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**NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON PROMOTING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
IN TANZANIA**

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**Gender Impact of Structural Adjustment Programme on Employment in the
Public Sector**

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THE GENDER IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ON EMPLOYMENT IN THE TANZANIAN PUBLIC SECTOR

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INTRODUCTION:

The gender impact of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on employment in all sectors is largely underpinned, firstly, by the fragility of the Tanzanian economy, whose crisis gave rise to SAPs in the first place, and, secondly, by the socially constructed gender roles in production and reproduction. Thus in order to understand the nature of the gender impact of SAPs on employment in the public sector in its proper perspective, we need to analyze it in the context of three interrelated factors. First is the crisis in the national economy which the structural adjustment initiatives purport to address. Second are the various stabilization and adjustment measures whose implementation has a bearing, positive or otherwise, on employment creation and on conditions of employment generally. And third is the set of social and cultural values as well as the legal system and administrative practices which largely determine gender roles in society in general and gender-based opportunities for and in employment in particular. The forgoing factors constitute the hub of the analytical framework within which the gender impact of SAPs on employment in the public sector is assessed in the present paper.

Tanzania, an East African country on the western fringes of the Indian Ocean with a population of about 27.5 million, is one of the world's least developed countries (LDCs), with an estimated annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of \$129.5 and a human development index (HDI) of 0.364. With inflationary pressures, a GDP growth rate that barely exceeds the rate of population increase, high unemployment and a marked deterioration of the social sectors, Tanzania faces critical development challenges. It is these challenges that the structural adjustment programmes, initiated in the 1980s, have sought to address. In this report structural adjustment will be employed to refer to the economic adjustment and stabilization measures, including institutional reforms, taken essentially at the behest of the Bretton Woods institutions -- the World Bank (IBRD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - with the general blessing of the donor community at large.

Structural adjustment in Tanzania originates from the economic malaise that began to afflict Tanzania in the mid-1970s and reached crisis proportions towards the end of the decade. During this period all the important economic indicators, including GDP growth rate, domestic savings and investment, public finance and balance of payments, took a negative turn. The crisis manifested itself in a variety of ways, including a decline in physical production, decline in employment opportunities, shortage of consumer goods, a high rate of inflation (above 30% in

the 1980s), a fall in real incomes, a fall in export earnings, an imbalance between domestic earnings and domestic consumption, and a deterioration of the social sectors as a result of under-funding by government.

It is against this background of a crisis of macroeconomic imbalances that, since 1981, the government of Tanzania has been implementing a series of programmes aimed at reviving the economy. These measures have already been ably analyzed in other studies. It will therefore suffice to simply highlight the major issues pertaining to the programmes and then proceed to discuss their relationship to developments in the labour market. Our central concern is the gender dimension of the developments in question. This paper focuses on the programmes implemented from 1986 within the framework of arrangements agreed between Tanzania and the international financial institutions (IFIs). It seeks to establish the extent to which the programmes in question impinge on employment opportunities from a gender perspective.

The present study draws on material from secondary sources, government statistical publications, documentation from government Ministries and parastatals as well as interviews with key informants at the Civil Service Reform Programme, the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission and in select parastatals. A major handicap in the use of these sources is that there is hardly any organisation that maintains gender differentiated personnel records.

The study is divided into four parts. The first part addresses the gender dimension of employment in the economy in general and the public sector in particular. The second provides highlights of SAPs in the Tanzanian context. The third examines the relations between SAPs and employment in the public sector from a gender perspective. A few concluding remarks and a set of recommendations appear in the final part.

THE GENDER DIMENSION OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

General Issues

The gender dimension of employment in the public sector is largely influenced by the general socioeconomic environment. It can therefore be properly understood in the context of three inter-related factors: the place of wage employment in the economy, the relative distribution of wage employment in the different sectors, and the gender patterns of employment in the wage sector in general and the public sector in particular. The gender patterns of employment are themselves intimately related to economic, social and cultural forces at play in Tanzanian society.

A conspicuous feature of the Tanzanian economy, which has changed but little since the advent of the market economy, is that the majority of the economically active population earn their

living in smallholder agriculture. The growth of the formal sector has been notably low as is reflected in the tiny proportion of persons in wage employment relative to the rest of the working population. This is largely a function of the low growth of the country's economy in general and its industrial sector in particular. Table 1 adapted from the report of the 1990/91 *Labour Force Survey* indicates that, of the 10,889,205 economically active persons, only 817,626, or 7.5 percent, were employed in the formal economy, distributed as shown in the table between the government, parastatal and private sectors. For obvious reasons, the proportion of the urban working population employed in the formal sector is much higher than the average at 38.8 percent.

Within the formal economy, women not only constitute a tiny minority of the working population but are concentrated in low-status occupations which are poorly remunerated. Their share of formal employment has risen over time but it remains substantially lower than that of men. The proportion of women in the total wage labour force progressively rose from 6 percent in 1966 to 12 percent in 1978, 15.5 percent in 1981 and 24.7 percent in 1990/91 (Sunny: 1987: 20; URT: 1988; LFS: 1-20). Women's limited access to employment outside traditional agriculture is further confirmed by the relatively low participation rate of women in the labour force in those sectors. Whereas the overall participation rate for men in 1990/91 was 72.4 percent, the rate for women was 70.9 percent. Women in the urban areas, where most of the formal employment is located, had a much lower participation rate at 58 percent (*LFS: 1-85; Statistical Abstract 1994: 20*). This means that close to half of the urban female population was engaged most probably for the most part in traditional female activities, notably domestic chores, which the gender biased collection of labour statistics relegates to the category of economically idle occupations.

A disproportionately large number of women are engaged in unskilled jobs and in such stereotypical female occupations as nursing, elementary school teaching and stenography. A gendered distribution of employment by occupation in the urban areas in 1990/91 is shown in table 2. Females outnumber males only in agricultural employment, and in clerical, retail trade and service occupations. They have a particularly strong presence in hotels, restaurants and domestic service. On the other hand, they are poorly represented in the professions and among operators of plant and machinery. Their representation in the associate professions, however, is rather better but most of them are mainly in teaching and nursing (*LFS: 1-87*). This pattern of occupational distribution between the genders is a function of a combination of three factors, namely the culturally determined sexual division of labour, the relatively low levels of education and training among women and their disadvantaged access to decision-making, especially in the allocation of economic resources, including opportunities for employment and promotion within employment. Such factors also influence the earnings differentials between men and women as is clearly evident in table 3 which relates women's average earnings to the overall average earnings in paid employment in 1990/91. The average income for women is lower in all occupations except for administrators/managers and professionals. It has been suggested that

the latter aberration from the norm is most probably due to the fact that men far outnumber women in these two occupations and as such "it is likely that by aggregating the means, extreme values have their effect more on male than female," (Mayeye in *LFS*: 1-74). The foregoing issues are explored further in the next sub-section which examines the gender dimension of employment in the public sector. Table 1: Employment by urban/rural by main sector, 1990/91

Geographical area	Total	%	Govt.	%	Parastatal	%	Trad. Agric.	%	Informal Sector	%	Other Private	%
Total	10,889,205	100.0	319,455	2.9	180,767	1.7	9,115,932	83.7	955,647	8.8	317,404	2.9
Urban	1,693,588	100.0	178,757	10.6	161,553	9.5	624,156	36.9	530,704	31.3	198,418	18.7
Rural	9,195,617	100.0	140,698	1.5	19,214	0.2	8,491,776	92.4	424,943	4.6	118,986	1.3

Source: adapted from *Labour Force Survey (LFS)*, p.1-18.

Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Employment by occupation - gendered: urban areas, 1990/91.

OCCUPATION	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Administrators/ Managers	7.9	10.3	4.4
Professional	0.9	1.5	0.2
Associate Professional	5.2	6.1	3.9
Clerks/ Cashiers	4.8	3.9	6.0
Service/Shops	10.0	9.9	10.2
Craft etc. workers	11.8	18.4	2.5
Agriculture - skilled	37.1	26.0	52.8
Operators plant/ machinery	5.5	8.6	1.1
Sales/ Labourers	16.9	15.3	19.0

Source: *LFS*, pp.1-87.

Table 3: Women's average earnings relative to overall average earnings in paid employment by Occupation, 1990/91

Occupation	(1) Overall Average Earnings	(2) Women,s Average Earnings	(3) % of women's average earnings relative to overall average earnings [(2)/(1)×100]
Paid Employment Total	4,946	4,292	86.8
Admin/ Managers	6,024	7,662	127.1
Professionals	10,031	12,799	127.6
Associate Professionals	6,579	5,900	89.8
Clerks/ Cashiers	5,049	5,040	99.8
Service/Shops	3,782	3,355	88.7
Agric./Skilled	5,341	3,373	101.0
Craft etc Workers	5,495	3,930	71.5
Operators Plant/ Machinery	5,415	3,816	70.5
Sales & Labourers	3,356	2,707	80.7

Source: LFS, p. 1-89.

Gender and Employment in the Public Sector

The size and, to some extent, composition of employment in the public sector have changed notably since independence in 1961. The most striking change is the rise in the proportion of public sector employment relative to national wage employment. This is illustrated in table 4. In terms of size, the relative significance of private sector employment began to decline from about 1968. From a phenomenal 72 percent of the total wage labour force in 1963, the private sector's share of national wage employment had fallen to 47.4 percent by 1968 and, over the long term, underwent a progressive decline until it had dropped to 26.9 percent by 1985. The obverse side of these developments is that the share of public sector employment grew considerably. Although employment in government has significantly expanded over the period, the greater part of this rise is largely attributable to the rapid enlargement of public sector enterprise following the nationalisation of private businesses and the creation of new state enterprises which came in the wake of the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The parastatal sector was also considerably augmented by the creation of several state-sponsored service institutions outside the normal ministerial structures of government. From employing a mere 4.9 percent of the total wage-earning population in 1963, the parastatal sector employed 18.6 percent in 1968 and a phenomenal 34.6 percent in 1985. As can be gleaned from table 4, in 1985, during the early phase of SAPs, the two sides of the public sector (government and the parastatals) employed 73.1 percent of the total. On the basis of these statistics, the significance of public sector

employment for the livelihoods of Tanzanians, male as well as female, cannot be overemphasized.

The gender differentiated patterns of formal employment as a whole which have been identified above are, by and large, replicated in the public sector. The inter-related elements which comprise the employment patterns in question can be summarised in terms of: (a) a gender numerical imbalance which is heavily tilted in favour of the male gender; (b) a disproportionate concentration of females in low-status, often gender stereotyped and poorly remunerated occupations; (c) gender differentiated access to education and training, whereby males have more than an edge over females; and (d) earning differentials in which gender plays a significant role. There is sufficient empirical data to establish the general validity of the foregoing characterisation of public sector employment.

