to the Legislature, as would be the case in a Westminster type system. Neither do the checks and balances of a presidential democracy apply, where the separation of power is more pronounced and the President faces several constraints by usually more than one House. The Executive’s strength may have been vital for implementing the various reform programmes, which the country has succeeded in pursuing over the last decade. This strength may have come at the cost of formal democratic accountability and government may have sought (or in fact may have had to seek) accountability and legitimacy through more informal channels, including prevailing party structures.

- Second, legislative and executive powers at the district level are rather unclear. There are executive elements at the district level (commissioners) for which there is no legislative control and oversight and for areas that fall under the jurisdiction of the district legislature, central government has a veto right. This blurredness may have made it easier or more feasible for government to exercise authority at the district level, ensuring that local level authorities and district level interests do not undermine central government’s policy decisions.

- Third, little is known about how societal accountability processes, both at the national and at the local level interlink with formal policy processes and at what stages and through which channels they matter for government decision making. Equally, little is known about how government uses (or perhaps even must rely on) societal accountability processes to garnish broader based support and acceptance of its policy decisions, including the allocation of public funds and the costs that may be associated with parallel accountability processes.

Based on these observations we propose to emphasise the following five aspects:

- **Structural weaknesses in institutional checks and balances along formal horizontal accountability relationships across different levels of government from a public financial management perspective:** This aspect would assess where the regulative framework for public financial management constrains the ability of legislative elements of the political system to oversee executive/administrative decision-making. It includes a systematic analysis of relevant Acts and Regulations, including the Constitution, the Public Finance Act, the Acts applicable for Local Government Authorities and other Public Service Regulations.

- **Parliamentarians’ understanding of their responsibilities and ability to oversee and control the Executive and their accountability relationship with their constituencies:** This aspect would probe Parliamentarians’ experience with and ability to participate in budget allocation decision, either through formal channels such as the public accounts committee and parliamentary debate or thorough informal channels such as via intra-party debates and informal networks. It would also include MP’s link to a) their constituents and to District Councils where they hold a seat and b) to organised interest groups, including mass based party organisations, party cadres, trade unions, business organisations, faith based organisations.
• **District Commissioners’ understanding of their responsibility as the executive arm of central government at the local level:** This aspect would probe District Commissioners’ tasks and responsibilities, how they participate in the budget process and how they are funded, whom District Commissioners feel accountable to and how District Commissioners relate to District Councils and other formal and informal organisations at the district level, including local level party organisations, trade unions, district development trusts etc.

• **District Councillors’ understanding of their responsibilities as elected government representative at the district level:** This aspect would probe what District Councils tasks and objectives are, what decisions District Councils take, what goods and services they provide, how they participate in the budget process, how they are funded, and how they relate to District Commissions and organised interest groups at the local level, including those of (semi-) public nature such as Village Assemblies, Ten Cells etc.

• **The points of interaction between formal and informal systems of accountability and the influence of contradictory allegiances/accountabilities on decision-making.** We would set out to find out where the entry points for informal societal accountability to formal policy processes are. We would investigate this question by considering, through the semi-structured interviews, recent landmark political decisions with a view to identifying the motivations for those decisions and the balance of interests lying behind those decisions. In particular, we would propose to examine the decision-making processes underlying the removal of the UPE levy and other primary school fees, the abolition of the development levy for local governments, the re-introduction of fertiliser subsidies and the decision to devolve financial and personnel powers to LGAs.

**A.3.3 Methods of Enquiry**

The first of the above four issues can be conducted as a desk based study of the relevant documentation mentioned above. The other three aspects we propose to explore through key informant interviews with relevant stakeholders amongst national decision-makers. These will take the form of semi-structured interviews. Appendix 5 includes preliminary interview guides for Parliamentarians, District Commissioners and District Councillors.

**A.3.4 Time Frame**

The Semi-structured interviews comprising Component 3 will be undertaken over early to mid April. A summary of the key findings will be made available by the first week of May and Professor Semboja will be available in Dar es Salaam to brief DFID, Tanzania.
Appendix 4  Component 2 - Survey Instruments

A4.1 Survey questions: JUSTICE

Background information of respondent

Sex

Male
Female

Age

18-30
30-50
50 and up

Marital status

Single
Co-habitant
Married
Divorced
Widow/widower

Religion

Christian
Muslim
Other

Ethnic identity/kabila

From the region
From another region
Bantu
Pastoralist
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Level of education
- None
- St. 1-3
- St.7
- Secondary (form 4/form 6)
- College or higher

Main occupation of respondent
- Housewife
- Farmer
- Small business
- Business
- Civil servant
- NGO
- Other

Principal source of income for the household
- Income from self employment
- Salary
- Transfer from relatives

Justice

When were you or your family last involved in a dispute?
- Last month?
- Last year?
- 2 years ago?
- 5 years ago?