Table 5 outlines wage employment trends in both the public and private sectors on a gender differentiated basis between 1977 and 1984. In both sectors, females were invariably in a minority in respect of both regular and casual employees. The general trend, however, is that the share of female employment in both sectors rose over the period. In the case of regular employment, the proportion of females progressively rose from 7.5 percent in 1977 to 12.0 percent in 1984 in the private sector, and from 12.8 percent in 1977 to 19.6 percent in 1984 in the public sector. The trend for casual employment was: 7.9 percent to 16.9 percent in the private sector and 7.9 percent to 12 percent, with fluctuations in the public sector. Table 5 clearly indicates a more favourable employment situation for females in the public sector compared to the private sector, a factor which underscores the significance of public sector employment in the context of the subject of this paper.

Table 4. Sectoral Proportions of Employment to Total National Wage Employment, 1983-1985

Year	Government	Parastatal	Private
1963	23.1	4.9	72.0
1964	24.6	5.0	70.0
1965	26.9	5.3	67.8
1966	29.0	5.0	66.0
1967	31.6	4.8	63.6
1968	34.0	18.6	47.4
1969	35.6	19.6	44.7
1970	35.9	22.5	41.6
1971	41.1	11.1	39.8
1972	35.1	23.0	41.0
1973	32.9	32.0	35.1
1974	36.8	29.6	34.9
1975	31.5	33.6	34.5
1976	30.6	34.9	33.4
1977	32.8	33.8	28.0
1978	34.7	37.3	30.0
1979	37.0	33.0	29.2
1980	37.1	33.7	27.3
1981	38.1	34.6	27.3
1982	38.1	34.6	27.2
1983	38.2	34.6	27.3
1984	38.5	34.6	27.3
1985	38.5	34.6	26.9

Source: ILO (JASPA) (1991) *Tanzania: Meeting the Employment Challenge*, p.176.

Table 6, based on a broader 1990/91 labour force survey, which included non-wage employment, indicates a similar pattern. Change of any consequence in this pattern in the more recent period is highly unlikely. Women were under-represented in all the sectors except traditional agriculture where they constituted nearly 54 percent. Their presence in the informal sector, at 35.5 percent was sizeable, given their relatively poor representation at 29.6 percent in government, 21.6 percent in the parastatals, and at a mere 18.7 percent in the formal private sector. These figures also show that women employment in the public sector, especially in government, fared better than in the private sector.

An important observation from table 5 is that there was an increasingly greater recourse to casual labour in the private sector. Women had a disproportionate share of the casual labour market in 1983 and 1984 in this sector compared to the public sector. The female proportion of casual labour in the public sector is less than its counterpart in the regular workforce, which suggests that casualisation of female labour in the public sector, especially in government, is much less of a problem than in the private sector.

It has been reported that women in the Civil Service, where they comprise about a third of the total employees, are disproportionately concentrated in the bottom 12 of the total 38 salary scales. Women in this category constitute about 81 percent of the total women civil service population. A schedule of 13 schemes of service in which women are concentrated have been identified. These are mostly for nurses, primary school teachers, clerks, secretaries/typists, office attendants, lower cadres in the police and prison services, and general labourers (Sinkonde et al: 1992:47-50). Unfortunately, the analysis does not include male civil service data and therefore its value for purposes of a comparative gender analysis of this question is rather limited.

Data on women's occupational status from the parastatal sector are more authoritative, albeit limited in coverage. It is suggestive of a generalised situation in formal employment. Evidence from two parastatal enterprises, one industrial and the other from the service sector indicate that, indeed, women tend to occupy the lower rungs of established positions in organisations. Table 7, which is based on an analysis of personnel data at the Friendship Textile Mill in Dar es Salaam for the period 1972 to 1982, clearly shows that the predominant majority of the women were concentrated in select departments: production, where they acted mainly as semi-skilled operators of spinning and weaving machinery; administration and services, where they attended mainly to general, usually unskilled duties; and finance, purchasing and supplies where the majority acted in subordinate positions as accounts assistants and purchasing and stores clerks. The figures in table 7 testify to the conspicuous absence at the Friendship Textile factory of women in senior administrative positions and in the technical and engineering departments (Mihyo: 1987: 50-56).

At the National Construction Council, a parastatal which is meant to coordinate, regulate and act as a catalyst for the construction industry, only 14 persons, or 24 percent, of the Council's 59 employees, were women. All the fourteen graduate engineers as well as all but two of the other eight well-qualified senior officers were men. The remaining twelve women were employed as personal secretaries (6), office attendants (4) and telephone operators (2) (Rugumyamheto: 1987: 62).

Table 5: Wage earners by gender and terms of employment (excluding young persons), 1977-1984.

Year	Regular employees					Casual Employees				
	Total	Males	%	Females	%	Total	Males	%	Females	%
PRIVATE SECTOR										
1977	110,669	102,338	92.5	8,331	7.5	46,271	42,594	92.1	3,677	7.9
1978	104,109	95,949	92.2	8,160	7.8	42,502	38,304	90.1	4,198	9.9
1979	117,894	106,511	90.3	11,383	9.7	57,238	51,104	89.3	6,134	10.7
1980	116,102	104,168	89.7	11,934	10.3	55,498	48,946	88.2	6,552	11.8
1981	114,792	102,818	89.6	11,974	10.4	58,135	51,432	88.5	6,703	11.5
1982	114,692	101,934	88.9	12,758	11.1	49,738	44,075	88.1	5,663	11.9
1983	117,069	103,757	88.6	13,312	11.4	46,848	40,113	85.6	6,735	14.4
1984	121,366	106,744	88.0	14,622	12.0	46,371	38,546	83.1	7,825	16.9
PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR										
1977	260,482	227,185	87.2	33,297	12.8	61,011	56,194	92.1	4,817	7.9
1978	306,683	263,542	84.9	43,141	14.1	78,455	70,635	90.0	7,820	10.0
1979	340,843	283,480	83.2	57,363	16.8	76,447	62,812	82.2	13,635	17.8
1980	376,093	294,105	78.2	81,988	21.8	70,588	62,905	89.1	7,683	10.9
1981	384,577	316,648	82.3	67,929	17.7	59,149	52,061	88.0	7,088	12.0
1982	404,605	330,774	81.8	73,831	18.2	59,982	53,269	88.8	6,713	11.2
1983	410,322	332,616	81.1	77,706	18.9	56,710	48,485	85.5	8,225	14.5
1984	413,475	332,568	80.4	80,907	19.6	48,094	42,342	88.0	5,752	12.0

Source: URT, Bureau of Statistics (1992), *Survey of Employment of Earnings*, p.5.

Table 6: Employment by sector and gender in 1990/91

Sector	Persons	Male (%)	Female (%)
Total	10,889,205	50.1	49.9
Government	319,455	70.4	29.6
Parastatal	180,767	78.4	21.6
Private Traditional Agriculture	9,110,804	46.2	53.8
Private Informal	960,775	64.5	35.5
Private Formal	317,404	81.3	18.7

Source: LFS, p.1-88.

To a large extent, women's relatively low status in employment is reflected in the gender differentiated average incomes in all sectors, including the public sector. Although we have no access to micro-level data, the available aggregate data confirm the view that women on average

earn less than men. It is clear from table 8 that men's average wages in all sectors in 1990/91 were higher than those of women. Male average wages across the sectoral range were invariably higher than the overall averages and, conversely, female average wages were invariably lower than the average in every sector. The highest differential was in traditional agriculture, and the lowest was in Government. The next lowest was in the parastatals. From a gender equity point of view, therefore, remuneration in the public sector seems more equitable than in the private sector.

It has been argued that a major determinant of women's low status and relatively poor remuneration in employment is the low level of their achievements in literacy, education and skills training (Sinkonde et al: 1992: 49-58; TGNP: 1993: 81-91). The evidence in favour of this argument is overwhelming. The gender pattern of occupational distribution at the National Construction Council that we discussed above corresponds to the well-documented levels of education and training (Rugumyamheto: op.cit). National level data indicates manifestly inferior levels of achievement in literacy, education and training for female workers in the public sector and in the national economy at large. The evidence in support of this general statement can be gleaned from tables 9 where vertical gender comparisons of literacy and levels of education are made in all sectors for 1990/91.

Table 7: Gender distribution of employment by department at Friendship Textile Mill, 1972-82

Department	1972		1975		1978		1981		1982	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Production										
Manager's office	8	0	17	0	6	0	6	0	5	0
Spinning Mills	860	116	1108	164	1187	184	1308	188	762	249
Weaving Mills	1334	135	2022	148	2083	147	2098	160	1582	174
Dyeing & Printing	485	38	572	51	580	64	565	57	n.a.	n.a.
Technical										
Manager's office	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	
Quality control	6	1	19	4	51	4	52	5	49	1
Work Study	-	-	-	-	3	1	2	1	n.a.	n.a.
Laboratory	5	1	6	1	6	1	4	1	n.a.	n.a.
Engineering										
Chief Eng. office	2	0	4	0	1	0	3	0	n.a.	n.a.
Mechanical	134	3	148	3	202	3	216	2	n.a.	n.a.
Electrical	86	0	136	0	136	0	129	2	n.a.	n.a.
Services										
Clerical & General	42	7	47	11	60	1	69	9	80	11
Personnel & Administration	118	33	186	93	228	140	196	189	160	154
Department	1972		1975		1978		1981		1982	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F

Finance	39	11	67	11	56	13	57	16	38	21
Sales & Marketing	35	1	56	3	43	1	45	1	32	1
Purchasing & Supplies	110	8	153	8	149	6	135	13	94	6
Total	3262	354	4541	497	4790	566	5452	644	2866	631
Percentage distribution by gender	90.3	9.7	90.2	9.8	89.4	10.6	89.5	10.5	82.0	18.0

Source: IDS Women's Studies Group (1987), *Statistics on Women Employment in Tanzania 1961-1986*, p.51.

Table 8: Gendered average monthly paid income in shillings by sector for 1990/91.

Sector	Overall Average Wage	Males		Females	
		Average wage	% of overall average	Average wage	% of overall average
All Sectors	4,950	5,150	104.0	4,300	86.9
Government	5,350	5,470	102.2	5,060	94.6
Parastatal	5,970	6,170	103.4	5,250	87.9
Private Traditional Agriculture	2,480	2,790	112.5	1,070	43.1
Private Informal	3,930	4,310	109.7	2,900	73.8
Private Other	4,820	5,010	104.0	3,910	81.1

Source: LFS, p.1-75

In table 9, women's achievement in education and literacy is lower than that of men in the total workforce. Of all employed females in 1990/91, 42.2 percent, compared to 23.1 percent of the males, had no education. Some 43.3 percent of the females, compared to 22.3 percent of the males, were illiterate. The negative education and literacy rates, for both men and women were lowest in government and the parastatals. All the same, the proportion of women with high education achievement in the public sector is lower than that of men. Among government employees, only 38 percent of the women, compared to 41 percent of the men had received education beyond primary school level. In the parastatal sector, the proportions for women and men were 36 percent and 43 percent respectively. Only 0.7 percent of the women, compared to 2.2 percent of the men among Government employees had a University education. And in the parastatals, only 1 percent of the women, compared to 3.8 percent of the men were University graduates. There are no sector-level figures on training but the macro-level figures shown in table 10 confirm the relative disadvantage of female employees in this area as well. The proportion of women without any training is higher than that of men. Women score proportionately lower than men for all categories of training. The above gender differentiated rates of achievements in literacy, education and training cannot but disadvantage women as far as status and benefits in employment are concerned.

Table 9: Percentage distribution (vertical) of education levels and literacy of employed persons by sector and gender, 1990/91

Educ/Literacy	Total Workforce		Government Employees		Parastatal Employees		Private Sector Employees		Traditional Agriculture	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Education Level									
None	23.1%	42.2%	1.5%	0.4%	4.3%	5.2%	9.6	22.1	27.7	44.9
Primary. not comp.	24.4%	18.4%	9.6%	3.9%	18.2%	3.9%	19.3	17.6	26.5	18.9
Primary complete	48.0%	37.5%	48.3%	57.7%	47.6%	54.6%	63.2	54.7	44.8	35.6
Secondary. F 2	1.0%	0.5%	4.9%	3.1%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5	1.7	0.4	0.3
Secondary. F 4	2.9%	1.3%	29.7%	31.7%	19.4%	30.2%	4.6	3.6	0.6	0.2
Secondary. F 6	0.4%	0.1%	3.8%	2.6%	4.1%	2.6%	0.4	0.2	0.04	0.01
University	0.2%	0.03%	2.2%	0.7%	3.8%	1.0%	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.003
	Literacy									
Literate	77.2%	56.7%	98.9%	99.6%	95.9%	95.2%	91.1	87.1	72.5	53.8
Illiterate	22.8%	43.3%	1.1%	0.4%	4.1%	4.8%	8.9	12.9	27.5	46.2

Source: Computed from LFS, p.2-16/17

Table 10: Training of employed persons by gender, 1990/91.

Training	Total Persons	Males		Females	
		No	%	No.	%
No training	10,092,171	4,828,463	47.8	5,263,708	52.2
With training	797,034	626,636	78.6	170,398	21.4
On the job training	345,785	295,331	85.4	50,454	14.6
Other formal training	451,249	331,305	73.4	119,944	26.6
Total	10,889,205	5,434,106	50.1	5,455,099	49.9

Source: LFS, p.1-90.

The factors that disadvantage women in accessing education and training as well as opportunities in employment have been attributed to broad societal characteristics. In the gender literature, women's social disadvantage in employment and other areas, including education, is treated as a function of patriarchal society in which sexual division of labour, unequal access to resources and decision-making constitute the 'basic triad' upon which the subordination of women to men is grounded. The impact of this triad on gender relations is mediated by such formal and informal institutions as education, culture, politics and the legal code (TGNP: 1993: 40-42; Mbilinyi: 1994: 25-60; Mbughuni: 1994: 212; Kaijage & Tibaijuka: 1996: 22-26). This is a broad subject whose details fall outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to state that gender inequality in the labour market is rooted in the policies, laws, social mores and cultural beliefs and practices that determine access to opportunities and regulate employment and other social relations. This is as true for the public sector as it is for the private sector.

Denial of educational opportunities to female children was ingrained in most Tanzanian cultures since colonial times. Girls were meant to grow up in order to marry and attend to their productive and reproductive roles, leaving the world of learning and paid employment to men. Although an increasingly greater number of women are finding their way into educational institutions and the employment market, the legacy of this problem still handicaps many women.

The legal system is another impediment to women's advancement in the labour market. There are still laws on the statute books that unabashedly discriminate against women in employment. Such a law is the Employment Ordinance where section 83 bars women from working in industrial undertakings, including mines factories, mills, electric power stations and the like, between the hours of ten at night and six in the morning. Section 86 of the same law, in keeping with International Labour Convention No. 45, forbids employment of women in underground

mines at any time, except for non-manual operations. The Ordinance only grants exception to women in managerial positions, those in training and those in health or welfare services. One author has expressed the view that, although these provisions are seemingly protective, "they are tendentially discriminatory on the basis of sex," (Kapinga: 1989:91).

Even laws meant to take care of the special needs of women are not so generous. Section 25(B) of the Labour Laws (Miscellaneous) Amendments Act, No.1 of 1975 grants 84 days maternity leave but in the same breath stipulates that the beneficiary would have to forfeit her annual leave, which in effect reduces maternity leave to 56 days only. The two-hour daily concession to nursing mothers in the same legislation to enable them to breast-feed their babies is not as generous as it appears in a working environment where mothers work far away from home and where there are no day care facilities.

One source of grievance for female civil servants has been the Government Standing Orders, the handbook on personnel administration in the Civil Service which is often referred to in the interpretation of terms and conditions of service, and which prescribes the rights, privileges and obligations of a civil servant. In their original form, the Standing Orders were renowned for their exclusive use of the masculine gender and for discriminating against women civil servants in regard to some entitlements. The language of the Standing Orders, Staff Circulars and Establishment Letters has constituted an open license for discriminatory treatment of women civil servants. The Standing Orders have recently been extensively revised to rid them of their androcentric tone and render them more favourable to female civil servants. It has been observed, however, that, even after this exercise, old-fashioned senior bureaucrats continue to interpret Standing Orders in ways that disadvantage women civil servants (interview Mpaka, CSD: Gender Unit).

A complaint has been expressed that appointments and promotions in the Civil Service, especially to senior positions, are less than transparent and therefore open to different forms of abuse. The Presidential appointments system for senior positions in Government, in particular, is allegedly controlled by a magic circle of influential men who, more often than not, instinctively discriminate against qualified women who naturally are not members of the 'old boys' network (Sinkonde et al: 1992).

An important question is whether the structural adjustment programmes that Tanzania has been implementing since the mid-1980s has had any impact on the gender patterns of employment in the public sector as we have described them above. This is an issue that the balance of this paper seeks to examine. As a prelude to this exercise, it is important to highlight the structural adjustment programmes themselves as they have been applied in the Tanzanian context.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES: HIGHLIGHTS

Antecedents

The current era of reform began in the early 1980s in the form of two home-grown programmes, initiated and implemented by the Tanzanian government without reference to any formal agreement with the international financial institutions. However, these initiatives, as will be noted below, are not entirely free from influence by IFIs. The first initiative, the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP), followed failed negotiations with the IMF. The second, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), was implemented in anticipation of a loan from the IMF, which unfortunately did not materialize.

The National Economic Survival Programme (1981-1982) aimed to eliminate food shortages, minimize and eventually do away with government budgetary overruns, increase export earnings by stimulating export production, especially in agriculture, encourage a judicious use of the scarce foreign exchange, and promote self-reliance in implementation of development plans. The programme did not produce any tangible results. It has been suggested that it was too general and lacked realizable targets (Wangwe et al: 1997: 7).

The Structural Adjustment Programme (1982-83) was formulated by a World Bank sponsored Tanzania Advisory Group. The programme aimed at restoring financial and overall economic stability, stimulating agricultural development and improving economic efficiency. The measures included, among other things, devaluation of the shilling by 12 percent in March 1982, 20 percent in July 1983 and 26 percent in July 1984. Other measures included control of monetary expansion, control of government expenditure and a downsizing of parastatals with a view to improving their efficiency.

The expected \$900 million in balance of payments support from the IMF (\$690 mi.) and other sources (\$210 mi.) did not materialize as the measures under SAP fell short of what was required to attain an agreement with the IMF, which donors insisted upon as a condition for the release of the funds. Shortage of foreign exchange, in particular, hamstrung the whole reform initiative. Moreover, the burden of international debt was weighing heavily on Tanzania. In the mid-1980s, Tanzania's debt service ratio was estimated at 100.1 percent of her annual merchandise export earnings (Wagao: 1990: 92). In these circumstances, Tanzania could not but seek a rescheduling of her foreign debt. There is no way that this could have happened without an agreement with the IMF. It is against this background of a deteriorating economy and a crippling debt burden that Tanzania was forced, against her inclinations, to adopt a more stringent reform programme

in order to win the approval of the IMF and therefore obtain the much needed injection of external funding for resuscitation of her economy.

The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 1986/87 - 1988/89

To a large extent, the Economic Recovery Programme was a continuation and intensification of measures introduced under SAP. It aimed at increasing food and cash crop production, rehabilitating the physical infrastructure as a way to support productive activities, improving utilization of installed capacity in industry from 20-30 percent to 60-70 percent, restoring internal and external balances by pursuing prudent fiscal, monetary and trade policies, restoring efficiency in the mobilization of domestic resources, reducing the rate of inflation and rehabilitating the social services.

The policies in pursuit of these objectives included increase of producer prices, exchange rate adjustment, interest rate adjustment, tight fiscal and monetary policies, decontrol of prices, and liberalisation of domestic and foreign trade. These measures were expected to raise the annual GDP growth rate from 2 percent during 1980-85 to 5 percent and reduce the inflation rate from 30 percent to 10 percent by the end of the ERP period. Considerable success was scored in the GDP growth rate which rose in real terms by 3.9 percent in 1986, 3.9 percent in 1987, 4.0 percent in 1988, 4.0 percent in 1989 and 4.3 percent in 1990. Appreciable improvements were recorded in food and export production, availability of consumer goods and availability of agricultural inputs. However, the rate of inflation proved more intractable as it dropped only marginally from 32.4 percent in 1986 to 21.9 percent in 1994 (Kaijage & Tibaijuka: 1996: 88-89). But a notable negative effect of ERP was the deterioration of the social sectors due to a decline in government funding in real terms as a result of the deflationary ERP policies. The adverse impact of ERP on disadvantaged low-income groups was a matter of grave concern to the government and among donors. The next short-term reform initiative, the Economic and Social Action Programme (ESAP or ERP-II) was designed with a concern for the fate of the social sectors and the situation of disadvantaged social categories.

The Economic and Social Action Programme (ESAP) 1989/90 - 1991/92

In the main, ESAP aimed to consolidate the measures instituted under ERP but added a new thrust, namely the social dimension of adjustment (SDA). The SDA was largely a response to the adverse impact of ERP on the poor. It sought to ensure that economic growth was equitable and that it benefited those on low incomes. ESAP proposed immediate action in the areas identified as fundamental to individual and communal welfare, namely health, education, water

supply, food security, incomes and employment. Sources of alternative funding for the social sectors to reduce over-dependence on the government budget were proposed as a way to achieve a sustainable social services programme. However, given the persistence of the economic imbalances, the tight fiscal policy, falling personal incomes in real terms and the limited inflow of external resources for the social sectors, the SDA under ESAP has not been realized. With the end of ESAP, government has sought to pursue a sustained reform programme through the Rolling Plan and Forward Budgeting (RPFb) system.

Rolling Plan and Forward Budgeting (RPFb), 1993 -

The RPFb covers three-year periods but is rolled over and updated every year. It constitutes the major annual statement on government's policy objectives, development strategy, economic targets and budgetary projections. While budgetary targets have a three-year horizon, policy statements and strategies are based on a longer-term perspective. Only modifications rather than major reviews of policy are inserted in the RPFb document when the process is rolled over. Among other things, the RPFb seeks to (1) reinforce the linkage between macro and sectoral policies so that the latter are consistent with the on-going macroeconomic reforms; (2) strengthen the link between policy and allocation of funds for both development and recurrent expenditure, and (3) facilitate a regular review of public expenditure so that it can be adapted to changing economic circumstances (URT: 1996; Mtatifikolo: 1994a; Wangwe, Musonda and Kweka: 1997: 12f.).