In what kind of dispute were you involved?
- Marital
- Theft
Assault
Land
Debt
Maladministration
Other

Were you plaintiff or defendant or both?

To whom did you take your case?

Friend/close relative
Balozi
Village Chair/VEO
WEO
Traditional authority
Religious authority
Police
Magistrates’ Court
Other

Explain briefly the nature of the case

What did you expect from the authority that heard your case?

Were there any “official” fees to be paid?

No
Yes

Amount
<500 Tshs.
500-1000 Tshs.
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1000-3000 Tshs.
>3000 Tshs.

For what?

Did you give the justice officials any gift/token of thanks?

No
Yes
If yes, to whom?

Amount
<500 Tshs.
500-1000 Tshs.
1000-3000 Tshs.
>3000 Tshs.

If yes, why did you do that?

Official asked me for it
Will not get good service next time if I don’t do it
Just wanted to show my gratitude

How would you evaluate the treatment/service you were given? Please elaborate.

Very good
Good
Fair
Bad
Very bad

If dissatisfied: What was your response?

Complain
Take dispute to other authority
Do nothing
Other
In your personal view, what is the biggest problem with justice services in your council?

- Too little resources from central government
- Long distances
- Unqualified personnel
- Impolite personnel
- Corruption – at what level, how? (Staff, District Council, Regional authorities, Ministry)

Have you ever been denied service at a law and order outlet, or treated badly?

Yes
No

If yes:

- Which service provider?
- What happened/who treated you badly?
- To whom did you complain?
  - To the local government (VEO, WEO, Councillor, Village Chairman, Other)
  - To the press
- Did not complain to anybody. Why?

If no:

- If it ever happened to whom would you complain?
  - To the local government (VEO, WEO, Councillor, Village Chairman, Other)
  - To the press
- Nobody. Why?

Accountability

In general, what do you think the government ought to provide you or your community?

How do you let the government know what it ought to provide? Give an example if possible.
When were you last consulted by the authorities about your views on development or democracy issues?

- Never
- During last year
- 1-3 years ago
- More than three years ago

If yes, can you say something about the process?

- Meeting
- Survey
- Other

What does the government actually provide?

What do you do if you government doesn’t provide what it ought to? Give an example if possible.

Who do you think are the people who have power and influence in your local community/in Tanzania?

What do they do/Who do they help with that power?

Which social or political groups are most relevant and helpful to you? Eg local government, political parties, traditional authorities, faith-based organisations?

What changes need to take place to give the common man/woman (wananchi) more influence?
A4.2 Survey questions: HEALTH

Background information of respondent

Sex
- Male
- Female

Age
- 18-30
- 30-50
- 50 and up

Marital status
- Single
- Co-habitant
- Married
- Divorced
- Widow/widower

Religion
- Christian
- Muslim
- Other

Ethnic identity/kabila
- From the region
- From another region
- Bantu
- Pastoralist

Level of education
- None
- St. 1-3
St.7
Secondary (form 4/form 6)
College or higher

**Main occupation of respondent**

- Housewife
- Farmer
- Small business
- Business
- Civil servant
- NGO
- Other

**Principal source of income for the household**

- Income from self employment
- Salary
- Transfer from relatives

**Health**

**When did you or a member of your family last need health care?**

- Within the last year
- 1-3 years ago
- More than 3 years ago

**Who was sick?**

- Adult
- Child
- 0-1
- 1-5
- 5-18

**What was the problem?**
Malaria

Diarrhoea

Infected wound/fracture

Homa/generally not feeling well

Other

Where did you go to seek treatment? (including traditional healers)

Public (dispensary, clinic, district hospital, regional hospital)

Private, modern medicine (dispensary, clinic, hospital)

Private, traditional medicine (mganga)

Why did you choose to go to this particular service provider/healer?

Closest to home

The cheapest alternative

Knew somebody working there/had contacts

They give the best services

Were there any “official” fees to be paid?

No

Yes

Amount

<500 Tshs.

500-1000 Tshs.

1000-3000 Tshs.

>3000 Tshs.

For what?

Consultation

Medicine

X-ray

Other
Did you give the health personnel any gift/token of thanks?

No
Yes

If yes, to whom?

Nurse
Doctor
Other

Amount

<500 Tshs.
500-1000 Tshs.
1000-3000 Tshs.
>3000 Tshs.

If yes, why did you do that?

Health personnel asked me for it
Will not get good service next time if I don’t do it
Just wanted to show my gratitude

How would you evaluate the treatment/service you were given? Please elaborate.

Very good
Good
Fair
Bad
Very bad

In your personal view, what is the biggest problem with health services in your council?

Too little resources from central government
Long distances
Unqualified personnel
Impolite personnel
Corruption – at what level, how? (Staff, District Council, Regional authorities, Ministry)

Have you ever been denied service at a public health service outlet, or treated badly?

Yes

No

If yes:

Which service provider? (Dispensary, clinic, District Hospital, Regional Hospital)

What happened/who treated you badly?

To whom did you complain?

To the local government (VEO, WEO, Councillor, Village Chairman, Other)

To the press

Did not complain to anybody. Why?

If no:

If it ever happened to whom would you complain?

To the local government (VEO, WEO, Councillor, Village Chairman, Other)

To the press

Nobody. Why?

Accountability

In general, what do you think the government ought to provide you or your community?

How do you let the government know what it ought to provide? Give an example if possible.

When were you last consulted by the authorities about your views on development or democracy issues?

Never
During last year
1-3 years ago
More than three years ago

If yes, can you say something about the process?
Meeting
Survey
Other

What does the government actually provide?

What do you do if you government doesn’t provide what it ought to? Give an example if possible.

Who do you think are the people who have power and influence in your local community/in Tanzania?

What do they do/Who do they help with that power?

Which social or political groups are most relevant and helpful to you? Eg local government, political parties, traditional authorities, faith-based organisations?

What changes need to take place to give the common man/woman (wananchi) more influence?
Appendix 5  Component 3 - Interview Guides

A5.1 Parliamentarians

Knowledge of and involvement in the budget process

- As an MP, what do you know about the budget process?
- What is your experience with the budget process?
- How do you think your work as an MP relates to the Government’s management of public finances and the budget process?
- Are you interested and involved in the budget process? If yes, why and how? If no, why not?
- If yes, at what stages do you get involved as an MP?
- From where does your government get most of the public funds? Do you think there will be new sources of revenue in future years?
- What does your government spend most of the public funds on? Do you have a strong opinion on where it should be spending more money and where less?
- How does government set its spending priorities? How is this discussed within your party?
- How do you think your government achieves enough with the money it spends? What is your opinion on whether it could be achieving more if the money was spent differently?
- How do you discuss these issues within your party, and when?
- Are you a member of the Public Accounts Committee? Who becomes a member of the PAC? What do you know about the PACs work? Is it useful?
- Have you noticed any changes to the budget process over the recent years and if, have these changed your interest and involvement in the process?
- Do you think MPs are sufficiently involved in the budget process? Are there areas or procedures that could be improved?
- Do you think it is necessary to change or improve the budget process to ensure greater involvement of MPs?
- What is your opinion concerning the involvement of civil society organisations in the budget process? How does it compare to the involvement of MPs?
- What is your opinion on the National Assembly’s role as the Legislature to oversee Government? Does it fulfil that function? If yes, how? What is key? If not, why not? What are the constraints?
- What would you suggest could be done to improve MPs knowledge on budget and financial issues?
- From where do you get information on government’s finances? How could this be improved?
- From where do your voters get information on government’s finances? Do you think they interested? And if, why and how?
- What do you think about the budget documents and other information on government’s finances? Could these be improved to make them more reader friendly?
• How important is it to you what the media reports about the budget process? And do you think they do a good job?

**MPs as members of District Councils**

• As an MP you are the representative of your constituency in the National Assembly, but you are also a member of your District Council. How much time do you spend on each job?

• Which of the two jobs is more important to you? Or how are the two jobs important to you?

• How would you describe your involvement in the District Council? What is your role?

• What are District Councils’ main responsibilities?

• Can District Councils make laws? And if, in what areas?

• If yes, what are the processes for taking legislative decision at the district level?

• If yes, what are the boundaries? How does District law making relate to central government and ministries?

• If no, should they be able to make laws and in what area?

• If District Councils can make laws, are there any major differences across districts?

• How well are laws enforced at the district level?

• Do you think your constituents are happy with the way they can enforce rights?

• If they weren’t/aren’t, what could you/can you do to improve this?

• Who are the key persons in the District Council? Who has the best advice and the best knowledge?

• How are decisions made in the District Council? How do they get implemented?

• What administrative capacity does the District Council have?

• How does the District Council communicate with its constituencies? Are there any Swahili publications? Do they communicate via the media (newspapers, radio etc.)? Do they communicate via other, perhaps non-governmental organisations?

• Who does the communicating?