In large measure, RPFb, the new strategy in government planning and budgeting initiated in 1993, signifies government abandonment of the programmatic approach to economic reform in favour of an institutionalised reform process. It accords recognition to a redefined role of government whereby key economic functions are increasingly being devolved to private economic agents, and social services rendered in a partnership between government and civil society.

Following the foregoing brief historical survey of the reform process, it would be useful for us to review it as a whole in order to identify its essential features some of which might have a bearing on gender patterns of employment in the public sector.

Structural Adjustment: An Overview

In their review of the relationship between SAPs and labour market institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Geest and Wignaraja (1996) have classified reforms under SAPs into two broad categories, namely (1) reforms that are designed to promote competitive markets within the

economy and (2) institutional reforms meant to bring about change in the conditions and contexts within which markets function. Presumably, the institutional reforms are meant to create an enabling environment for the operation of competitive markets, to lend them a permanence that is consistent with an economy free of distortions. According to Geest and Wignaraja, reforms of the first type were characteristic of the early phase of SAPs, while institutional reforms, which "have a more direct impact on demand for labour" (p.3), belong to a later period, beginning from the early 1990s. Geest and Wignaraja's scheme is an extremely useful one and, indeed, is consistent with the Tanzanian experience (Mtatifikolo: 1994).

Measures effected under NESP, SAP, ERP and ESAP aimed to rid the Tanzanian economy of distortions, put in place an incentive system that would get the market functioning properly and "get the prices right" for capital, foreign exchange, and goods and services. It was mainly the ERP and ESAP reforms between 1986 and 1992 that were unprecedented in their intensity and coverage. The reforms included massive devaluation of the shilling, removal of foreign exchange restrictions, decontrol of internal prices, removal of price subsidies on essential consumer items, liberalisation of domestic and foreign trade, ending of the monopoly of the National Milling Corporation and state marketing boards in agricultural marketing; opening up the export of traditional commodities to private capital, and freeing up of interest rates. Attempts at controlling government expenditure was tried with little success in the first phase. It is within the context of the more recent round of reforms that a sustained fiscal reform programme has been embarked upon.

The current round of reforms which are of an institutional nature roughly date from around 1991/92. These reforms cover a wide range of institutions including the financial sector, public finance, the civil service, the parastatal sector and the external sector.

The enabling legislation for the reform of the financial sector is the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1991. The legislation has opened up the financial sector to private enterprise. Following this law, a number of banks have already began operations in Tanzania. A notable feature of financial sector reform is the highly controversial proposed restructuring of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC). Also a significant effect of financial restructuring is the requirement to withhold credit from insolvent parastatals. The 1994 Capital Markets and Securities Authority Act of 1994 has paved the way for a full-fledged capital market the preparations for which are at an advanced stage.

Fiscal policy reform has hinged upon efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, the fiscal deficit by controlling government spending and borrowing. These efforts have been coupled with measures to improve revenue collection.

The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) which was launched in 1991, aims to reorganize the structure and reduce the size of government in order to suit a redefined role of government in the context of devolution of some of its activities to private economic agents and civil society in general. In a nutshell, the programme entails a review and restructuring of the different organs and departments of government and a redefinition of their functions, retrenchment and redeployment of staff, review and reform of the remuneration system, and development of the human resources in the Civil Service to improve performance.

The CSRP has its counterpart in the parastatal sector, the Parastatal Sector Reform Programme (PSRP), launched in 1992. The programme is largely a response to the problems of the ailing state enterprises which have drained Government resources through subsidies and have crippled the NBC by failing to honour their credit obligations to the bank. The PSRP seeks to free government from direct productive and trading activities in order to create greater space for private enterprise. It involves divestiture of most of the state enterprises, liquidation of those deemed unviable and fully commercializing and introducing a large element of competition for those that will remain under public ownership.

Parastatal sector reform seems to have been initially conceived mainly in terms of divesting loss-making state enterprises that were a drain on the public purse. There would then be improvement in the efficiency of those parastatals retained in public ownership. As the restructuring exercise has unfolded, however, the agenda seems to have been redefined, mainly by the IFIs. Parastatal sector reform has now taken the form of a full-fledged assault on state enterprise in general in order to broaden space for private enterprise and leave government to perform only its "traditional functions." A number of organisations which were not originally envisaged in the restructuring programme are now up for divestiture.

An important question is whether the above measures under SAPs have affected employment in the public sector and whether such an impact has a gender differentiated effect. This is the question that constitutes the focus of the following section.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES AND EMPLOYMENT: A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

SAPs, the Economy and Employment

Such evidence as I have been able to assemble indicates that, on the whole, the reform process has had a tremendous impact on employment in both the public and private sectors. Some

reforms have a direct while others an indirect impact on employment and gender issues. There are aspects of the reform programme whose impact on employment is not easy to gauge.

Limited assessments have previously been made of the impact of ERP-I and ERP-II on employment but the evidence adduced so far remains inconclusive. Given the nature of the available evidence, it is easier to comment generally about such impact than to attempt to measure it in any precise terms. This suggests a mixed impact of the reform process on employment. A case in point are deregulation of the import and export trade, liberalisation of foreign exchange, devaluation, decontrol of prices, interest rate adjustment, liberalisation of internal trade and reduction of government expenditure.

Deregulation of trade included removal of quantitative restriction on imports, rationalisation of the tariff system, own-funded imports which did not require authorization from the Central Bank, an export retention scheme, abolition of surrender requirements for foreign exchange earned on non-traditional exports, and elimination of licensing and registration requirements for exports. Other exchange control measures have been gradually dismantled. As a result of this liberal package, importers had a lot more foreign exchange at their disposal than hitherto. It was much easier for industries with direct access to foreign exchange to import intermediate goods and spare parts in order to raise capacity utilisation and create jobs. A further impetus was lent to this process by the decontrol of domestic prices which provided an incentive for expansion of industrial production.

On the other hand, devaluation of the shilling meant higher costs for imported inputs, especially for those industries which could only import their requirements with foreign exchange purchased locally either through the Central Bank or on the parallel market. The rise in the interest rate as a demand control mechanism jacked the price of credit, and is reported to have badly hurt cash-strapped parastatals and impaired their operations. Parastatal expenditure on interest payment during ERP I and II reportedly rose 30 times (Kahyarara: 1995:5). What is more, liberalization of the import trade through removal of quantitative restrictions and other concessions extended to the import trade opened the door for foreign producers to outcompete products from domestic industries. Reduced government financing of the social sector as part of an effort to reduce the fiscal deficit, has certainly hit employment prospects in the social sectors. The setbacks in education have meant reduced prospects for the advancement of women in education and, ultimately, in employment.

The textile industry provides a typical illustration of the adverse impact of reform on production and employment. To be sure, problems in the textile industry are not wholly attributable to SAPs. Some of these predate SAPs, such as water and power supply problems, deficiencies in management and so on. But SAPs have certainly exacerbated the situation. The high price of credit hurt the textile industries' liquidity and impaired their operations. Trade liberalisation

opened the way for the second-hand clothing market and brought in cheap textiles, especially from Asia, to the detriment of the market for domestic textiles. Whereas the price for a locally manufactured *khanga*, a popular textile item for women, costs from sh. 1,500 to 2,500, an imported one costs only between sh. 950 and 1,050 (Kahyarara: 1995: 38). There has been a precipitous fall in textile output on account of production bottlenecks and a fall in product demand due to foreign competition. Public sector textile firms are the worst hit. Since demand for labour is derived demand contingent on the characteristics of the product market on the one hand and the production process on the other, these developments have had a negative effect on employment in the textile industry.

The differential impact of SAPs on employment is reflected in the uneven developments in the industrial sector, measured by growth in production and utilization of installed capacity as revealed in a study conducted by the Centre for Development Research (cited in Wangwe et al). Whereas production in industry rose at annual rate of about 5 percent between 1986 and 1990, this rate dropped to only 2 percent between 1990 and 1995. Of the 131 enterprises surveyed between 1986 and 1992, production increased in 60 percent of them, decreased in another 30 percent and remained constant in 10 percent of the firms. Industrial capacity utilization declined from 38 percent to 29 percent between 1982-83 and 1986/89, rose to 37 percent in 1990-91, but further declined to below 25 percent thereafter with a mixed employment record in different sectors of the economy. Another study indicates that, during the era of reform, employment has grown in trade, construction, transport and public administration; stagnated in manufacturing; and declined in agriculture, mining and quarrying (Mjema & Shitundu: 1996: 13).

Neither of the above, nor any other, studies explore the possibility of a gender differentiated impact of SAPs on employment. This can only be properly gauged through a rigorous, firm-level study of the situation based on a carefully selected sample of firms. This is a task which has yet to be undertaken. An aspect of SAPs whose impact on public sector employment is possible with some measure of accuracy is the on-going restructuring process in the public sector which originated as the World Bank's Public and Parastatal Sector Reform Project. The Project has now been transformed into two programmes, namely the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) and the Parastatal Sector Reform Programme (PSRP). The implications of the two programmes for employment in the public sector constitute the focus of the rest of this paper.

The Civil Service Reform Programme:

The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) which was introduced in 1991 but began to be implemented in 1993, aims to achieve "a smaller, affordable, well-compensated, efficient and effectively performing civil service." (URT:1997a: 1). It addresses the problem of a Civil Service

which has grown too big and therefore too costly in relation to its functions, is inefficient and ineffective, and is demotivated because it is poorly remunerated. The CSRP has a two-fold objective. First, it is part of a larger effort to reduce the fiscal deficit through control of government expenditure. Second, it is an exercise in redefining the functions of government in keeping with a new order in which the role of the private sector in economic production and social services delivery is supposed to be enhanced at the same time as that of government in those realms is curtailed.

The CSRP was initially conceived in terms of retrenchment to reduce the size of the civil service, a matter of great concern to the donors, the World Bank and IMF in particular. In 1992, the World Bank tried to push for a retrenchment of 80,000 civil servants. However, Government decided, instead, to be guided by a functional analysis of the civil service in determining the levels of retrenchment. Such an analysis, carried out in 1992/93, categorised government functions as: core, critical and non-critical. Government decided to retain core functions, examine the possibility of eventually contracting out critical functions, and hive off the non-critical ones. The functional analysis was followed by an analysis of staffing levels on the basis of which 50,000 redundant civil servants, who constituted about 15 percent of the total, were earmarked for retrenchment beginning financial year 1992/93 (interview Ntukamazina, Chair, CSRP).

The retrenchment effected during FYs 1992/93 and 1993/94 concentrated mainly on the unskilled in the OS to MS2 salary scales, using the "last in first out" (LIFO) formula. Outside this category, other retrenchees included those whose performance was rated as poor and those who had stayed in the civil service beyond retirement age. Against the wishes of the World Bank, skilled civil servants, including fresh graduates, were 'ring-fenced', but in the 1995/96 exercise, civil servants across the board were invited to volunteer for retrenchment, to jump or be pushed, with a golden hand-shake as an enticement (ibid). Civil service employment has been further tightened by imposition of a hiring freeze currently in force.