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of District Councils?

• What is your opinion on how the work of the District Councils could be improved?

• How are District Councils funded?

• Can District Councils raise and retain their own revenue? If yes, who oversees this collection and spending?

• Do you think there are problems with the funding of District Councils? Do they receive and regular enough funds to provide those public goods and services for which they are responsible?

• What is your opinion on whether District Councils could be achieving more with the funds they receive if they were to spend government funds in different ways?

• District Councils are responsible for the provision of some public goods and services. For example health care? How does the District Council do this? And how does it work with central ministries?

• What do you think about the capacity of District Councils? What could be improved?
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- How do the District Councils relate to organised interests at the district level, for example District Trust Funds, party organisations at the district level and below the district level, trade and farmer unions? Different District or Village Committees?
- What do you enjoy most about being a District Council member? What least?
- What is your opinion on having District Councils? Has it been positive to have the LGA reform? Do you think it would be easier and better, if the country were governed from the centre and central ministries were in charge? If yes, why? If no, why?
- How does the District Council relate to the District Commission?
- What is your relationship as an MP with the District Commission?
- On what issues do you work with the District Commission?
- Could you comment on whether there are any overlaps and perhaps contradictions with respect to the District Commission and the District Council?
- Could you comment on whether there are any overlaps and perhaps contradictions with respect to executive and legislative powers at the district level?
- Could you comment on whether you thought it would be a good idea if Tanzania had a second house where districts would be represented at the national level?

MPs support at district level

- As a representative of your constituency you need to ensure your support at the local level? How do you do this?
- If there are problems with the provision of public goods and services in your district, do your voters seek your advice? If yes, how do you help? Do you address issues in the District Council, or in the National Assembly, or through other channels, such as in Party Conferences?
- If there are problems with health care? Whom do you constituents consult? How can you assist?
- If there are problems with legal issues? Whom do your constituents consult? And how can you help?
- How relevant is your work as a member of the District Council for the political support that you receive from your voters?
- Could you comment on whether your work in the District Council matters for you voters?
- Could you comment on whether your relationship with the District Commission matters for your voters?
- Could you comment on whether and how your relationship with other district level organisations, for example district development trusts, different committees, trade and farmer unions, broad based party organisations matters for your voters?
- How do you maintain your relationship with district level organisations and with your voters? What do you do to know what people are concerned with? Where from do you get information? Whom do you consult and listen to? How often do you travel back and forth between your constituency and the capital? Who supports you in your work at the district level? Whom do you have to rely on?
A5.2 District Commissioners

- What are the tasks and responsibilities of the District Commission?
- What is your role as District Commissioner? (or any other role as an employee of the District Commission?)
- Could you comment on how you do your work?
- How is your work supported administratively at the district level and at central government level?
- How is your work supported politically at the district level and at the central government level?
- Since when are there District Commissions, and what was there before?
- How is the District Commission funded? Under what central government agency do you fall?
- How do you receive your funding during the course of the fiscal year?
- Could you comment on how you plan your work over more than one year and the financial implications of your work?
- If applicable, could you comment on how you participate in the governments' budget process?
- How do you think could your involvement in the budget process be improved to make your work more efficient?
- Do you think the funding District Commissions receive in relation to their responsibilities is appropriate?
- Have any of the budget reforms that your government has been pursuing had any influence on your work?
- To whom is the District Commission accountable/responsible?
- How well do you know you are doing with your work? How do you ensure that you deliver good work? How do you proof to central government that you do good work? What matters most to you in this respect?
- How do you relate to the District Council? What are your formal and informal links to the District Council?
- How do you work with the District MP? Or any other MP?
- What is your opinion on whether the District Council supports your work?
- If you have difficult decisions to take, who supports you most? Whom can you rely on?
- If you need to coordinate something with the District Council, how do you do this? Who do you contact? How do you seek consensus?
- What overlapping responsibilities do you have with the District Council, if any?
- Could you comment on how you work with other organisations at the district level? For example party organisations, trade unions, cooperatives, village assemblies? Whom do you usually interact with?
- How do you work for example with district development trusts, faith based organisations in your area etc.?
- If citizens are not happy with law and order issues at the district level, what do they do? Whom do you think they contact and complain to?
• If citizens do not contact you directly, how do you hear of their concerns? How do you take it into consideration?
• How has your work improved over the last years?
• Could you comment on how you think District Commission have contributed to the good performance of your central government? What role have you played in implementing government reforms?
• Have you been happy with the role you played? Are things getting better at the district level? Do you wish there was more support, either from central government or the district council and other district level organisations?
• What impact have the Local Government Authority Reforms had on your work
• How do you work with district courts and other lower courts?
• How much are you involved with the work of the district courts?
• How do you relate to the regional commissions?
• How do you work at the sub-district level? In villages (rural areas), streets, quarters (in towns)?
• How does the District Commission relate to district based party organisations? Do you seek their assistance in some of your work? For example the Ten Cells?
• If there are problems in the district? How do you find out? Who do you rely on? Whom do you listen to, consult and trust most?