The CSRP has increasingly assumed a more scientific outlook. Retrenchment is part of a more broadly defined restructuring programme whose components include:

- organisation and efficiency review (O&E),
- rationalisation of government employment,
- redeployment,
- pay reform,

- personnel control and management,
- capacity-building, and
- local government reform.

O&E started in 1994. Its objective is to redefine the roles and functions of Government Ministries in order to hive-off functions considered to be non-core, to reduce the scope of Government operations to an affordable scale, and to restructure its organisation and operations to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services. Among the first results of O&E was the decision to transform ten of the Government departments into Executive Agencies which would operate without being encumbered by central bureaucracy, discharge their functions with efficiency and, as far as possible, be self-financing. It is within the O&E component that staffing levels in the different ministries are determined and job descriptions specified. Retrenchment, which is now euphemistically now euphemistically referred to as 'rationalisation of government employment', is effected as a result of O&E and cuts across the board, irrespective of skill levels.

Pay reform is supposed to be a direct outcomes of the down-sizing of the civil service through retrenchment. In the medium to long term, pay reform seeks to improve total compensation at all levels so that it meets at least the minimum household living requirements and is commensurate with qualifications, skills, experience and responsibilities of individual civil servants. Among the important steps taken in the 1996/97 FY were doubling of the minimum wage and measures to evolve a transparent compensation system by consolidating most benefits.

Personnel control and management is intended to enhance the capability of Government to monitor, control and maintain the Civil Service employment and wage bill at target levels. It is supposed to consolidate the gains made from O&E, budget reviews and retrenchment.

Capacity building is broadly conceived to encompass human resources, administrative technologies, work processes and systems, and working conditions generally. Among the focal points are leadership development, development of operational, technical and management skills, and mainstreaming of gender into the Civil Service Reform initiatives. The latter is intended to spearhead a gender sensitization thrust in the Civil Service and gender awareness creation in the country at large.

Local government reform is an initiative to rationalize central and local government linkages and restructure regional administration so that local authorities are strengthened in order to become major public providers of basic services, while the central government at the regional level plays a facilitative role.

Redeployment is directly linked to retrenchment. It is a 'resettlement' programme meant to help retrenchees to cope with the psychological, social and economic effects of retrenchment. In the main, it seeks to help retrenched civil servants to find alternative means of livelihood either in self-employment or as paid employees. It is important to point out that this facility is available only to those retrenched from the Civil Service. The services provided include counselling, technical and business skills training, and information via pamphlets and the print and electronic media. There is also an Enterprise Development Programme (ED) which is conducted through seminars. Retrenchees avail themselves of counselling and training services provided in different centres around the country by using their rations of vouchers. The voucher system is funded by donors (CSRP Redeployment Unit: n.d. *Information Package Vol. V*).

What bearing does the CSRP have on employment in government service and how does it relate to gender issues? In answering this question, I shall address mainly retrenchment, redeployment, capacity-building and pay reform.

Civil Service Reform, Employment and Gender

The commonly-held view is that women in the Civil Service came out of the retrenchment exercise relatively worse off than men. Because of their disadvantaged position in respect of education and training, women were concentrated in the lower cadres of the Civil Service where retrenchment took a much heavier toll than elsewhere in the Civil Service hierarchy (TGNP: 1993: , Wangwe: 1996:). This is an issue which we have set out to investigate. Except for the 1993 retrenchment exercise, the data on retrenchment up to January 1997 is gender differentiated and broken down according to salary scales - which correspond to seniority. Unfortunately, there is no reliable gender or seniority differentiated data on the Civil Service prior to retrenchment. This deficiency is a limitation on the data because we cannot determine precisely what proportion of the female civil servants on post were retrenched relative to that of the males. Barring that limitation, important observations can still be made with the data in hand.

Table 11 (sections A and C) indeed shows that the largest proportion (54 percent) of the retrenchees was drawn from the most junior categories in the Operational Service (OS) and General Service 1 and 2 (GS 1-2) salary scales¹. How did this reflect itself in gender terms?

¹In the classification referred to in this text, there are operational service (OS), general service (GS), rare professions (RP) and super scale (SS) salary scale categories graded in that ascending order. Each is subdivided into different, numerically designated, scales on the basis of seniority. Salary scale categories change from time to time.

Since there is no gender differentiated figure of civil servants before retrenchment, this question is difficult to answer. It is not possible with the data in hand, for example, to establish the percentage of women who have been retrenched in the total number of women civil servants before retrenchment. However, if we extrapolate from the gender proportions in the civil service in 1990/91 as indicated in table 12, then we can conclude that from 1994 to January 1997, female civil servants suffered a slightly heavier toll from retrenchment than their male counterparts relative to their proportion in the civil service. Assuming that the situation did not change much between 1991 and 1994, the ratio of female to male civil servants prior to retrenchment was 29.6 percent to 70.4 percent. In the retrenchment exercise, the average ratio of retrenched females to retrenched males in the Civil Service from 1994 to January 1997 was 31 percent to 69 percent. If we analyze the figures on a yearly basis, women were relatively better off than men in 1995 and 1996 when their share of retrenchment was below the average at 27.3 percent and 28.5 percent respectively. They were relatively worse off in 1994 and 1997 when their share was higher than the average at 30.6 and a very high 38.2 percent respectively. On balance, these figures indicate that female civil servants have been slightly worse affected by retrenchment than their male counterparts. However, it would not be quite accurate to state that the retrenchment exercise has been heavily biased against female civil servants. The evidence is equivocal in some respects and therefore suggests only a cautious pessimism.

What redeployment arrangements exist for retrenched civil servants? This is the question I would now like to address. When redeployment was first launched in 1993 as the Labour Market Development Project, it was envisaged as a programme for retrenched workers from all sectors. Government opted for a less ambitious programme which catered exclusively for retrenched civil servants because a larger programme would be beyond the organisational and financial capacities available to it. Even the less ambitious current programme is not without problems.

Information obtained through the monitoring and evaluation system of CSRP's Redeployment Unit is that retrenchees are generally taking advantage of the services rendered under the redeployment programme. There is an estimated 80 to 90 percent utilization of the skills training services and a 50 to 60 percent use of the counselling services. But problematic areas exist. There is a critical shortage of counsellors and an imbalance in the allocation of available counsellors. Rukwa region, for example, does not have a single counsellor.

Table 11: Retrenchment of Civil Servants by salary scale and gender, March 1993 to January 1997

A. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION (BY SALARY SCALE AND GENDER)

SALARY SCALE	YEAR									
	1993		1994		1995		1996		JAN. 1997	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Operational Service	-	-	8555	3404	1271	214	4673	1613	3775	2169
General Service 1 - 2	-	-	5149	2889	1163	415	2512	1397	2164	1477
General Service >=3	-	-	1637	468	578	191	1107	303	419	278
Super Scale	-	-	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
GRAND TOTAL	4686		22105		3832		11607		10282	

B SALARY SCALE DISTRIBUTION

SALARY SCALE	YEAR									
	1993		1994		1995		1996		JAN. 1997	
	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%
Operational Service	-	-	11959	54%	1485	39%	6286	54%	5944	58%
General Service 1 - 2	-	-	8038	36%	1578	41%	3909	34%	3641	35%
General Service >=3	-	-	2105	10%	769	20%	1410	12%	697	7%
Super Scale	-	-	3	0%	0	0%	2	0%	0	0%
GRAND TOTAL	4686	100%	22105	100%	3832	100%	11607	100%	10282	100%

C. GENDER DISTRIBUTION

GENDER	YEAR									
	1993		1994		1995		1996		1997	
	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%
MALE	-	-	15343	69%	3012	79%	8293	71%	6358	62%
FEMALE	-	-	6762	31%	820	21%	3314	29%	3924	38%
GRAND TOTAL	4686	100%	22105	100%	3832	100%	11607	100%	10282	100%

D. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY SALARY SCALE AND GENDER

SALARY SCALE	YEAR									
	1993		1994		1995		1996		JAN 1997	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
Operational Service	-	-	71.5	28.5	85.6	14.4	74.3	25.7	63.5	36.5
General Service 1 - 2	-	-	64.1	35.9	73.7	26.3	64.3	35.7	59.4	40.6
General Service >=3	-	-	77.8	22.2	75.2	24.8	78.5	21.5	60.1	39.9
Super Scale	-	-	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Civil Service Reform Programme.

Table 12 Civil Service retrenchees by gender, 1994 - January 1997.

Year	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1994	15,343	69.4	6,762	30.6	22,105	100.0
1995	3,012	72.7	820	27.3	3,832	100.0
1996	8,293	71.5	3,313	28.5	11,606	100.0
1997	6,358	61.8	3,924	38.2	10,282	100.0
TOTAL	33,006	69.0	14,819	31.0	47,825	100.0

Source: CSRP

Although counsellors are supposed to provide clients with labour market information, the programme does not have any infrastructure that would enable such information to be assembled. In the present economic climate, retrenchees have more opportunities for self-employment than paid employment. However, lack of capital is a serious constraint in this area. For their capital, retrenchees are expected to draw on their lump-sum payments in terminal benefits. These are awfully inadequate as most retrenchees have to deal with the immediate problems of housing, children's education and other demands on their purse. Plans by the CSRP to set up a retrenchment credit scheme has stalled because of lack of funds (interview: Mponguliani, CSRP Redeployment Unit).

To the Redeployment Unit's reckoning at the CSRP, there is no gender differentiated access to the services provided under the redeployment programme. This is an issue that could benefit from further enquiry as no relevant data have been assembled. The well-known special problems that women face in the labour market and in setting up and operating private business are not addressed by the programme. For example, no attention seems to have been paid to women's relative disadvantage in accessing employment, credit facilities, extension and other services. It would not be surprising if a deeper investigation of the issue revealed that, because of this gender neutral approach to redeployment, the benefits accruing to women under the programme are less than those accruing to men.

Civil Service pay reform in the context of structural adjustment has been a complex question for the Government. The problem has been, and still remains, how to reconcile efforts to evolve pay scales that are necessary for a well-motivated, efficient and adequately compensated civil service on the one hand and the need to reduce the fiscal deficit on the other. Since SAPS'

inception in 1986, Government's adjustment of civil service wages has not been able, on the whole, to counter the effects of SAP-related inflation, let alone yield a minimum living wage.

Table 13 shows the relationship between government yearly adjustment of nominal salaries and the annual rate of inflation between 1986 and 1996. Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct a real wages index for this period in the absence of data on tax rates and the value of the myriad of allowances paid mainly to senior civil servants since the late 1980s. Such data have been impossible to assemble in the time available for this study. Table 13 cannot therefore provide a full picture of the impact of SAPs on real earnings in the Civil Service. However, valuable observations can still be made on the figures on offer.

The average annual rise in nominal civil service pay before 1992 kept behind the rate of inflation. Because of differential rates of salary increases which favoured minimum wage recipients, those in the higher wage brackets fared worse. Only the nominal minimum wage kept pace with the rate of inflation, except in 1988. The picture becomes even more bleak when one considers the fact that the average real wage fell by 80 percent between 1969 to 1986 (Mtatifikolo: 1994b).

In the final analysis, it is the civil servants in executive category who fared best from pay adjustments because, from the late 1980s, Government sought to compensate them with a wide range of non-taxable allowances covering fuel, vehicle maintenance, rent assistance, house maintenance, electricity, telephone, domestic servants and a few others. Upper middle-level civil servants with cars were also able to draw vehicle maintenance and fuel allowances. Employees in service parastatals were compensated, more or less, on similar lines. Commercial parastatals have been left to their own devices, to individually adjust pay in accordance with financial situations. Wage trends under SAPs in commercial parastatals can therefore only be gleaned from firm-level studies.

It is not easy to gauge the gender impact of the foregoing salary adjustments in the public service because official policy is equal pay for equal work for all employees in different grades. However, given the fact that women public servants are grossly under-represented in the senior categories, the system of inequitable untaxed allowances is likely to have intensified the gender imbalance in public service remunerations.

From 1996, pay reform has been taken up in earnest in pursuit of CSR objectives. The objectives include: (1) a more transparent and more equitable pay system which is commensurate with skill, performance and responsibility, (2) salary enhancement in such a way that the government minimum wage converges towards a target minimum living wage and (3) a properly determined, planned and controlled wage bill.

In the 1996 pay adjustments, the government minimum monthly wage was raised from sh.17,500 to sh. 30,000. Most of the allowances were consolidated into taxable basic pay. And the grading structure was streamlined by reducing the numbers of pay scales and job grades. The results were less than satisfactory. The changes benefited employees in the lower and middle grades. The upper ranks of the Civil Service, who had benefited from the allowances, incurred substantial losses, some as high as sh. 130,000 per month. Approximately 93 percent of civil servants currently (in 1997) earn less than the target minimum living wage of sh. 60,000 per month, constructed on the basis of household expenditure surveys. At sh. 47,000 per month, the current average monthly wage stands at 78.3 percent of the target minimum living wage (URT:1997b:)

Salary enhancement under pay reform is partly premised on savings expected to accrue from retrenchment. However, such savings are so far insufficient to enable the government to comply with the wage bill benchmark imposed by the IMF as a condition for the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Whereas the target ESAF benchmark is a wage-bill-to-GDP ratio of 5.1 percent by FY 1997/98, the ratio in question is estimated at 5.5 percent in 1997 (URT: 1997b). As table 14 indicates, the wage bill has been progressively rising since 1992/93 in relation to GDP, recurrent expenditure and total revenue. Government's major predicament in pay reform is therefore how to square the circle. In the final analysis, the real constraint is the low rate of economic growth which undermines the Government's revenue base.

Capacity-building is one aspect of the CSRП which has the potential to redress the gender imbalance in the civil service and to improve the status of female civil servants. In the mainstreaming of gender into the reform initiative the CSRП works hand in glove with the Gender Unit of the Civil Service Department (CSD). Periodic CSRП reports indicate that some steps have already been taken to work towards enhancement of capacities of women civil servants to enable them to participate in the civil service more effectively and to empower them for managerial positions. Gender is already built into recruitment, promotion, training and other aspects of human resources development. To aid this process, gender sensitisation initiatives are under way to encompass all levels of the Civil Service, from policy and decision makers to subordinate staff (URT: 1997a). However, CSRП reports do not spell out in concrete terms the measures that have been taken. Only time can tell whether these initiatives will bear fruit and redress the gender imbalance in the Civil Service. A more thorough investigation will have to be made in the future to determine the extent to which declaration of intent will have been translated into reality on the ground.

Table 13: Percentage annual increase of Civil Service pay in relation to rate of inflation, 1986-1996.

Year	Annual Inflation Rate	Change in average nominal wage	Change in nominal minimum wage	Change in nominal maximum wage
1986	32.4	19.0*	30.0*	2.5*
1987	30.0	17.0	30.0	10.0
1988	31.2	15.0	20.0	10.0
1989	30.4	nil	nil	nil
1990	35.9	20.0	n.a.**	n.a.**
1991	28.8	27.5	40.0	15.0
1992	21.9	28.4	42.8	15.0
1993	25.2	-- ***	-- ***	--***
1994	34.1	n.a.	100.0	48.3
1995	27.7	41.0	75.0	7.0
1996	21.0	46.1	55.2	36.9

* a temporary pay addition withdrawn in 1987.

** the nature of graduation was not spelt out in the circular

*** no pay rise except for a cost of living allowance which was withdrawn in 1994.

Source: (1) Bank of Tanzania *Economic and Operations Report*, June 1995,
 (2) URT (Planning Commission) (June 1997), *Economic Survey 1996*.
 (3) CSD annual circulars on government salary changes, 1986-1996.

Table 14: Government Wage Bill, 1989/89 - 1995/96

Financial Year	Total Govt. Wage Bill in million T/shillings	Annual rate of increase %	Wage Bill as percentage of recurrent expenditure	Wage as Bill percentage of Total revenue	Wage Bill as percentage of GDP at current prices
1989/90	26,834	n.a.	28.6	28.3	4.5
1990/91	30,439	13.4	22.5	22.8	4.1
1991/92	37,535	23.3	23.1	21.6	4.1
1992/93	57,946	35.5	24.1	35.3	5.0
1993/94	77,884	34.4	23.0	32.1	5.1
1994/95	111,494	43.2	27.3	33.7	5.8
1995/96	156,087	40.0	37.4	34.8	n.a.

Source: Calculated from Bank of Tanzania: *Economic Bulletin*, June 1996.

The Parastatal Sector Reform Programme

The restructuring of parastatals is high on the reform agenda. Among the problems with which the parastatals sector is beset are under-utilisation of industrial capacity, low market for goods produced, lack of working capital, heavy indebtedness to the National Bank of Commerce, and liquidity problems which have caused failure on the part of some parastatals to meet their obligations in respect of payment of salaries, servicing of loans and remittance of pension fund contributions. A number of them have had to lay off their workers, especially when credit facilities and state subsidies were no longer forthcoming. As can be seen in table 15, a number of parastatals in the manufacturing, mining, public utilities, construction and transport sectors operated at a loss at one time or another between 1982 and 1991. In 1988, for example, the losses incurred, mainly in manufacturing, mining and public utilities, ate away 48 percent of the profits made in the parastatal sector as a whole.

As we have already seen, some of the troubles in the parastatal sector were underlain by constraints engendered by SAPs. Others, however, are endemic to the parastatal sector as a system due to problems relating, among other things, to structure, management, operational efficiency, financial discipline, decision-making, accountability and employment policies. Both Government and, especially IFIs, regard parastatal reform as an extremely important exercise which has the potential to turn the economy around mainly for two reasons. First, the haemorrhage in public finance in the form of subsidies to the parastatals will be halted. Second, divestiture of the parastatals will improve efficiency in the productive sector by creating greater space for the private sector to which economic pundits give a much higher rating than the parastatal sector in enterprise and economic management.

To facilitate restructuring in the parastatal sector, Government launched the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1992. The PSRC was expected to restructure parastatals in order to improve their performance. Government was expected to retain control of only a residual of parastatals. The rest were expected to be either divested through outright sales or be leased, liquidated or closed.

In 1993 the PSRC issued a five-year Master Plan according to which 20 out of 344 parastatals were to be either retained in the state enterprise sector or transferred to an appropriate Ministry, and the remainder were to be divested. The divestiture strategies include outright sale, joint venture with a private company, placement of shares on stock exchange when the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange becomes operational, auction, performance and management contracts, management buy-outs, management and employee buy-outs and employee share-ownership plans. Liquidation and closure might also precede the ceding of an organisation's assets to a private investor (URT: 1996a).

As shown in table 16, at least 120 parastatals had been divested by different methods by mid-June 1996. The most common method of divestiture was sale of shares or assets which involved some 50 firms. A substantial 12 firms were closed down. Of the 30 divested manufacturing firms, 11 or 37 percent of the total were put under receivership. It means that probably all the workers here were laid off and most are unlikely to be rehired because few investors are willing to take over the firms. For a sector which employs relatively many women, especially in production and administration-related services, such developments are likely to have tipped further the gender balance in employment against women.

Table 15: Parastatal profits and (losses) by sector, 1982-1991 (Million shillings).

Sector	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Agriculture	156.2	64.7	72.2	72.0	128.6	447.1	412.8	712.3	361.2	1900.2
Mining	7.0	(-49.8)	(-28.4)	(-64.6)	42.7	(-89.0)	(-266.4)	(-677.9)	(-1786.0)	1063.4
Manufacturing	810.7	256.8	770.7	1572.9	2532.7	(-2562.7)	(-14872.0)	(-7728.1)	13143.9	6336.0
Public Utilities	170.6	140.9	89.5	164.5	567.8	2289.7	(-3018.7)	(-671.9)	956.1	(-492.4)
Construction	37.9	23.5	40.0	2.7	(-22.0)	(-67.6)	(-48.5)	108.7	301.1	321.3
Commerce	1054.7	2257.2	2155.9	2407.2	663.9	4959.9	19023.7	13565.4	11338.1	8164.5
Transport	204.4	346.7	232.8	974.7	(-514.2)	89.1	2713.1	4544.1	3195.8	5647.5
Finance, Real Estate and Services	922.8	1000.4	1684.4	1818.4	952.8	12225.2	15341.1	17296.5	22731.1	27482.9
Total Profits	3364.3	4040.4	5017.1	6947.8	4351.9	10300.7	19265.1	27149.1	52240.9	50524.1

Source: Bureau of Statistics: *Analysis of Accounts of parastatal Enterprises, 1982-1991* (Dar es Salaam, 1993)

Table 16: Divestiture of Commercial Parastatals by June 1996, by Sector/sub-Sector & Divestiture Type

Sector/sub-Sector	METHOD OF DIVESTITURE							TOTAL
	Share or Asset Sales	Receivership	Lease	Managmt & Employee Buy-Out	Perform. & Managmt Contracts	Liquidation	Closusre	
Manufacturing	19	11	-	-	-	-	5	35
Trading	-	4	-	2	-	6	-	12
Agricultural Processing	4	9	7	-	-	-	5	25
Farms & Agric. Estates	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Agric. Marketing	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Communic.& Transport	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	3
Hotels & Tourism	5	-	4	-	-	1	1	11
Natural Resources	2	1	3	-	-	3	-	9
Mining	4	2	-	-	-	-	1	7
Building & Construction	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	7
TOTAL	50	29	18	2	1	10	12	122

Source: PSRC (1996): *1995/96 Review and Action Plan for 1996/97, (Annex 1)*.

Parastatal Sector Reform and Employment

The implications of parastatal restructuring on employment, much less on the gender dimension of this question, are not easy to gauge. This is because the PSRC, unlike its counterpart in the Civil Service, does not yet have a data base. An obvious option as a source of information would be the individual firms but, even in this case, personnel records, for the most part, have no gender classification. Firms which have been closed down or liquidated are even more difficult to study.