A5.3 District Councils

• What is your role as District Councillor? (or any other role as an employee of the District Council?)
• Could you comment on what work you do and how you do your work?
• How is your work supported administratively at the district level and at central government level?
• How is your work supported politically at the district level and at the central government level?
• Since when are there District Councils, and what was there before?
• How are District Councils funded? Under what budget line/ministry do you fall?
• Do you have your own sources of revenue? Can you collect and retain revenue?
• How do you receive your funding during the course of the fiscal year?
• How predictable is the funding you receive? Can you properly plan your work?
• Could you comment on how you plan your work over more than one year and the financial implications of your work?
• If applicable, could you comment on how you participate in the governments’ budget process?
• How do you think could your involvement in the budget process be improved to make your work more efficient?
• Do you think the funding District Councils receive in relation to their responsibilities is appropriate?
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- What does your district spend most of its funds on? How much freedom do you have to decide what to spend your funds on? How, if, do you set your priorities?
- How monitors and oversees the spending of District Councils?
- How do you do your accounting? What administrative capacity do you have to account for the funds you have received? What do you struggle with on the financial management side?
- Do you get sufficient support from central government for this? If not, what are the problems? And how do you think these could be rectified?
- Have any of the budget reforms that your government has been pursuing had any influence on your work?
- To whom is the District Council accountable/responsible? Is it clear whom District Councils are accountable to?
- How well do you know you are doing with your work? How do you ensure that you deliver good work? How do you proof to central government that you do good work? What matters most to you in this respect?
- How do you relate to the District Commissions? What are your formal and informal links to the District Commission?
- The District MP is on the District Council? What is his/her role in the council?
- Could you comment on whether you think the District MP spends enough time working with the District Council?
- What is your opinion of the support that you receive from your District MP at the central government level?
- Do you think the MP can represent the district in the National Assembly?
- Could you comment on whether you think districts’ concerns would be better represented if there was a second house in addition to the National Assembly which would represent districts’ concerns?
- What is your opinion on whether the District Commissions and central government support your work?
- If you have difficult decisions to take, who supports you most? Whom can you rely on?
- If you need to coordinate something with the District Commission, how do you do this? Who do you contact? How do you seek consensus?
- What overlapping responsibilities do you have with the District Commission, if any?
- Could you comment on how you work with other organisations at the district level? For example party organisations, trade unions, cooperatives, village assemblies? Whom do you usually interact with?
- How do you work for example with district development trusts, faith based organisations in your area etc.?
- If citizens are not happy with health care provision or any other public services, what do they do? Whom do you think they contact and seek advice from? Do they consult you, and if how?
- If citizens do not contact you directly, how do you hear of their concerns? How do you take it into consideration?
- How has your work improved over the last years?
Could you comment on how you think District Councils have contributed to the good performance of your central government? What role have you played in implementing government reforms?

Have you been happy with the role you played? Are things getting better at the district level? Do you wish there was more support, either from central government or the district council and other district level organisations?

How do you work with district courts and other lower courts?

How much are you involved with the work of the district courts?

How do you work with non-governmental service providers, for example those that provide health care services?

How do you work at the sub-district level? In villages (rural areas), streets, quarters (in towns)?

How does the District Council relate to district based party organisations? Do you seek their assistance in some of your work? For example the Ten Cells?

If there are problems in the district? How do you find out? Who do you rely on? Whom do you listen to, consult and trust most?
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Appendix 4   Abbreviations

BER  Budget Execution Report
CAG  Controller and Auditor General’s Office
CFAA  Country Financial Accountability Assessment
EC  European Commission
ESAF  Economic Structural Assessment Framework
GBS  General Budget Support
HIPC  Highly Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative
IMF  International Monetary Fund
MDF  Multilateral Debt Fund
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MoP  Member of Parliament
MTEF  Medium-term Expenditure Framework
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
PAF  Performance Assessment Framework (for PRBS/ PRSC)
PER  Public Expenditure Review
PMS  Poverty Monitoring System
PRBS  Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRGF  Poverty Reduction & Growth Facility (IMF)
PRSC  Poverty Reduction Support Credit (World Bank)
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
WB  World Bank
AfDB  African Development Bank