Over-employment has been one of the donors' major complaints about the parastatal sector. It is a problem which has been attributed to (i) the absence of alternative dynamic labour markets, (ii) a lack of financial discipline, (iii) poor human resources planning, and (iv) cumbersome legal and regulatory procedures involved in laying off workers (KK Consulting Associates: 1992: 2). An informed source estimated employment in the parastatal sector at around 250,000 in 1992. Of these, between 20 and 40 percent, i.e. 50,000 to 100,000, were believed to be redundant (Ibid., p. 2). A recent human resources analysis of the nationalized sugar estates reveals that 11,000 workers, constituting 26 percent of the labour force, are redundant (interview: Nyamwihula, PSRC). In anticipation of an enhanced capacity utilization due to restructuring, the PSRC originally planned on 30,000 lay-offs in its divestiture programme.

Information available at PSRC indicates that both investors and workers in divested parastatals tend to favour retrenchment. Most investors, worried about overstaffing and the proverbial lack of work discipline in parastatals, insist on laying off all the workers and reserving the right to rehire some of them at their discretion. The workers for their part have genuine worries about their future in new, privatised organisations where industrial discipline is more rigorous and where the sanction of the sack is a readily used weapon. They prefer to draw their statutory terminal benefits and to trust on their luck for being rehired in the divested organisations (interviews: Temba & Nyamwihula, PSRC).

It is not yet clear how many workers in the parastatal sector have lost their jobs so far. There is only a sprinkling of evidence from a handful of parastatals. These are Kunduchi Beach Hotel, National Bank of Commerce (NBC), Tanzania Breweries (TBL), Tanzania-China Friendship Textile Company (FTC) and the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). For all their limitations, data from these organisations provide some indication of the impact of restructuring on employment in the parastatal sector.

All the 134 workers at Kunduchi Beach Hotel in Dar es Salaam were laid off in June 1997 (interview Temba, PSRC). Restructuring in the NBC, launched in mid-1995, involved closure of 34 branches, consolidation of 20 regional offices into six zonal offices and retrenchment of some 3,000 employees, constituting 34 percent of the bank's total workforce (Wangwe et al:

1997: 57). At TBL, a subsidiary of South African Breweries, INDOL, acquired a 50 percent share-holding in 1993. One of the major reforms subsequent to this event has been a retrenchment programme, which has reduced the company's workforce by 40 percent, from 3,000 in 1993 to 1,800 in 1997. A further 700 employees have already been earmarked for retrenchment in 1997, which will have reduced the original labour force by 50 percent (TBL personnel records). In 1996, the Friendship Textile Mill went into a joint venture with a Chinese company and was renamed the Friendship Textile Company (FTC). Two rounds of retrenchment have been effected by the new management so far. Some 806 workers in 1996 and another 205 in 1997 have already been axed. These figures constitute 36 percent of the total labour force in 1996 before retrenchment (FTC personnel records). The 1996 retrenchment exercise at the University of Dar es Salaam, whose employees draw their wages from the Government, was in effect an extension of retrenchment in the Civil Service. The number of retrenchees was 633 or 32.8 percent of the 1,930 non-academic staff (UDSM personnel department & PMU). All in all, from a third to all of the employees in restructured/divested individual parastatals have lost their jobs.

Only the Friendship Textile Company and the University of Dar es Salaam have provided gender differentiated data on retrenchment. Although NBC retrenchment data is not differentiated, it is reasonable to assume that most of the retrenchees at NBC branches were women, given the well-known feminization of banking at the clerical level where retrenchment took the heaviest toll.

The FTC data are displayed in tables 17 and 18. The proportion of female employees in the labour force generally increased between 1983 and 1997, rising from 13.7 to 23.3 percent. The figures on retrenchment can be interpreted at many levels. It would appear that the women's 29 percent share of retrenchees in 1994 is higher than their proportion in the total pre-retrenchment labour force, if the gender differentiated figures in other years are anything to go by. In the years where the figures are complete, the situation seems more favourable to female employees. In 1996 the women's retrenchment share is 18.6 percent against a total labour force share of 20.1 percent. In 1997 it is 20.0 percent against a pre-retrenchment total labour force share of 23.2 percent. Turning to table 18, some 26.5 percent of the female workers compared to 29.2 percent of the male workers at the textile mill were retrenched. Analysis of the figures in table 16 by department is instructive. Women suffered a heavy toll in the production and administration and services departments where most of them are concentrated. Their share of retrenchment in administration and services was a phenomenal 60 percent in 1994. One's construction of the gender impact of retrenchment at the textile mill, therefore, depends on one's frame of reference. On the basis of the statistical evidence available, it would seem that, on the whole, a general conclusion that women in the parastatals have, on balance, come out of retrenchment worse off than men would not be quite accurate. It would only be true in respect of some years and in some departments of the organisation.

A similar conclusion can be made with respect to the data from the University of Dar es Salaam. According to calculations based on figures in table 19, only 27.8 percent of the female compared to 35.3 percent of the male non-academic employees were laid off in 1996. As shown in table 19, the proportion of females among the non-academic staff rose after retrenchment, from 32.8 percent to 35.3 percent. Perhaps a larger sample of parastatals is needed before any conclusive statement can be made on the issue of the gender impact of retrenchment. What is currently on offer, however, does not quite confirm conventional wisdom on the question.

Table 17: Employment and Retrenchment at the Friendship Textile Mill by department and gender, 1983 - 1997.

YEAR	EMPLOYMENT			RETRENCHMENT											
	No.	Percentage		BY GENDER			BY DEPARTMENT AND GENDER								
		Male	Female	No.	Male	Female	Production		Technical		Engineering		Admin. & Services		
						Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1983	5,111	86.3%	13.7%	- *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1984	4,357	-	-	424	78.7%	21.3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1985	4,176	84.3%	15.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1986	4,203	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1987	4,254	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1988	4,020	82.3%	17.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1989	3,858	80.1%	19.9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	3,861	78.0%	22.0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	3,612	77.7%	22.3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	3,241	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	3,083	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	2,889	-	-	162	71.0	29.0	71.7%	28.3%	0%	0%	88.8%	11.2%	40.0%	60.0%	
1995	2,833	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	2,808	79.9%	20.1%	806	81.4%	18.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	1,954	76.8%	23.2%	205	80.0%	20.0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*Note: the dash (-) denotes 'not available'

Source: Friendship Textile Company personnel files.

Table 18: Retrenchment by gender at Friendship Textile Company, 1996 - 1997.

Year	1996		1997			
	Employed	Retrenched	Employed	Retrenched		
Employment Status		No.	%	No	%	
Males	2243	656	29.2	1500	164	10.9
Females	565	150	26.5	454	41	9.0

Source: Friendship Textile Company personnel files.

Table 19: Retrenchment at the University of Dar es Salaam by gender, 1996.

Status	Total	Males		Females	
		No.	%	No	%
Pre-retrenchment employees	1,930	1,296	67.2	634	32.8
Retrenched employees, 1996	633	457	72.2	176	27.8
Post-retrenchment employees	1,297	839	64.7	458	35.3

Source: University of Dar es Salaam Personnel Department & Programme Management Unit

There are, however, considerations regarding the gender impact of restructuring in the parastatal sector which are subtle and sometimes imperceptible and therefore difficult to measure, but which are likely to disadvantage female relative to male employees. The most important aspects relate to training and welfare.

It has been observed that, because of the cost involved, new owners of privatised parastatals are generally unwilling to continue investing resources in the robust training and staff development programmes that the parastatals had been conducting. Only short-term in-house training which is job-related may be conducted (Wangwe et al: 1997: 52). This is borne out by the evidence from Tanzania Breweries and Friendship Textile Company.

TBL seems to have changed its training policy upon restructuring. The company views previous training policy as unfocused, costly and frequently unrelated to job needs. The company intends to be more selective in training with a focus on short-term production-related training conducted mostly in-house (TBL personnel dept.).

The training programme at the FTC was the first to be axed by the new management. Prior to the new joint venture arrangement, Friendship Textile Mill had a vibrant training and workers' education programme which consisted of adult literacy classes, study groups, workers' secondary education in evening classes, business education, vocational training, and supervisory and management development sub-programmes. Available figures indicate that an average of 1,000 employees a year took advantage of these training opportunities between 1988 and 1992 (FTC personnel & training records). The whole training and staff development programme was frozen after privatization, and very little of it is likely to be resumed. Current management policy is to recruit only workers who already possess the requisite skills (interview: FTC training and personnel officers).

Statistical evidence already presented in this paper has shown that the literacy, education and training levels of women in the formal sector are much lower than those of men. Training opportunities provided by employers help to raise the levels of women's knowledge and skills in employment and, probably in the long run, enhance prospects of redressing part of the gender imbalance in employment. The withdrawal or diminution of training opportunities in newly privatised enterprises therefore constitutes a setback to the advancement of women in employment.

The new FTC management has also withdrawn from provision of welfare services, which had been a unique feature of the textile parastatal. These include a staff social club, a health centre, canteen services, staff transport and a nursery school-cum-day care centre. The new company wants these services privatised and therefore commercialised. Withdrawal of two of the services,

health care and day care/nursery school, will hurt women more than they will hurt men employees. An extra financial burden is likely to be imposed on women employees especially for services related to reproductive health. Withdrawal of day care facilities is a direct threat to employment prospects at the company for young mothers.

There are other effects of parastatal restructuring which impinge on employment matters for both men and women, and where it is difficult to determine impact on gender lines. One issue worth examining is the extent to which privatisation opens up new employment opportunities in the private sector. The standard reasoning is that the anticipated injection of private sector capital will rehabilitate industrial machinery and therefore enhance capacity utilisation, facilitate expansion of operations and improve liquidity. Moreover, the newly created favourable climate for the private sector will attract investments into new areas. All this can only lead to an expansion of employment opportunities (KK Consulting Associates: 1992). It is probably too early to make a fair assessment of this position since the newfangled private sector is only taking shape. But it is possible to make a tentative assesment on the basis of what is presently on offer.

On balance, hopes of expansion of employment opportunities are still illusive. Efforts by the PSRC to interest 'reputable' investors in a number of industries have failed to bear fruit. Many a prospective investor tends to be deterred by a number of factors. Many complain about the poor infrastructure or the length of time and rigmarole involved in getting Government to approve divestiture agreements concluded with the PSRC. Also, a large number of parastatals have serious internal problems relating to financial status, state of plant and equipment, operations or even property ownership. All the textile factories, for example, are plagued by unserviceable debts, dilapidated capital equipment and a shrinking market (URT: 1996a: 30). New investors in some agricultural parastatals have run into serious land disputes with neighbouring communities which had enjoyed a liberal access to parastatal land for seasonal cultivation and which now claim customary rights to such land (interview: Nyamwihula, PSRC).

Table 20: Post-restructuring and performance at Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL), 1993 - 1997

Item	1993	1994	1995	1996 Budget	1997
Sales Volumes ('000 crates)	3,960	4,489	7,262	10,478	n.a.
Annual growth	n.a.	13%	62%	44%	n.a.
Sales Revenue: bn. Tsh.	24.5	29.1	59.3	102.0	n.a.
Sales & Excise Taxes Paid: bn. Tsh.	12.1	11.7	23.2	36.7	n.a.
Profit/ (loss) after tax: bn. Tsh.	(0.6)	(0.9)	7.8	15.4	n.a.
Employees	3,000	2,945	2,345	1,940	1,800*
Minimum wage Tsh./ month	9,000	25,000	55,000	75,000	75,000

Note: *the number of employees will drop further to 1,500 by mid-1998.

Source: (1) PSRC, *1995/1996 Review and Action Plan for 1996/1997*., p.3
 (2) Tanzania Breweries, Personnel Department.

What has happened at TBL and FTC is instructive. At TBL, INDOL and other financiers have injected over \$80 million, a substantial part of which has gone into refurbishing and expanding the Dar es Salaam brewery, and completing and bringing into operation the new plant at Mwanza. As table 20 indicates, there has been a turnaround at TBL since divestiture. Production and sales have quadrupled; contribution to government revenue is up three times; the minimum monthly wage increased from sh. 9,000 in 1993, to 55,000 in 1995 and sh. 75,000 in 1997; and, from a record of sh. 0.6 billion loss in 1993, the company earned \$7.8 billion profits in 1995 - which was expected to double in the following year. The only negative development at TBL is the decline of employment from 3,000 employees in 1993 to 1,800 in 1996 and 1,500 in 1997 (TBL personnel department records). Employment figures at FTC have already been provided above. Even at this early stage of privatisation, substantial staff has already been laid off. Interviews at the factory indicate that the newly introduced technology is capital-intensive and has come with longer work shifts and greater intensification of work for the reduced labour force. In the weaving section, for example, one worker operates three looms instead of the previous one-and-a-half (FTC interviews). Studies based on a larger sample of divested manufacturing firms are likely to reveal similar characteristics.

These developments do not necessarily presage what will happen to the industrial sector in the long run. However, the available evidence strikes a pessimistic cord. The gender patterns of these developments is unclear. It is reasonable to assume that, given the long-term trend whereby the proportion of women in the formal sector has been increasing, the diminishing

employment opportunities as discussed above are probably hurting women more than they are hurting men and, at least in the short to medium terms, is arresting prospects of redressing the gender imbalance in formal employment.

Finally, a word on safety nets and redeployment. In the Civil Service, payment of redundancy benefits has been smooth because it is underwritten by donors. The Civil Service retrenchment package is a relatively generous one consisting of statutory benefits as well as ex-gratia payments worth up to 40 months' salary. In the parastatal sector, on the other hand, there is a great deal of variation because the benefits have depended on the financial status of the enterprise in question. At one end of the spectrum are the financial institutions, the NBC and Bank of Tanzania (BOT) in particular, which have granted benefits more generous than those in the Civil Service. At the other end are cash strapped firms, some of which are up for closure or liquidation, which cannot even meet their statutory obligations to retrenched employees. The BOT and NBC, for example, offered their retrenched employees ex-gratia payments ranging from 12 to 84 months' salary, a waiver of housing loans, long-term service awards, and, in the case of BOT, a string of allowances covering housing, utilities, and health care. In contrast, TEXCO, the textile holding company, did not offer a single supplementary benefit. New Africa Hotel only offered a maximum of 40 months' salary in ex-gratia payments. A disturbingly large number of parastatals have failed to pay pension benefits because of past failure to remit contributions to the Parastatal Pension Fund (PPF) (Mushi: 1994). Only an estimated 25 percent of new investors in privatised firms accept any obligation to incur or share the costs on retrenched workers' statutory benefits. They would rather expend their resources on rehabilitating the physical plant than get bogged down with problems of workers whose services they never benefited from (interview: Temba, PSRC).

In anticipation of pre-privatisation redundancies, some parastatal managers have sought to solve the problem by concluding legally binding "voluntary agreements" on retrenchment benefits. According to the PSRC, most such agreements are problematic because the levels of agreed benefits are almost invariably disproportionate to the value of the firms' assets. At the Sikh Saw Mills, for example, the value of negotiated benefits was sh. 900 million when the company could be sold for only sh. 300 million. The agreed benefits at Morogoro Canvas were four times the value of the company assets. Management in some illiquid parastatals have sold company physical assets to pay out redundancy benefits. Because of these developments, the many parastatal are on a collision course with the PSRC which is anxious to interest investors in their purchase (interview: Temba, Nyamwihula, PSRC).

One of the major current pre-occupations at the PSRC is to work out a common policy on safety nets in the parastatals in order to lay down ground rules and thus lend order to and ensure equity in the exercise (URT: 1994).

There is therefore a large proportion of parastatal sector retrenchees for whom resettlement is a difficult proposition. With puny or no terminal benefits to go by, they cannot begin to contemplate self-employment because they would have no capital. What is more, there is no redeployment plan for ex-parastatal employees and neither the Government nor the PSRC is contemplating one for the moment. More will have to be done, especially in the form of tracer studies, to determine the extent to which these problems have a gender differentiated impact on parastatal employees who have been declared redundant.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Statistical evidence clearly indicates a long-term trend of a progressively increasing proportion of women in formal employment in both the private and public sectors. This proportion has increased faster in the public sector where women's employment opportunities are more favourable. Despite this positive picture, all manifestations of women's relative disadvantage in employment are reflected in public sector employment. These include their numerical weakness, their preponderance in low-status, low-paid jobs attributable partly to relatively inferior levels of education and training and partly to outright discrimination, their fragmented career paths that arrest their professional development, and their conspicuous absence in positions of power and influence. A question that has been central to this paper is the extent to which SAPs have impinged on the gender differentiated patterns of employment in the public sector, and whether the gender imbalance and inequity inherent in formal employment has been aggravated by the adjustment and stabilization policies.

This line of investigation has been constrained by paucity of data and deficiencies in the available data. The main problem in this regard is that little of the data on employment in the public sector is differentiated according to gender. But such evidence as could be marshalled indicates definite patterns in some respects and is ambiguous in others. A general conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence is that:

- (1) Although the reform programme might generate more jobs in the future, its immediate effect has been diminution of employment opportunities for men and women alike. In this regard, retrenchment in Government and the parastatals, as well as general restructuring in privatised firms, are responsible for most of the job losses. Hopes of new

job opportunities in the budding private sector have been dashed because, so far, almost every new investor, in keeping with the current world-wide trend, wants to operate with a slim labour force. What is more, a considerable proportion of ailing parastatals have so far failed to attract private investors. The worst affected is manufacturing industry which would otherwise have been a major source of formal employment in the economy.

- (2) Aggregate data indicate that the generally held belief that women have lost more than men in the restructuring exercise cannot be pushed too hard because the data is subject to varying interpretations. However, firm-level analysis indicates that women in specific occupations and at particular moments of restructuring have suffered a heavier toll than men.
- (3) Given the fact that the public sector has demonstrably offered better employment opportunities for women than the private sector, its shrinkage under SAPs is bound to constitute a serious setback to any prospects of redressing the gender imbalance in employment in the medium and even long term. Such an adverse development can only be kept in check by deliberate social interventions that seek both to enhance women's competitiveness in the labour market and to do battle with gender discrimination in employment.
- (4) It has been more difficult to establish the impact of SAPs on wage levels and other conditions of employment than on employment levels. Although there are published figures on wage changes in the Civil Service, they do not include the myriad of other, less transparent, forms of remuneration, especially as enjoyed by senior civil servants. Given the great deal of inter-institutional variation, changes in wages and other working conditions in the parastatal sector can only be established in the context of firm-level studies. Such studies require more time and resources than were available for the present study.
- (5) Because, under the law, men and women of equal employment status are expected to enjoy the same rights in respect of wages and other conditions, it is difficult in a general survey, as this study really is, to establish the extent to which SAPs have had a gender differentiated impact on wage levels and other working conditions. This is a task that can only be accomplished through a painstaking study of gender patterns of employment and pay at different organisational levels. There are indications, however, that the evolution of a more transparent pay structure under the CSRP might serve to enhance gender equity in the Civil Service.

- (6) The diminution of training opportunities and withdrawal of other workplace facilities and amenities in privatised firms is likely to arrest the long-term trend in which career development prospects for women have been on the rise.

Recommendations

Action to remedy the disadvantaged position of women in formal employment has to take place at two levels. First, at the level of policy and legislative action and, second, at the level of institutional practice. The policy and legislative initiatives would serve to create an enabling environment for social transformation, for redressing the social disadvantage relating to women in society in general and in employment in particular. Institutional practice would help to concretise this process of reform. The following recommendations will therefore fall into these two domains.

At the level of policy and legislative action the following recommendations are suggested:

1. Gender should become a constitutional category. The discrimination clause in the Constitution should include sex and gender.
2. The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Youth, should take the initiative to revise all the labour laws to rid them of all the clauses that discriminate against women. A case in point is the Employment Ordinance which contains explicitly discriminatory clauses, such as Section 83.
3. The initiatives that have already been taken in education policy which have sought to improve educational opportunities for women should be strengthened. Equal opportunities for both men and women should be the guiding beacon for all educational reforms and, where necessary, affirmative action could be taken in the short term with a view to redressing gross imbalances. In the latter regard, a policy to encourage as many women students as possible to opt for science and technology-related fields of learning which will improve their share of high-level technical careers should be pursued.

In order to enable Government to keep track of the relative development of men and women in employment, it should be mandatory for all employers in both the public and private sectors to maintain gender differentiated personnel records.

All available means of information, education and communication should be employed to sensitise different sectors of society and the general public on gender issues.

6. The redeployment of retrenched public servants needs to be extended beyond the civil service. On the basis of lessons drawn from the redeployment programme for civil servants, a more inclusive, better formulated scheme for all laid off public sector workers, should be worked out. Apart from humanitarian reasons, such a scheme would make economic sense in that it would provide retrenchees with an opportunity to participate in, and contribute to, the national economy. Possibilities of joint funding need to be explored through a dialogue between government, employers, NGOs and donors. A redeployment programme designed on these lines needs to be gender sensitive to ensure that women and men would enjoy equal opportunities.

At the level of organisations I would recommend that:

1. In government, the mainstreaming of gender into the CSRP initiatives must be institutionalised as a permanent feature of Civil Service practice which will proceed beyond the life of the CSRP. Gender should feature in all employment-related issues, including recruitment, promotion, training, disciplining and retrenchment. In this regard, the Gender Unit of the CSD should be strengthened through human resources development, logistical support, empowerment and enhancing the Unit's capacity to investigate complaints against sex discrimination, and sensitize the different levels on gender.
2. Special provision should be made for women's management and leadership development in all sectors, public and private. Donors might be invited to help underwrite some aspects of such a programme.
3. Employers in all sectors should be encouraged to mainstream gender into their employment practices. In particular, employers should create equal opportunities for career development, through training programmes. Enhancing the knowledge and skills of women employees should be an integral feature of training in organisations.
4. The initiatives taken elsewhere to take care of the special needs of working women, as producers and reproducers, should be emulated. These include flexible working times, career breaks, job sharing, part-time working, and day care facilities in the workplace (Mpaka: 1996).

The above recommendations can only be effective under conditions of economic growth; otherwise attempts at social reform would simply serve to generate social conflict, including

polarisation of society along gender lines. It is therefore important that initiatives to enhance gender equality should go hand in hand with efforts to turn the economy around. It is for this reason that the current reform programme in the context of SAPs should be kept under constant and critical review to ensure that economic rather than ideological considerations prevail.

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